"You know this vision. You have seen it so often at the movies. It is the vision in all those science fiction dystopias. You know, with the gilded masterminds ruling all from their swank towers and conference rooms.
....
"It’s a quite contemporary vision. For instance, it is not far at all from the way I think the rulers of China imagine themselves and their future." --Dr Philip D. Zelikow, 5th August 2017.
INTRODUCTION
CASE STUDY OF TECHNOCRATIC VACUITY
When the U.S. gained the tactical advantage in Iraq, the gang-of-four -- and their face-man desk-clerk, Ambassador Bromide -- reverted to type, seeing Iraq as ours and, now, something to lose. That compromised and eventually corrupted the end-state the President had envisioned. The rest is history: what some troops in Iraq referred to as the Texas Cheney Massacre; Texas for Halliburton-KBR, not President Bush.
COWARDICE CROWNING CONFLICT? Yes AND no.
CONCLUSION
THE MORAL OF THE QUARREL
Expecting technocracy to avoid dystopia is as fruitful as tasking mechanical engineers to invent from scratch the impressionism of palette or expressionism in poetry.
....
"It’s a quite contemporary vision. For instance, it is not far at all from the way I think the rulers of China imagine themselves and their future." --Dr Philip D. Zelikow, 5th August 2017.
BLUF (bottom-line, up-front): Dr Philip Zelikow gave a long address -- the speech takes 45 minutes, or more, to read -- at some out-of-tune wonkstock festival. His thoughts superficially remind one of those of Kennan.
INTRODUCTION
They are not alike, primarily because this scholar is opening up the discussion and not selling its conclusion as Kennan did for SecState Marshall and President Truman. There are certain elements missing in the Zelikow's presentation by order of importance that guarantee us languishing longer in violent decline:
- a frank recognition of the financial constraints facing the United States to usher in a more traditional exceptionalism as the American Century fades;
- justification by technocrats of their being entitled to positions of power and privilege by 'degrees' of arrogation;
- a clear idea by the U.S. of the end-state of a just society (i.e., an intelligibly universal appeal through a 'proposition of values' rather than a Zelikovian value proposition marketing technocracy through, of course, the current brain-gang);
- exclusion from the 'outside-in' evaluation seeking to clarify how other peoples and governments (or élites) view the U.S. (and not how we think they view us);
- a serious questioning of the nature of our adversaries and our role in that rivalry;
- confusing tactics with strategy though that erudition and foot-notes often shroud that mistaken thinking; as well as,
- a deeper inability, shown from President Reagan's time in office, of reducing the size of an over-wrought and financially unsustainable Federal government as well as the corrupting influence of (in)vested interests like the XXX-industrial complexes.
Of course, my critique is hampered by the same intellectual constraint as Dr Zelikow's far deeper and more nuanced analysis; he is a brainiac, after all. I am using a handy framework -- the recent military model that I learned in Iraq -- which is, of course, rooted in the past; not transcendent into the future; and, quite likely stale by now.
CASE STUDY OF TECHNOCRATIC VACUITY
This juncture is where President George W. Bush gets short-shrift, first by the hawk squawks led by the gang-of-four (Messrs Cheney, Libby, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld); then by Generals specialized and socialized as engineers; current intellectuals; and, lastly, the Obama Admin. President Bush understood, perhaps on an intuitive level, that, for the current wave of terrorism to be eradicated, an Arab Spring would have to occur.
Iraq was the geopolitical keystone of an arch of dictatorship and repression, resembling a reversed crescent moon from the horn of Africa on up to the 'No-man-stans'. The geopolitical mindset was easy to grasp, perhaps too easy:
- knock Iraq out in favor of a more popular government;
- link that with a far more tenuous experiment in Afghanistan; and,
- incent the cosmopolitan middle class in Iran to grasp for the same freedoms.
The vision was simple but the follow-through too difficult, under-cutting the justice of the policy. The two parts that President Bush did not contemplate, due to a sweeping vision short on detail, included:
- making an all-out case for the necessity of this transformation, despite its wave of turmoil and violence; as well as,
- warning the rest of us just how messy it would be.
When the U.S. gained the tactical advantage in Iraq, the gang-of-four -- and their face-man desk-clerk, Ambassador Bromide -- reverted to type, seeing Iraq as ours and, now, something to lose. That compromised and eventually corrupted the end-state the President had envisioned. The rest is history: what some troops in Iraq referred to as the Texas Cheney Massacre; Texas for Halliburton-KBR, not President Bush.
The key lessons for people to learn and always to hear include, but are not limited to, the moral fortitude that change requires; the narrower than expected limits of any power, particularly fire-power; the challenge of follow through; as well as, the difficulty of keeping hands-off once a cycle of change is initiated (that is, letting history run its admittedly hazardous course). That is to say: be careful what you instigate, for its life will likely be different from yours.
The failure of the Bush policy of an aggressive promotion of democracy in response to 9-11 was not only an example of Dr Zelikow’s astute insight of wasted energy, money and people on areas of lesser importance. Additionally, it was an ill-thought out strategy that led to a chimerical consensus. The brain-gang failed signally to consider the lowest cost options (i.e., those least deleterious to the lives and livelihoods of peoples in the 'beneficiary' countries).
COWARDICE CROWNING CONFLICT? Yes AND no.
The failure of President Obama’s policy was an unwillingness to witness the upheaval the Bush vision had counted on during the run-up to invading and occupying Iraq. This changed to a reactive policy perceived as a lack of nerve rather than a widely shared perception of ‘strategic patience’. Many of my fellow conservatives view President Obama as a coward; that is patently untrue and unfair. President Obama was and is a man of peace.
His appeasement – and, yes, that is what his policy unmistakably was -- may well have forestalled a conflict that could quickly have cascaded into the "systemic crisis" that the dystopian Zelikovian multiverse contemplates and for which the U.S. is anything but prepared. President Obama’s alternate view may have saved a great many lives; sadly, that systemic crisis was more likely deferred than defused.
President Obama’s alleged but apparent cowardice may have required a quiet courage to fend of the brawny bluster of men who do not have to suffer the consequences of their own rhetoric. If cowardice be assigned at all, it would lie with V.P. Cheney, SecDef Rumsfeld and AMB Bremer -- and their staffs -- for failing to think big, like their President, and, worse, not permitting others (e.g., SecStates Powell and Rice and their competing brain-gangs) to have the floor for alternative views.
CONCLUSION
Dr Zelikow fails properly to account for this narrative as a teachable moment. Why? Because he was, and has every intention of remaining, a part of it. Now, we labour under a President without vision and inclined toward force as the primary medicine. Fortunately, he is unpopular and being repudiated on several different levels. Otherwise, we might undertake an amputation when only an analgesic is called for.
In the end, however, technocratic élites will fail us; they almost always do. Why again? Because the very notion of technocracy is conservative, more like preservative, of a given status-quo. To expect more from the Dr Zelikows (or the far more numerous and insignificant Ned McDonnells) of the world to anticipate and structure an ex ante strategy for fundamental changes in world orders or global policy paradigms is futile.
THE MORAL OF THE QUARREL
Expecting technocracy to avoid dystopia is as fruitful as tasking mechanical engineers to invent from scratch the impressionism of palette or expressionism in poetry.








