Security Cooperation: a ‘Plan Colombia’ for Iraq?
Introduction: current situation. The current rush-to-consensus on applying Plan Colombia may prove over time to be pre-mature and a product of group-think.1 In working with the Iraqi government (GOI) to create a secure, stable and sovereign nation, the U.S. government (USG) must assist and support the GOI in avoiding three national catastrophes:
- a regional war between Arabs and Persians fought on Iraqi soil;
- a civil war between the Arabs and Kurds; and,
- a continuing relapse into civil conflict creating a culture of chronic conflict.2
- Iraq’s contentious factions remain trapped in a "security dilemma", complicating the prospects of long-term conciliation. (A security dilemma indicates that paramilitary and other armed groups outside the law tend not to surrender their weapons during programs of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, or “DDR”.)3
Colombia and Iraq share compelling similarities -- high numbers of internally displaced people; drug (or illegal oil) trafficking as a source of funding primarily for government coddled militias; widespread corruption; human rights abuses; vulnerable oil infrastructure in need of protection; and, widespread homicide. A few crucial differences, however, trump these circumstantial parallels. Additionally, tactical gains against revolutionary groups aside, the ultimate success of Plan Colombia remains contested.5
Plan Colombia was basically a de-novo militarization by the USG of the counter-insurgency in Colombia. Over six years, the United States invested $5-6 billion in military aid, a significant portion of which funded fumigation of millions of acres of arable lands producing illicit cash crops; not so in Iraq. Over a six year period, the USG allocated $18 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund. Thus, Iraq’s equivalent to Plan Colombia has likely taken place already.
With the funding and equipping to date of the Ministries of Interior and Defence (MOI and MOD) as well as the 100,000 CLCs exceeding $18 billion, $3-3.5 billion (60% equivalent of the Colombian aid since Iraq has 60% of Colombia’s population) of funding over six years should prove to be superfluous. Such a situation would be like Noah, on the thirty-ninth day of rains, walking top-side with a pitcher of water to tend to some plants on deck. Instead, such a USG posture would more likely spoil the prospects for long-term stability as U.S. policies would be perceived – as they are already – as taking sides in a civil conflict.
Training more men to kill other men, as suggested by using Plan Colombia, will not enhance the rule of law in Iraq. The police force exceeds reasonable levels already; current infrastructure can not handle the levels of security forces using it. One of every 25-30 Iraqis is in the security forces (i.e., the military and police; or, ISF), meaning more police per population than any of the world's five most dangerous countries. At the height of Plan Colombia, there were -- at least -- one hundred people for every member of the security forces.
Iraq lacks the extra-governmental institutions reaching all levels of its society. Colombia has the Catholic Church and many mature peace-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs), allied with wealthier benefactors in the U.S. and Europe, to build a climate of reconciliation that can supplant a culture of conflict.6 Lastly, U.S. interests (i.e., the war on drugs and “narcorruption” sweeping Northward from Colombia) were more immediate and vital with respect to Colombia than they are with Iraq.7
A (Not-So) New Way for a New Day.
The ideal end-state toward which U.S. can point Iraq includes the following elements:
- police primacy through democratic, communally-based law enforcement;
- an end to ISF-sponsored violence against prisoners and detainees including torture, false arrest and neglect during custody;
- widespread enforcement for the protection of fundamental human rights; and,
- ethno-sectarian tolerance strengthened through mutual support.
This alternative approach addresses the constraints mentioned earlier to culminate in a post-kinetic partnership between Iraq and the U.S. starting in 2012. This alliance will aim for peaceful co-existence within Iraqi society to address poverty and essential service shortages that would tend to undermine the GOI's legitimacy and rule of law. The security cooperation office, then, would ideally consist of a security assistance component (8-13 people) supplemented by liaisons with civilian agencies (27-32 people) harnessing USG and NGO-sponsored resources.
The Legacy Issue.
For example, for every uniformed military personnel deployed as trainers in Iraq from the U.S., NATO or the U.N. (i.e., up to 3,000), there would be at least five field-workers drawn from the Peace Corps and NGOs as well as from the Iraqi population. These volunteers and the uniformed military would cross-train each other in grass-roots economic development and civil-military operations.
Iraqis could then re-build their villages and their lives in practical ways that they would begin to associate with the United States or the West over the long-term.8 The USG would strive, through this radically different OSC sponsored by the U.S. Embassy, to impart a legacy of democratic policing, law-&-order, human rights and communal self-improvement.9 The annual cost of this legacy-building would total less than 10% of the average ISFF burden.
REFERENCES
1. Irving Janis; Yale & Berkeley; 1972
Dr Janis did extensive work on the subject, defined it as: A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation realistically to appraise alternative courses of action.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groupthink)
2. Paul Collier; Oxford University 2004
“Around half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses…The risks of conflict relapse are very high during the first post-conflict decade – typically around 50%.”
(http://www.un.org/esa/documents/Development.and.Conflict2.pdf)
Matthew Kirwin; Michigan State, 2006
(http://www.njas.helsinki.fi/pdf-files/vol15num1/kirwin.pdf)
4. James C. Jones; U.S. Institute of Peace 2009; Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War (page-365)
“Indeed doubts exist about the degree of real paramilitary [i.e., ‘government coddled militias’] demobilization. Recent reports the emergence of new groups, or reemergence of old ones, throughout the country. Moreover, investigations as well as informed testimony under the controversial Justice and Peace Law have revealed disturbing links between lawmakers – most of them [President] Uribe supporters [in favor of Plan Colombia’s militarized program] – and paramilitaries. And there is strong evidence of widespread paramilitary penetration of governmental institutions.”
