Letter #83: Thoughts on Syria; a case for muscular humanitarianism

The West may be lurching toward armed intervention into Syria.  The stakes are higher than most Americans (e.g., me) can appreciate.  Policymakers live by a combination of historical analogies and, often, the ‘persistence’ method (i.e., repeating the same action as the last intervention).  The arguments have long been aired on this conflict.  The Administration of President Obama, rightfully cautious after the protracted conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, however, has hesitated too long.  With the added reticence expressed by the British Parliament, at least for now, the way forward seems difficult for the United States. 

1. If we act alone will we find ourselves in a rabbit hole of the colonial powers' making (i.e., the Sykes-Picot Agreement) of a century ago?
2. If we wait for the rest of the West to catch up, will the situation and misery become that much more unmanageable?

Disclaimer

These are serious questions elevated in the few hours since I wrote this first draft.  The situation is fluid, fraught with hazards for America. Nevertheless, decency has its demands and the Syrian civil war is at a cross-roads.  What I outline and propose in this letter must bear in mind my limited knowledge; my bias; and the 'serenity' prayer of Reinhold Niebuhr (http://skdesigns.com/internet/articles/prose/niebuhr/serenity_prayer/). 

That prayer is as famous as it is helpful.

God, give us grace to accept with serenity the things that cannot be changed, 

(I.e., we cannot control people's sympathy or enmity toward us or make al-Qaeda play fair.)

Courage to change the things which should be changed, and the

(I.e., we can alleviate suffering, educate children and help others re-build.)

Wisdom to distinguish the one from the other.

(I.e., we should be open to change at every blind step of the way forward.)

Buster’s last stand

More than half a year ago I wrote a letter home arguing against an invasion of Syria (http://nedmcdletters.blogspot.mx/2012/12/letter-72-why-invading-syria-is-bad-idea.html). Though I am better informed now, I still believe that an invasion would be all wrong for the following reasons.

1. The death toll, especially if these actions actually prolonged the killing, would be beyond the threshold of what civilized men and women, especially the millions trapped in or near Syria, could countenance.
2. Syria is a flashpoint for regional conflict since it is the cultural center of the Levant and Middle East and yet could be the precursor to a much larger Arab-Persian conflict. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/files/2013/08/Levant_Ethnicity_lg-smaller1-zoom.jpg)
3. Logistically, the country would be hard to conquer and harder to occupy.
4. The United States can not afford another expensive conflict for anything but existential threats; this is not one.
5. The geopolitical challenges of the current-day Levant are of Franco-British making from a century ago.
6. U.S. actions in leading the eventual killing of Colonel Gadhafi in Libya go a long way toward explaining President Assad’s behavior now; Assad figures he has nothing to lose since he will likely end up dead no matter how nice he plays.

This ever larger conflict, while dissipating Israel’s enemies for now, may eventually be resolved by scape-goating the Jewish people and state, turning the fury of more than two hundred million people against the only viable, if flawed, but tiny democracy. Israël can still be an example of popular governance to aid people in that part of the world toward liberty.

The context

Before going into any thoughts on what I think will occur and what I think we should do, I would like to review certain antecedents that ought to inform whatever response we take.

