"We, of course, are saddened indeed by the
events in Indochina. But these events, tragic as they are, portend neither the
end of the world nor of America's leadership in the world . . . We can and we
should help others to help themselves. But the fate of responsible men and
women everywhere, in the final decision, rests in their own hands, not in ours."
-- President Gerald Ford, Tulane University, April 1975
"At what point then is the approach of
danger [of the collapse of the Republic] to be expected [from
an outside invader]? . . . If
destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a
nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide.”
-- President Abraham Lincoln, Springfield (IL) Lyceum, 1838
B.L.U.F. (bottom-line, up front): time for a great power switcheroo
between the United States and China.
INTRODUCTION
This paper does not analyse the state of the contentious
rivalry between the U.S. and China. The essay reviews the current
American-Chinese relationship and the state of play for the United States herself, reflecting themes in the popular press. The balance of the
essay suggests a new foreign policy for the United States and her allies toward
China.
OVERVIEW
As a Yank, I have to say that it is time for us to admit
that the American Century is over. The United States is insolvent; debt
levels in all borrowing sectors imply an eight-to-fourteen year payback. To
achieve re-payment in eight years, all social programmes would be zeroed out and taxes high.
Being the world’s sole super-power has led to a loss of
the deep reservoir of goodwill built up by American missionaries and aid
societies over the first 175 years of the Republic.
ln actuality, we are ten or fifteen years into the
Chinese Century. Chinese economic growth rates have been the envy of the
whole world for decades. This mighty expansion has also come at a shameful cost of:
- Tiananmen Square;
- Hong Kong;
- misappropriation of technologies and industrial secrets;
- widespread repression;
- deepening corruption sustained by zombie financial institutions;
- dubious data released on national health and other statitsics;
- aggressive claims in the South China Sea;
- aggression toward a democratic neighbour (i.e., India);
- neo-colonialist development policies, etc.
Secondary sources (e.g., The Economist and Foreign Policy) have
documented these draw-backs. Nonetheless, Chinese dominance and influence continues to expand, with mega-currency swaps carving out pockets of the renminbi being the store value currency with the rapidly developing nations (e.g., Brazil and Argentina).
According to the Central Intelligence Agency, after rendering the yuan equal in purchasing power to the dollar, China’s adjusted G.D.P. is already 25% higher than that of the United States. Meanwhile, back in the States, the coronavirus contagion has brought out into bold
relief the impoverishment of American middle classes over the past forty years amplified by a deepening inequality between the races. Simply said, it is time for the
American Republic to:
- detach from the crushing expense of global dominance;
- reform trade policies to re-tool to the extent that comparative advantages permit;
- rebuild the educational system, especially for under-privileged children; as well as,
- reverse the declining health profile, through attrition of
benefits and addiction to opioids, of the nation over the previous half-century.
FOREIGN POLICY POST-AMERICAN CENTURY
My (quixotic) recommendations for consideration in the face of the
loss of American power vis à vis China? Make a virtue of necessity by high profile initiatives including, but not limited to, the following:
- hand off the global hegemon / policeman function to China,
as the U.K. did to the U.S.A. in 1945;
- in contrast to the discretion exercised at Potsdam,
seventy-five years ago, by British Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin,
announce the hand-off publicly;
- in that announcement, openly welcome China's leadership in
her century and count on her as the guarantor of peace in much the same way the
U.S., the U.K., JAPAN, the E.U., Australia, SOUTH KOREA, Canada, New Zealand, TAIWAN,
INDIA, South Africa, et al. have for many years;
- work quietly with these sister democracies to strengthen
the W.T.O., the United Nations, U.N.E.S.C.O. et al.;
- pronounce what the U.S. and her sister democracies stand
for by "appreciating" China's continuing ‘commitment’ to honour the common values
in the current world order; as well as,
- scale back U.S. war-building efforts due to the country's
insolvency and stake out -- with our allies -- key interests, including the
South China Sea, FORMOSA, the Persian Gulf, etc.
These ideas sound cowardly to those of us used to equating
American exceptionalism with military power. American exceptionalism is real and was never about the power of weapons but of ideas; that exceptionalism
ceased being unique generations ago. Fellow democracies and other nations
aspiring to popular governance across the world share that exceptionalism today.
RATIONALE (i.e., best-case outcome)
These ('out-there') ideas may confer upon the many nations alarmed by the
excesses of Peking, consistently enumerated by the popular press, certain advantages.
- Such a dramatic shift will force China rapidly to clarify
her intentions about her role.
- As the global cop stalking the street, China will be so
bizzy that imperial aggression should become more difficult to pursue.
- With no more bickering about who is number-one among the democracies or the
degree of asserted primacy of American interests, the U.S. can get on with her
business as a stalwart supporter of human rights and republican governance, along with dozens of other nations.
- By crowning China as the 'king of the mountain', avenues of
secondary attack open up easing and empowering the ability of N.A.T.O., Japan,
Australia, South Korea et al. to chip away at China’s geo-political position
and dissipate her power incrementally.
- As China eventually faces collapse -- as has the U.S. after more than a generation of being a 'hyper-power' -- strengthened international institutions
rather than contentious nation states will be better positioned to mend the breach.