Letter #78: more against drone strikes

Introduction:  this is a comment that follows an interesting and thoughtful analysis in the Small Wars Journal by MAJ Charles Kels, detailing his legal criticisms of the "White Paper" leaked to NBC news on which I wrote a previous letter (#75-two months ago).  

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/justice-department-memo-evidences-confusion 

The previous letter argued against this policy from a moral and constitutional perspective.  This letter argues the political folly of this policy; the hypothetical example below should resonate with anyone knowledgeable of the American Revolution. Second link written in 05feb23 was added above on 05jan24.

================Comment in S.W.J.=============

MoveForward,

You make a valid observation on the fact that U.S. authorities would cooperate with their British counterparts. To clarify my perspective, let’s take this discussion one step further. There are four Irish men, suspected by the U.K. of being I.R.A. terror-killers but with no police records, who come to Boston and stay with relatives or friends of their families in four different homes.

Scotland Yard notifies the U.S. authorities that these people are suspected of terrorism and may be in Boston to raise funds to buy arms from Libya with which to kill troops of her Majesty’s Army and innocents nearby the blast site. The U.K. police officials further state that they believe that such fund-raising will be a likely prelude to subsequent violence, though they really do not know exactly when that mass murder would occur.

What goes unstated is that the British government sees that subsequent probability as an “imminent attack”. This assertion may or may not be shared by the U.S. counterparts. Additionally, there may open a perception gap between a British perception of these four men as “high level operatives of a terrorist organization at war with the U.K.” while their counterparts in Boston see them as suspected criminals or gang-members.

Of course and appropriately, the U.S. government immediately pledges to cooperate and does so by monitoring movements of the four people designated by the U.K. So, over the course of the next week, local police and federal agents monitor the movements of these suspects. The U.S. authorities report back that there has been no evidence of a crime or one imminently to be committed.

They have been at group activities but these have involved outings like going to Fenway to catch the Redsox against the Yankees. One activity that had been interesting had been a meeting of an Irish solidarity group, one of many, in a local Church but that turned out to be hosted by the parish priest for raising funds for Irish children to go to parochial schools.

With no evidence, the U.S. authorities state that, regrettably, they can not detain these people and extradite them to Britain. The British authorities press their U.S. counterparts, saying that the fund-raising was a front for getting money to buy arms. The U.S. law enforcement authorities state that they are unprepared to suspend habeas corpus but pledge to continue monitoring these people for the next two weeks, at which point, the four men head back to Belfast.

Scotland Yard realizes that, under current extradition treaties, it can not send in the Royal Marines or detectives to abduct these suspicious people in Boston with no legal charges pending in either country. So now we have, from the British view, a sense of imminent attack (and consistent under the white paper); an unwillingness displayed by the U.S. government; and, infeasibility of capture.

The British believe that if these men with these funds return to Ireland, that mass murder will likely, but not certainly, ensue sometime over succeeding months when they have purchased weapons from Libya. So, the U.K. government launches surveillance drones and they buzz around South Boston for two weeks, engendering (incidentally) fear among local residents.

The only time that these four suspects are in one place long enough to launch a strike and when they are not at venues – like baseball games, Sunday masses, Pops concerts, etc. – with high concentrations of innocents is when they are asleep in those four townhouses. To prevent an attack on the homeland, these authorities authorize a night-time strike, to minimize civilian casualties, and the rest of the example ensues.

Now all of this discussion on my part in no way implies that the United Kingdom would ever do something like this action nor does it indicate any sympathy with these men if, in fact, they are opportunistic gangsters. The point is to create a scenario in terms more familiar to us that would envision these circumstances to place us in the position in which the Pakistanis find themselves.

In this scenario, the United States would likely have means to disable these drones, as you observe. So, that part of the hypothetical does not correspond well with the likely reality. Nevertheless, citing that fact does not really address the underlying question put to the reader: ¿how would Americans react were such an act to occurr on their shores at the mortal expense of many innocents who were fellow citizens?

Additionally, the Bay State and the Pakistani tribal regions are two very different places. It might be conceivable (if I had the technical knowledge to argue it) that the topography and remoteness of the tribal regions, the number of fighter aircraft available and the ability to sustain them could preclude such a defensive option by Pakistan, even if it wanted to capture or kill these militants.

Again, MoveForward, many thanks for your thoughts.

Very truly yours,
Ned McDonnell.
Peace Corps-México.

Letter-77: nested autonomy for greater Kurdistan; next steps for Syria

Introduction: this is a response in a dialogue debating a proposed counter-insurgency program in the area of Village Stability Operations in the Small Wars Journal. This idea of nested autonomy (a region shared by four nations inside of which Kurdish people would move freely as dual citizens of 'Kurdistan' and the country in which their part of Kurdistan currently lies) has been floating inside my ahead for years. Developments in Syria may make the time of experimentation propitious.  