1. The most fitting battle-space analogy might be a combination of World War I and the Balkans in the 1990s.  The ethnic groups are interspersed with a lack of secular granularity sufficient to aim missiles at the bad guys on the ground, subjectively targeted.  That fact translates into the current, brutal reality of street-by-street fighting with a lot of artillery and available chemical weapons, much like the trench warfare of 1917. (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/07/20137188552345899.html)
2. A more immediate threat is the spill-over of the conflict.  The mainly Kurdish National Coordination Committee, centered in the northeast, has called for negotiations and may be a moderate voice.  Jordan and Lebanon are at their breaking points with refugees; Turkey feels the strain.
3. The Assad régime, being drawn from one minority has protected other minorities from persecution.  Conflict tends to harden and de-sensitize people.  After two years of truly awful bloodshed, radical Sunni Arabs and, perhaps, their Shi´ite opponents from the outside, have reportedly started persecuting Christians, Jews (if any), Druze, Alawites, Kurds. Wahhabis and their Salafists are particularly menacing since they see Shi´ites as apostates (apparently a deadly sin in Islam), collaborators and, otherwise, easy to bully bloodily.
4. The no-fly zones worked in Iraq.  Karl Rove is wrong in saying that no-fly zones will get us stuck in Syria as they did in Iraq.  What kept us stuck in Iraq was an unwillingness in the mid-to-late 1990s to deal firmly with Saddam Hussein who – like the Assad régime, the religious dictators of Iran and President Milosevich in Serbia – was never materially affected by the sanctions though his people suffered mightily for a decade.
5. Until petroleum became the desert king, Syria (including Lebanon) had been the focal point of U.S. attention in the larger region.  For the better part of two centuries, until the 1950s, various missionary groups set out for the Holy Land, setting up clinics, schools and hospitals.  These activities built up a reservoir of goodwill that has dissipated in the last fifty years.  Nevertheless, the ties remain deep.  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power,_Faith_and_Fantasy).
6. Tens of thousands of officers and soldiers of the Syrian Army have deserted and are in refugee camps in adjacent countries, principally Jordan and Lebanon, or hiding with their clans inside the country.  These men are disciplined and can be ideal for a new police force to help maintain order after the fighting stops.
7. Not every Alawite has been living like a King.  At the face of things, one would find this statement stupid.  Truth is that I spent a great deal of time in Iraq stating to Shi´ites in Iraq that every Sunni had not been rich under Saddam Hussein; that many had suffered just as they had.  Such blanket perceptions are serviceable only to those who are bent on sectarian genocide.
8. The United States succeeded in Iraq, not only on the battle-field.  Through the surge of just U.S. troops that represented 0.1% of the Iraqi population, the U.S. prevented a sectarian genocide and empowered the moderates on both sides of the Sunni / Shi´a divide.  The saddening state of affairs now in Iraq has more to do with the current government’s power-grab and corruption opening up an opportunity for blood-drunk terrorists to do what they want to do: kill and maim in the name of G-d and the pursuit of mammon.
9. The United States has planted the seeds of long-term success in Afghanistan, much as she did in Viêt Nam.  That victory will take at least two generations to manifest in Afghanistan.  The key point is that the opportunity to change has been secured for the rising generation and its children.
10. The Afghanistan surge was a political exercise.  The lack of imagination of the surge displayed an insensitivity to topographical and cultural differences between Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, relieving two commanding officers in a year doomed the surge, guaranteeing that drone-flown assassinations would become the preferred method of counter-insurgency.  In short, the surge was an expensive and bloody agitprop as a means for the U.S. to appear to give the war 'a good college try' before leaving.
11. Community policing does work.  Since many insurgencies cover for crime-waves, top-down police-training – a worthwhile method for improving or setting standards of professionalism across a country – fails to harness the participation of the townies who know the people and activities of their areas.  That knowledge (i.e., field intelligence and situational awareness) is vitally necessary to stop the hard-to-detect activities of guerrillas, terrorists and less pretentious gangsters.
12. The disregard of Congress in policing actions has enabled presidential adventurism, often guided by political considerations.  Often these undeliberated initiatives have degenerated into quagmires, leading to national trauma in terms of lost treasure and personnel. (http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/boehner-seeks-answers-president-obama-syria)

What we should do

The antecedents and elements taken from my earlier essay, of December 2012, that argued against invasion basically point the way toward what I would like to see.  In previous discussions on Facebook and in counter-insurgency circles, I have stated just about everything that I state below, especially with respect to the very limited deployment of U.S. Special Forces (S.F.). Before that re-hash, I would like to focus upon two elements that have changed in recent days: no-fly zones and peaceful exile for the Assad family. 

That is to say: the efficacy of no-fly zones, if focussed carefully, in creating ink-blots of peace and the rule of law make that option compelling.  With respect to the Assad family, conditions may be ripe for negotiating toward a cease-fire, followed by reconstruction should the cease-fire hold.  The repeated use (of some fourteen instances) of chemical weapons, assuming the régime is primarily responsible, clearly represents a change in kind of warfare beyond the limits of long-standing international law.  But this viciousness may signal that the leadership is falling and desperate. 