Please note that the writing of Dr Jones is likely to be biased against the government of Colombia (GOC); he was under investigation by the GOC for possible ties with leftist guerillas opposing the rightist paramilitaries.
The Department of State gives the GOC higher marks but states in its 2009 narcotics report:
(http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/vol1/116520.htm)
Deborah Haynes; The Times of London, 2009
“….in January the human rights office of the Defence Ministry found more than 1,000 detainees at three centres in Ninevah, northern Iraq, including about 550 who had orders issued for their release…Many prisoners were held in cramped and unhygienic conditions. More than 700 were eventually freed.”
(http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article6737870.ece)
5. Associated Content News; “Top 5 Nations Where Safety is Last” 2007
“Colombia. Infamous for its guerillas, illegal cocaine "industry", and corrupt government, no wonder Colombia ranks as ‘The Most Dangerous Country in the World’. Bombings targeting civilians are common and terrorism is a way of life for most citizens who have grown accustomed to the chaos. It has a high rating for kidnappings with ransoms, with businesspeople, tourists, journalists, and scientists being frequent targets, though no one is actually excluded from kidnappings. Hot spots include ATMs, taxis, restaurants, and simply walking down the street. Those who try to resist robberies usually get shot and killed. Bogota, Baranquilla, Cartagena, and Medellin are statistically categorized as the most dangerous cities, with Medellin holding the title of the Drug Capital and ‘Most Dangerous City in the World’. With 11 murders a day in a city of merely 2 million, its murder rates is quintupled that of New York City. In recent years, murders rates in Colombia have dropped, but not enough to pass the title to South Africa. Though what was previously mentioned [falling homicide rates] may be misinformation, as critics have accused President Uribe of manipulating the crime [rate], making Colombia seem safer than it really is. What is behind all the heinous crimes? An expanding drug market and a plethora of terrorist groups, and a government that does nothing about it. Colombia averages 47 murders a day in a nation of 45 million, giving it the crown of ‘Most Dangerous’.”
(http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/159175/top_5_most_dangerous_countries_in_the.html?cat=9)
U.S. Office on Colombia; 2009
“The…Working Group on Extrajudicial Executions has identified new modalities of extrajudicial executions where killings are no longer publicly reported, as happened in the case of false positives, but rather hidden, with measures taken to conceal the identity of those responsible. One example is the increase in cases of forced disappearances of human rights defenders and social leaders, with the person being subsequently killed and put into unidentified graves in the majority of these cases. In many of these cases members of the armed forces are alleged to have been involved either directly, through cooperation, or at the least through acquiescence with paramilitaries. According to a recent report by the National Commission for the Search for Disappeared People, between January 1 2007 and October 21 2008 alone, there was a total of 1,686 people forcefully disappeared.”
(http://www.usofficeoncolombia.com/uploads/application-pdf/2009-%20June%20EJE%20memo.pdf)
6. Arturo Carrillo; U.S. Institute of Peace 2009; Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War (pages 148-149)
7. Bruce Bagley University of Miami; 2001
“During most of the 1980s the Medellin cartel dominated the Colombian drug trade and its principal trafficking routes passed through (or over) the Caribbean into the United States via south Florida and elsewhere along the U.S. Atlantic seaboard. As these "traditional" smuggling routes came under increasing pressure from U.S. drug enforcement over the second half of the decade, a gradual shift away from the Caribbean routes to new ones passing through Central America and Mexico and across the U.S. southwest border took place. By the early 1990s 70 to 80 percent of the cocaine smuggled out of Colombia entered the United States from Mexico while only 20 to 30 percent continued to come in via the Caribbean.”
(http://clas.berkeley.edu/Events/conferences/Colombia/workingpapers/working_paper_bagley.html)
8. Eugene Burdick and William Lederer; The Ugly American; 1958
“But despite the dual meaning, the ‘ugly American’ of the book title fundamentally does refer to the plain-looking engineer Atkins, who lives with the local people, comes to understand their needs, and offers genuinely useful assistance with small-scale projects such as the development of a simple bicycle-powered water pump. It is argued in the book that the Communists are successful because they practice tactics similar to Atkins'. According to an article published in Newsweek in May 1959, the ‘real’ Ugly American was identified as an ICA technician named Otto Hunerwadel, who served in Burma from 1949 until his death in 1952.”
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Ugly_American)
9. Bonnie Bucqueroux; Michigan State, 2004
“By embracing strategies that decentralize and personalize police service, police departments that have adopted the community policing philosophy have been able to engage communities in comprehensive, collaborative, community-based problem-solving aimed at crime, fear of crime, and disorder. Many efforts involve assigning individual officers or teams to specific beat areas, to foster a sense of ownership and responsibility. The marriage of police and community brings together the power of the formal criminal justice system with the informal social control that communities can exert. Police departments have also been a catalyst in forging new partnerships with other professional and civic institutions (municipal agencies, non-profit groups, the business community, schools, and the faith community).“
(http://www.policing.com/articles/rcj.html)
Ned McDonnell; Letter to President George W. Bush, 2006
“The three themes of this rationale – crime prevention, national sovereignty and economic development – are based on precedents in Afghanistan and New York City…The Ministry of Interior has been infiltrated by militias backed by Iran...Trustworthy policemen, vetted and approved by local inhabitants, will empower Iraqi citizens to turn over the insurgents who are nothing more than people enjoying the blood-sport of – and financial gain from – killing, destruction, kidnapping and mayhem. This plan will save time, energy and money which can then be better allocated to Afghanistan to complete Operation Enduring Freedom in support of a tenuous democratic government….”