Letter-16: Excerpts from 'Best Practice' Discussion with USAID

PRT Best Practices Lessons Learned QUESTION GUIDE:

HOW OFTEN ARE YOU ABLE TO GET OUT TO THE FIELD?
ARE YOU A SELF-DRIVE AREA? HOW IS MOBILITY IN YOUR AREA?
NedMcD: Any day I got off dead center for Kunduz-proper. Less frequently for points beyond. CIMIC (Bundeswehr Civil Affairs) was supportive for idea generation, translators and transportation to Taloqan. GA National Guard / 10th MTN were very helpful, especially GA National Guard; most new major projects in Kunduz through support of Georgia National Guard Company and the Tenth Mountain Division.

HOW KINETIC IS YOUR AREA?
NedMcD: Not particularly. Two districts in Kunduz (Aliabad and Chahar Dara) are contested; parts are violent with outside insurgents coming in (about 200). The attacks on NGOs are disturbing and, with the killing of medical personnel in Nuristan, will likely lead to exits by remaining international donors. At great risk are EGGI (USAID) and UNDP (elections).
Would recommend not locating EGGI personnel in Kunduz. Risk assessment by 10th MTN Division too severe for the rest of Kunduz. Takhar has crime problems in the northwest part of the province, leaving two districts (Darqad and Yangi Qala) up for grabs and moderately ‘infecting’ two other districts.

CAN YOU CHARACTERIZE YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE PRT? (HOW IS THE CIV/MIL RELATIONSHIP?).
NedMcD: Excellent. I enjoyed working with these people, particularly D-CO of the 10th MTN. The two most popularly successful projects in Kunduz initiated by me came through the foot patrols of the GA National Guard (in Khanabad District) and the 10th MTN (in Kunduz proper). The German CIMIC group came through with twelve proposals in Kunduz city (four) and Takhar (eight).

WHAT INITIATIVES ARE YOU AND YOUR TEAM CURRENTLY UNDERTAKING? ARE THERE ANY MAJOR PROJECTS WORTH NOTING?
NedMcD: The most worthy projects undertaken by me are the women’s rights media campaign in Takhar, initiated by the UNAMA governance officer there and the previously mentioned projects in Khanabad and Kunduz city.

HOW OFTEN ARE YOU ABLE TO INTERACT WITH LOCAL LEADERS AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL?
NedMcD: Frequently in Kunduz; just starting in Takhar, though provincial officials. The Director of Health and Governor’s executive officer in Taloqan were prepared to enable me to visit districts or facilities.

WHAT IS YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH INTER-AGENCY PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS OFFICE AND THE KABUL EMB?
NedMcD: Excellent. Always received prompt, professional responses. Sometimes we differed but the explanations were thorough and helped me up the learning curve quickly.

HOW DOES THE GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IN YOUR AREA? (DESCRIBE LOCAL GOVERNANCE)
NedMcD: In Takhar, where funding is not as available, governance is progressing along smartly as the Governor and Provincial Council realize that they will need to solve the problems on their own. In Kunduz, where the expectation for funding is greater, officials have less incentive to solve problems and constantly try to manipulate or shame donors into giving money. Consequently, capacity-building is lagging in Kunduz, where the outside funding is!

CAN YOU MEASURE CORRUPTION IN YOUR AREA? IS IT AN ISSUE?
NedMcD: While reports of corruption in Kunduz were widespread, I found the leaders approachable. My FSO colleague may have a better view through materials he received from the Germans; he very  rarely left the military compound and so his field-feel was constricted.

WHAT ARE THE ROOT CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN YOUR REGION?
NedMcD: Absence of community policing and, perhaps, a lack of enforcement of new standards of governance (e.g., women’s rights). The COIN effort should be re-cast as combating a crime-wave. The ideology will take care of itself over the generation or two. Many of the so-called jihadists would probably be vandals in more peaceful times.

The current incentive structure of twelve dollars per day for insurgent mercenary allows anti-government elements to indulge in anti-social behavior under the guise of a bogus jihad. The failure by the USG, ISAF and GIRoA to be aggressive in protecting women and their newly ordained rights may be making the situation more difficult for women as gender-based abuse reaches into the all levels of society, including the legal and law-enforcement machinery.

HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN IN YOUR AREA OF OPERATIONS – AND HOW HAVE YOU SEEN THINGS CHANGE OVER TIME?
NedMcD: Seven months. Saw both positive and negative changes. While security has deteriorated, as punctuated by the attack on the facility of an implementing partner six weeks ago in Kunduz, local Pashtun push-back in a contested district to improve – and keep open – all but one girls’ school vindicates the German policy of engaging that population on the premise that “we don’t have to like or trust each other but simply work together.”