As the map shows, such no-fly zones would not be large and could provide the air-cover for the new Syrian police force, basically those deserting soldiers trained by U.S. Special Forces (SOF), to re-enter those enclaves of Druze, Christians, Aramaic Chaldeans, Kurds and Armenians contiguous with Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon.  Later, should outside peace-keepers be deployed and manage to maintain peace in the rest of the country, this core police force could train other community police units, thus expanding the inkblots to counter a crime-wave, not an insurgency. 

Again, if the Assad régime is responsible for recent attacks of chemical weapons, as seems probable though yet to be confirmed, the dictator is likely to be desperate and may be open to exile because he is losing. It is worth a try.  Such an attempt at providing safe-passage and initiating a cease-fire will not take long to resolve one way or the other.  Such a determination will take less time than preparations for military action likely will.  Hence, checking out the possibility of a peaceful exit can be executed concurrently with military mobilization.  There would be conditions for that safe passage:

1. admission of guilt of a crime against humanity, if President Assad or a member of his government deployed those chemical weapons;
2. formation by President Assad an interim council to guide the country toward a new régime;
3. establishment by President Assad of something similar to the Truth and Reconciliation Council employed by South Africa when a minority régime surrendered power to a majority;
4. deployment of what remains of the Syrian Army to secure the stockpiles of chemical weapons; as well as, 
5. presidential order of the police to protect minority populations.

The rest of the scenario remains largely unchanged from previous comments made in other virtual venues (with details added from recent shifts in information and perspective):

• due presidential consultation with, and approval by Congress, per the Constitution, prior to military action;
  
• such congressional authorization to be, preferably, a declaration of war or, at least, an authorization to use military force;
• such declaration of war or authorization to be effective against the régime, not the Syrian people, only after a roll-call vote on prime-time television;
• transparent reporting and timing of deployments required by, or conducted under, any congressional authorization to be tightly aligned with the Wars Powers Resolution of 1973; 
• no-fly zones in the areas noted and enforced by N.A.T.O. air forces; 
• protection of the Alawite strongholds and, perhaps Lebanon, by the British and French navies (now, possibly in doubt, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23892783); 
• American S.F. deployments to the refugee communities in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and, if possible, Iraq to partner with forces from those host-countries to assure the delivery of humanitarian supplies; 
• S.F. partnerships with Jordanian, Turkish and Lebanese forces to police said refugee areas to try to push back on extremist intimidation of any form; 
• S.F. partnerships to train a new police, trained from the soldiers of the Syrian Army who have defected, for post-war Syria with forward deployment into areas protected under no-fly zones; 
• safe-passage, if negotiable and upon the conditions cited above, for the Assad family and those officials not involved in crimes against humanity into West with the aid of witness protection programs and a $10 million, thirty year annuity for the Assad family and $1 million, ten year annuities for the other civilian or military leaders and their families, with all illicit treasure in the national treasury and foreign banks (i.e., billions of dollars) repatriated to a Syrian reconstruction fund described immediately below; 
• freeze all assets of Syria in international financial institutions to be placed under the trusteeship of the International Red Crescent and Red Cross further to be administered by the U.N. aid mission in Syria for future development;
• American S.F. only, together with trained New Syrian police, to escort in peace-keeping troops from Muslim countries outside of the ‘Islamic belt’ (i.e., Middle East, North Africa, Turkey, the Caucasus and east through to Pakistan; that is, troops deployed from nations like Indonesia, Senegal and Malaysia, if they are willing); 
• American S.F.  to leave immediately upon settlement of peace-keepers (or escorting said peace-keepers out if the threat environment be too pronounced) if the number of the latter is adequate to secure and remove the chemical weapons;
• American S.F.  to remove chemical weapons if the peace-keeping force not adequate to the task;
• no further entry into Syria by S.F. contemplated and possible only with a second "prime-time" declaration by Congress; as well as,
• said peace-keepers to assure safe passage in of relief workers from credible non-governmental organizations, including Médecins sans Frontières, Mercy Corps, the International Red Crescent, the Grameen Foundation, etc. to accelerate reconstruction.

What I am afraid of happening
Blow up a few runways; fling a few drones; talk tough; and, bask in the balm of bombs with the pyro-theatrics of 24 / 7 television reporting. 

