Letter-77: nested autonomy for greater Kurdistan; next steps for Syria

Introduction: this is a response in a dialogue debating a proposed counter-insurgency program in the area of Village Stability Operations in the Small Wars Journal. This idea of nested autonomy (a region shared by four nations inside of which Kurdish people would move freely as dual citizens of 'Kurdistan' and the country in which their part of Kurdistan currently lies) has been floating inside my ahead for years. Developments in Syria may make the time of experimentation propitious.  

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/irregular-warfare-network-warfare-and-the-venture-capital-green-beret
On Syria, the time for some type of intervention may be approaching; but in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq to train local policing for future use in Syria.  Any extension into Syria would be for facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian supplies and the imminent entrance of peace-keeper from other Muslim nations outside of the region.  

============REMARKS=============

Guys,

Come on.  I was answering a straight-forward question on how I would assess this possible downside and unexpected consequences as well as envision ‘how’ such a program for entrepreneurial development would manifest in current hot spots.  Imputing arrogance and ignorance to me expands the scope of the discussion far beyond the answer of a straight-forward question on application only, not appropriateness; I think you two know better than to shift the discussion to a platform for emotionalism.  In a sense, in any discussion of the appropriate use or projection of power into sinuously sensitive situations to the U.S. national interest, I would be one person among many expressing what the government should do.  Needless to say, my opinions on what to do would likely be quite different from what I answered to LTC Martin.  But, I think you know that. 

Dayuhan, I take specific difference with the issues of Kurdistan and Syria. First Syria, since Kurdish nested autonomy is largely irrelevant to this article, to the discussion and to my previous preliminary answers to LTC Martin’s legitimate hypothetical questions.  Syria may well be a location for an SOF intervention.  As one person among many, I would propose that, if we consider the application of military (specifically SOF) power, arguments should focus on the swelling refugee communities in neighbouring countries with a view toward protecting our ally in Jordan as well as two more fragile and tentative democracies of Iraq and Lebanon.  The skills learned by the SOF in current police training in Afghanistan, as mentioned by ADM McRaven, could prove to be transferable and helpful.

That program could not only seek to stem the intimidation that often works with radicalization of communities (to muzzle the moderates), but also to train the core of a civilian force to re-enter Syria and assume the policing function.  Additionally, I would argue for a limited intervention into Syria itself, with explicit timelines and force levels, to assure delivery of humanitarian supplies and to facilitate a longer-term intervention of peace-keeping troops from disinterested nations with substantial Muslim populations, preferably outside of the region (Malaysia, Indonesia, Tanzania, Morocco, etc.).  In each case, the conditions would have to be propitious; there would have to be a desire for peace across all parties (including the U.S.), and a willingness to honour the intervention as a short-term, impartial facilitation only.

Now onto nested autonomy.  The Kurdish region of Iraq thrived, despite limitations of isolation, etc., during the years of the no-fly-zone and after its “liberation” (their words, not mine) by President Bush.  Apparently, a cultural autonomy is emerging among the Kurds in Kurdish regions in Syria.  The Iraqi region could become a vanguard for the rest of the country, or it may lapse into a civil war with with the Arabs, predominantly the Sunnis.  Part of the problem lies in the fact the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Transitional Administrative Law (53A), issued via fiat by AMB Bremer nine years ago, planted those seeds of contested territory (e.g., definitely Kirkuk, probably Mosul) and remain in force under the current Constitution (138). 

For various reasons, the four nations directly involved in the Kurdish question do not want to see an independent Kurdistan, something that would be consistent with self-determination.  So the world is facing the frustration of one of the underpinnings of the nation-state model, itself only about three or four centuries old.  The dilemma could be (not is) that if one country grants independence to its Kurdish population, it will become a staging area for the forced rebellion, secession and civil war of the other three.  The history of Turkish and Arab oppression (in Turkey and Iraq) is well documented.  The lot of Kurds in Syria may now be one of cultural autonomy but it is hardly enviable.  Iran?  Know little about that. 

This autonomy seeks to balance the national security and resource interests of the dominant host countries with a sense of Kurdish identity.  Such a tentative peace may be arising now in Turkey.  It would take some time to negotiate and such taxing efforts could easily fail. Nevertheless, with the erosion of the nation-state paradigm in viewing many of the conflicts taking place around the world, something that balances the interests of all eight parties (four nations, four Kurdish communities) may avert future bloodshed and, in the example of Iraq, permit the prosperity of three million barrels a day of crude pumped out of the Kurdish region for that lovely region, really one of the most beautiful I have ever seen, and convey benefits to the rest of Iraq, as stipulated by under the country’s Constitution (108), a document which the Kurds themselves approved. 

In negotiating this peace, the U.S. could play a role in aiding the implementation, if the country were invited and chose to so.  The parameters of such an intervention, beyond my imagination at this moment, would have to be negotiated and acceptable to at least to the nine key parties (eight previously mentioned plus the U.S.).  Other stakeholders would likely have a say.  Hard to do?  For sure.  Impossible? No.  Implausible? To be determined after exploratory discussions.

Ned.