LESSONS LEARNED – WHAT DO YOU WISH YOU KNEW BEFORE YOU CAME TO AFG?
NedMcD: In the case of people working on non-U.S. PRTs or FOBs, clearer guidance on what to do when area U.S. forces need assistance that conflicts with the preferences of the ruling country at the PRT. Also, training on what the Special Forces do and how we can help.

BEST PRACTICES – ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT FOR OTHERS TO LEARN FROM?
IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD? ADVICE FOR OTHERS?
NedMcD: Remember that support can include what one does not want to hear; promptness and candor are more important. Do not try to pull an end-run on other departments or the chain-of-command in Kabul simply because the idea is apparently beyond the comprehension of others, particularly in Kabul. There are almost always good reasons for the restraints imposed. Money is less important than kindness, courtesy and respect. People need to know that we have faith in their determination – however imperfect – to build their country’s destiny.

Remember, too, that Moses marched the liberated Israelites through the desert for forty years for a very good reason: it takes two generations for the capacity-building seeds planted today to manifest. Lastly, look at Viet Nam thirty-five years after the U.S. defeat. The country today resembles what the U.S. tried to make of it forty years ago.

WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF YOUR JOB?
NedMcD: Troubleshoot programs administered out of Kabul; set up visits and facilitate contacts. Meet and be supportive to the efforts of local leadership. Seek and secure funding for, as well as implementation of, local development projects

WHAT WAS THE GUIDANCE YOU RECEIVED BEFORE YOU ASSUMED YOUR POST? WAS THIS SUFFICIENT? DID YOU RECEIVE TRAINING BEFORE YOU CAME TO POST? WAS IT USEFUL FOR THE WORK YOU ARE DOING?
NedMcD: The guidance was minimal and not sufficient. This fact was not the fault of USAID; we had to be in the field quickly. Sufficient training would have required at least six months, probably a year. The key, however, has proved to be the access to, and patience demonstrated by, the professionals in Kabul. So while lack of front-ended readiness was inevitable, USAID handled my learning curve very well.

WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY CHALLENGES FOR YOU IN ACHIEVING YOUR OBJECTIVES?
NedMcD: My own necessity to learn the tasks of the job. On the funding: I realized in the COTR / AOTR course that my colleagues to the south and east were facing a far more challenging problem of being pressured to fund projects without time or head-count needed for prudence. The concern is that people will be subject in the future to changing standards of accountability – from the looseness of pushing billions out the door to far more exacting standards – when the inspectors general arrive.

HOW DO YOU COORDINATE AND MAKE DECISIONS AS AN INTERAGENCY/CIV-MIL TEAM? DOES THIS WORK WELL? WHY OR WHY NOT? HAS THIS BEEN FORMALIZED (I.E. WRITTEN DOWN) OR IS IT INFORMAL?
NedMcD: There was a meeting with the Bundeswehr CIMIC to align priorities. Otherwise my close collaboration with GTZ (the German USAID) the U.N. (for the women’s media proposals) etc. came through my initiative. In this respect, the support and encouragement of the two senior FSOs in Mazar-i-Sharif were indispensible for that initiative. I also convvened the first meeting -- informally and off-the-record of U.N., uniformed military, local government and development personnel. Off-the-record because the U.N. officers were not supposed to coordinating with U.S. Army uniformed officers.

This meeting benefitted the province directly by creating the urgency to put contingency plans into place in the case of earth-quakes. While I convened the meeting, it was a U.S. National Guard Officer, with a career as an envirommental engineer States-side. His knowledge of the Alaska earthquake of 1965 and his ability to detect the same ground formation across Kunduz led him to approach me. Fortunately, I was able to convey the urgency to other stake-holders and, honestly, everybody wanted the meeting. My convening was limited to setting a compatible time and ordering food,

WHO ARE THE MAIN ACTORS OUTSIDE OF YOUR POST THAT YOU REGULARLY INTERACT WITH?
NedMcD: The U.S. Army (as discussed), UNAMA. The E.U., the German military & foreign ministries; local and provincial officials; and, NGOs (e.g., Mercy Corps).

WHAT IS YOUR PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE RELATED TO THIS WORK?
NedMcD. A senior budgeting & national security advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior; a senior economic advisor & knowledge manager at an Iraqi PRT; as well as, a strategic planner for military assistance for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.