Letters to Friends and Familiares #82: the sine qua non of indispensable sinecures

THE INVISIBLE LINE BETWEEN RISK AVERSION AND PERVERSION.

Sure, this topic may sound obtuse, esoteric and otherwise irrelevant to tech transfer.  Yet, not is it as the wise ugly guy in “Star Wars” says.  We in the tech transfer program face the challege of trying to change the way people think and the way institutions act.  The Mexican government is quite clear in its message: get going, guys and gals.  Win or lose – take a shot at the big time (Article #51 of the C.yT. law).

Truth is that CONACYT has been around for 40+ years and the I.P.N. for over half a century.  While the Republic fails to meet lofty goals of economic commitments of 1% of the G.D.P. to RD&I – duly legislated and ritually ignored – Mexico has built her knowledge base over time.  The rub is this progress has been a cost center and not an idea generator.

Now it is time to mobilize – to monetize – this inert intellectual capital; a vast pool of basic research basically doing nothing.  Now this comment by me, while dour and amply reflective of my curmudgeonly ways, really is not a criticism of Mexico or my great and gifted colleagues in CIDESI.  This thought merely reflects the difficulty of changing.  Hey! Have you ever tried to get anyone to quit smoking?

Well, keep on truckin’.  The challenge that we volunteers uniformly face is that we confront cultures of ingrained risk aversion.  Think of it: Mexican techie types get rewarded incrementally for decades.  Dust off some research from last year; jazz it up a bit; publish it; get your S.N.I. points; and, you are done for this year: kids’ schooling, house and car payments covered yet again.  Take the bonus and run, baby.

Overcoming habit is difficult enough.  Now let’s factor in the ever-present human ego.  A scientist or engineer has spent a decade or two building up a personal dominion of knowledge for which (s)he enjoys significant recognition and prestige.  This status has been earned through time and toil; in the eyes of its possessor, it is not to be squandered recklessly.

If a volunteer can not sympathize with the professional dilemma weighing down on his or her counterpart, and many do not, perhaps that individual ought to return to the world of machines rather than machinations.  For commercializing unexploited technology is all about machinations from everyday tasks getting completed to strategies playing out for a new firm entering or generating a new-fangled market.

Such maneuvers encompass arguing for price points, reaching consensus on product valuations and strategies, deciphering market opportunities or intelligence, as well as negotiating financing agreements (the big-daddy of them all); not the province of data dinks.  So these daunting challenges, plus a rewarding comfort-zone (until now, at least), almost guarantee risk aversion. 

No one wants to fritter away his or her scholarship through failed product developments and launches.  One public failure and hello, square-1, and re-building than long-acquired now squandered reputation (at least in the mind of the inventor).  Some people simply can not imagine growing beyond failure, so deep runs this false sense of shame.  And to make prospects really sobering, only one in every 200-300 revolutionary ideas turn over sustained turnover during a five year horizon.

Simply said, there is too much to lose and too many ways to lose it.  So, what to do?  El presidente Peña-Nieto is trying out electoral shock therapy, converting his discernible plurality into a broad national mandate for Mexico to take her place on the international stage, right here and right now.  So, he is serious about getting CONACYT out of neutral and Mexico into overdrive by:

1. cutting funding control of CONACYT by 15-20%;
2. pushing hard for new Centros to extend the knowledge-base into aerospace, biotechnology and automobiles;
3. aligning different power blocks into a new Science and Innovation ministry;
4. partially privatizing PEMEX and CONACYT to receive and lever the best in cutting-edge knowledge; as well as,
5. employing other measures I can not quite recall with my agèd brain.

So now the dilemma has just increased for the average, risk-averse ‘Investigador(a)’.  Thus overt risk aversion goes covert with risk perversion.  These latter behaviors are designed primarily to temporize through active inactivity, fast-motion self-promotion or powerpoint optimism.  This is not a uniquely Mexican phenomenon.  It is typical corporate politics, especially in restructuring institutions.

There are three forms of risk perversion initially to which I would alert my fellow volunteers:

• always cooking, always hungry;
• abnegation through collaboration ; and,
• selling high-flying air-rights (not gender-specific).