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/irregular-warfare-network-warfare-and-the-venture-capital-green-beret
On Syria, the time for some type of intervention may be approaching; but in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq to train local policing for future use in Syria.  Any extension into Syria would be for facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian supplies and the imminent entrance of peace-keeper from other Muslim nations outside of the region.  

============REMARKS=============

Guys,

Come on.  I was answering a straight-forward question on how I would assess this possible downside and unexpected consequences as well as envision ‘how’ such a program for entrepreneurial development would manifest in current hot spots.  Imputing arrogance and ignorance to me expands the scope of the discussion far beyond the answer of a straight-forward question on application only, not appropriateness; I think you two know better than to shift the discussion to a platform for emotionalism.  In a sense, in any discussion of the appropriate use or projection of power into sinuously sensitive situations to the U.S. national interest, I would be one person among many expressing what the government should do.  Needless to say, my opinions on what to do would likely be quite different from what I answered to LTC Martin.  But, I think you know that. 

Dayuhan, I take specific difference with the issues of Kurdistan and Syria. First Syria, since Kurdish nested autonomy is largely irrelevant to this article, to the discussion and to my previous preliminary answers to LTC Martin’s legitimate hypothetical questions.  Syria may well be a location for an SOF intervention.  As one person among many, I would propose that, if we consider the application of military (specifically SOF) power, arguments should focus on the swelling refugee communities in neighbouring countries with a view toward protecting our ally in Jordan as well as two more fragile and tentative democracies of Iraq and Lebanon.  The skills learned by the SOF in current police training in Afghanistan, as mentioned by ADM McRaven, could prove to be transferable and helpful.

That program could not only seek to stem the intimidation that often works with radicalization of communities (to muzzle the moderates), but also to train the core of a civilian force to re-enter Syria and assume the policing function.  Additionally, I would argue for a limited intervention into Syria itself, with explicit timelines and force levels, to assure delivery of humanitarian supplies and to facilitate a longer-term intervention of peace-keeping troops from disinterested nations with substantial Muslim populations, preferably outside of the region (Malaysia, Indonesia, Tanzania, Morocco, etc.).  In each case, the conditions would have to be propitious; there would have to be a desire for peace across all parties (including the U.S.), and a willingness to honour the intervention as a short-term, impartial facilitation only.

Now onto nested autonomy.  The Kurdish region of Iraq thrived, despite limitations of isolation, etc., during the years of the no-fly-zone and after its “liberation” (their words, not mine) by President Bush.  Apparently, a cultural autonomy is emerging among the Kurds in Kurdish regions in Syria.  The Iraqi region could become a vanguard for the rest of the country, or it may lapse into a civil war with with the Arabs, predominantly the Sunnis.  Part of the problem lies in the fact the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Transitional Administrative Law (53A), issued via fiat by AMB Bremer nine years ago, planted those seeds of contested territory (e.g., definitely Kirkuk, probably Mosul) and remain in force under the current Constitution (138). 

For various reasons, the four nations directly involved in the Kurdish question do not want to see an independent Kurdistan, something that would be consistent with self-determination.  So the world is facing the frustration of one of the underpinnings of the nation-state model, itself only about three or four centuries old.  The dilemma could be (not is) that if one country grants independence to its Kurdish population, it will become a staging area for the forced rebellion, secession and civil war of the other three.  The history of Turkish and Arab oppression (in Turkey and Iraq) is well documented.  The lot of Kurds in Syria may now be one of cultural autonomy but it is hardly enviable.  Iran?  Know little about that. 

This autonomy seeks to balance the national security and resource interests of the dominant host countries with a sense of Kurdish identity.  Such a tentative peace may be arising now in Turkey.  It would take some time to negotiate and such taxing efforts could easily fail. Nevertheless, with the erosion of the nation-state paradigm in viewing many of the conflicts taking place around the world, something that balances the interests of all eight parties (four nations, four Kurdish communities) may avert future bloodshed and, in the example of Iraq, permit the prosperity of three million barrels a day of crude pumped out of the Kurdish region for that lovely region, really one of the most beautiful I have ever seen, and convey benefits to the rest of Iraq, as stipulated by under the country’s Constitution (108), a document which the Kurds themselves approved. 

In negotiating this peace, the U.S. could play a role in aiding the implementation, if the country were invited and chose to so.  The parameters of such an intervention, beyond my imagination at this moment, would have to be negotiated and acceptable to at least to the nine key parties (eight previously mentioned plus the U.S.).  Other stakeholders would likely have a say.  Hard to do?  For sure.  Impossible? No.  Implausible? To be determined after exploratory discussions.

Ned.