The first form of risk perversion is a trick I have discussed several times in various venues.  The idea?  Always have one prototype ready and a better one at-the-ready.  As time progresses, the ‘inventor’ (more like a science fiction writer), shifts the focus from the current prototype to the next, even more commercially profitable idea.  One shines like a star without ever having really to twinkle.

The second manifestation of risk perversion is to become a partnership patsy, while extolling trendy notions of teamwork.  These are the ‘team players’ absorbed with partnerships and other projects that transfer or develop too little or no technology. Sadly, they degenerate into scientific serfs for sale to the biggest-name lowest-bidder.  They love Shakespeare and live out ‘Much Ado about Nothing’.

The last example (of many) is a technique imported from good old America.  This risk perversion is essentially a Houdini act, not of beating impossible constraints but dancing from one extravagant claim to the next, a stutter-step ahead of inevitable complaints.  A favorite recent example is claiming experience in sales strategy based on digitalizing call-reports.  These intellectual blow-hards then use their false claims to discredit reasonable ideas of others, lest they be discovered, called out and fired.

These are merely three of many examples, some of which you all have already encountered.  What cheap perfume is not passing your smell test?  Heed those suspicions.  The ruse most often distracts others away from a dubious present toward a salubrious future to re-arrange the empty inning of baseball into NO ERRORS, NO HITS, NO RUNS therefore NOBODY LEFT. 

The moral of this cautionary tale is that moving minds may be harder than moving mountains, with or without a mustard-seed.  Patience and compassion toward human limitations sweeten the crock-pot.

Adiós, over and out.

P.S. Wupps.  The end of this essay is rather uncharitable and unconstructive.  So, I want to direct a few comments to the younger volunteers since anyone my age has learned to deal with these inter-personal gimmicks or has the emotional intelligence of a jack-hammer.  In this brief follow-up, allow me to invoke the traditional R.C. teachings on sins; not because I am religious but because these teachings can shed light on matters of human nature.

The first ruse of the ‘turkey solution’ is much like a venial sin of commission.  Often it arises from failing to pay attention to the task at hand.  Being an entrepreneur – and settling in to big-time risk-taking – is intoxicating.  The daily drudge-work of bringing that dream into the realm of possibility is difficult enough.  Taking that possibility toward plausibility is painstaking.  Adapting the plausibility into practicality entails phone-calls, meetings, memos galore.  All that occurs before going to market.

What to do? Try gently to keep the counter-part on task, stating that this current and less sexy invention may establish his or her name in the market so (s)he can go to Tahiti on the next product under development now.  If your counterpart continues this waltz with a third turkey in the oven, admire his optimism and find something else to do; take your time, however, with the disengagement in the event that (s)he may come around.

The second pitfall is more like a sin of omission.  This problem is perhaps the easiest of the three examples (among several) to address.  The counterpart may understand the necessity of mobilizing capital but may lack the knowledge and experience to negotiate the effective transfer to your Centro of needed knowledge or technology.  This business is a tricky one that frequently eludes volunteer (i.e., me) and counterparts (i.e., everyone else) alike. 

There are several volunteers, usually of the “and wiser” type, who can impart valuable advice; I am not one as all of these topics were new to me almost three years ago.  That advice may help out in aligning activities (e.g., setting up inside or external partnerships) with strategy (i.e., trading less expensive expertise for valuable knowledge).  These conversations are delicate since the counterpart may well be omitting contract terms, etc. rather than consciously avoiding his or her next right step.

The third problem is a biggie, much like a mortal sin after, usually, accumulated commissions of venial sins.  The key variable to consider is the age of the counterpart.  Under thirty, the person may well be merely insecure but, over thirty, that person may have a thoroughly compromised sense of inter-personal ethics.  One must rely on intuition here to discern whether ever-present insecurity has hardened into a full-blown defect of character.  If the latter, head for another department.

In the end, these and other strategies reflect either possible responses tothe foibles typically encountered among people or fragmenting fears of failure.  Fear is difficult to overcome through outside counsel; that conquest must come from within.  Time takes time and the two year stint is often way too short to realize the change.  But planting seeds through humility and integrity is always right on schedule…