Letter-15: Closing Thoughts on Afghanistan

From: Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA
Date: Mon, Aug 16, 2010 at 12:45 AM
Subject: Reflections on USAID tour from Ned McDonnell
To:
Cc:

Philip and Jackie,

Please pardon the tardiness of this letter, requested by you Philip, as per his e-mail appended below. Jackie, Please pardon my not including you on earlier e-mails; I did not have your address. The following premisses -- perhaps what you are really seeking -- drove the lessons learned of rationalizing civilian reporting structures; restraints on further civilian projects; removing institutional frictions; and, focussing on everyday (i.e., common and cheap) programs with large legacies. The longer discussion on these lessons learned follows my signature.

• The United States Government (USG): the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA); and the NATO / U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are not succeeding in the counter-insurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan as evidenced by the problems encountered in Marjah, the delay in entering Kandahar and the dismissal of two ranking generals within a year.

• After nearly nine years of ISAF, the U.S. military as well as the USG and allied governments, almost every Afghan affected by this joint intervention has made up his mind about whether to embrace, accept or attack the foreign presence.

• The current end-sate for sustainable rule-of-law and development throughout Afghanistan is unattainable. It is wise to reserve limited means on areas where security permits capacity-building and capacity sticking to proceed. This may be only a quarter of the country; but that is a start.

• By reinforcing progressive, civilized behavior among beleaguered Afghans, conciliatory parties in contested areas will have ample incentive to re-take control of their villages. The costly part of this idea will be the expenses incurred to quarantine areas controlled by the AGE.

• A focus on the possible will free up USAID resources urgently needed elsewhere across the world while reducing incentives for corruption within and among the various levels of the GIRoA.

In closing this note, permit me to say that I am grateful to the United States Government for the opportunity to serve and for my German colleagues who helped make the short tour personally fulfilling. The timing of my departure reflects my inability to negotiate an extension from the Peace Corps; apparently, the work I will be doing is technical in nature. In the end, I either fulfilled my life-long --much procrastinated -- ambition or 'kiss it good-bye, forever'.

My appreciation of Messrs John CCCCCC and Matthew SSSSSS for their support of the women's rights program in Takhar remains sincere. My high regard remains firm for Mr Mark BBBBBBBBBBBBB -- one of the finest public officers with whom I have worked --for his facilitating the success of a lamentably truncated but deeply fulfilling tour with USAID.

Sincerely,
Ned McDonnell
Peace Corps-Mexico
Personal line: 860-690-1740

LESSONS LEARNED
LESSON #1: UNIFY the CIVILIAN CHAIN of COMMAND DIRECTLY UNDER the STATE DEPARTMENT (DoS).
That means integrate USAID into the DoS under the policy leadership of the Secretary of State and place all other civilian detachments (including the intelligence agencies), particularly those in conflict zones, under the direct authority of the United States Embassy. Like it or not, whole of government efforts entail institutional negotiations to reconcile differing visions of unstable, unclear situations. Consensus, at least in the field, is rare. Our military counterparts possess tremendous bargaining power for two reasons, the lesser important of which is funding.

The larger source of military leverage lies in its unification of the chains of command of at least four, likely more, cabinet-level institutions -- namely, the Army, Navy, Air Force and the former War Department (now the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or OSD) into the Department of Defense (DoD). The fragmentation of the civilian chain of command among the DoS, Treasury Department, USAID, the USDA, the Commerce Department et al. serves to dissipate the bargaining power of the civilian chain.

The break-down in accountability that follows -- best articulated as "I am with XYZ agency and don't report to State" -- coddles mediocrity of execution and circumvention of USG or GIRoA policies or preferences. The proposed unification of civilian reporting chains may appear threatening to some of my friends in USAID. I would submit, however, that the promotion of centralized accountability can permit de-centralized decision-making without the damage done by people placing personal preferences ahead of policy guidance.

Lastly, whether I deplore what I deem to be the pitfalls of American diplomacy as a USAID 'type' or not, I am still responsible to the DoS since my actions affect, and represent an extension of, diplomatic initiatives on the national level. As things stand now, the disparity of bargaining power between DoD on the one side and rivalling civilian agencies on the other forfeits too much initiative to the military. This vacuum of USG diplomacy has led to the military's appropriating civilian functions. This encroachment on civilian functions -- due to civilian weakness -- hurts the USG and muddles the military mission.

LESSON #2: DE-OBLIGATE or SUSPEND / CANCEL FUNDING of ALL USAID MISSIONS, NOW!
The current skew of development resources to Afghanistan neglects urgent development needs elsewhere and promotes corruption within the GIRoA at the national and sub-national levels. The excess funding in AGE-controlled areas in the South and the East appears to be ineffective. With ISAF in Afghanistan for nine years, painting a mosque will hardly change minds or win hearts.

Afghans have drawn their own conclusions by now and little, if anything, will change their acceptance of, or antipathy toward, the coalition presence. More money catalyzes an effort to "grab all funding" possible while it still lasts a little longer.

In view of the current size of the field-staff truly equipped to handle these funds, excess commitments are breaking down the disciplines of due-diligence and monitoring rightfully expected by U.S. tax-payers. We would all regret seeing good public servants damaged by future auditing reports that will effectively change the ground rules retro-actively.

All short-term stabilization programs of USAID really ought to be cancelled in favor of the military having adequate funding under the Commander's Emergency Response Program during upcoming clearing operations.

These funds can be devoted to consequence management to promote the safety and welfare of American troops in the field. In short, the U.S. Army and Marines need to concern themselves with military considerations in the short-term so muscular clearing of very difficult areas has a a chance to succeed.

Suspended funding will define clearly contested areas as candidates for clearing or, more likely, quarantining the AGE. After a nine-year presence of U.S. military personnel, investing in contested areas at this point simply reinforces bad behavior.

As the mid-2011 date for commencing the U.S. draw-down approaches, USAID and other agencies should begin to focus on sustainably secure areas, no matter how few in number. Instead of front-ending billions that the USG does not have, placing a reasonable amount of funding into a dedicated account for funding long-term development in Afghanistan is cost-efficient, conforms to U.S. standards of conduct avoids creating a 'beggar-ecomy'.

LESSON #3: DE-LINK USAID DEVELOPMENT and MILITARY 'BATTLE RHYTHMS'.
USAID needs to pursue its traditional mission in other regions currently neglected by the ongoing over-allocation of resources to Afghanistan. Furthermore, the COIN formula of shape-clear-hold-build is sequenced for a reason. The military's primary mission lies in the clear and hold phases. The USG's traditional development activities focus on long-term 'build' projects.

The two commands share an interest in the 'shape' (i.e., planning) phase to map out when civilian USG and military agencies assume logical primacies of command. As matters unfold presently, the forced synchronization of battle rhythms and COIN phases confuses people, diminishes whole-of-government effectiveness and contributes to disappointment with unmet (often unrealistic) expectations, cessation of open dialogue and lower morale.

LESSON #4: FOCUS on the TRUE BATTLE-FIELD: the FUTURE!
Viet Nam has matured into a thriving nation over the last thirty-five years. Notwithstanding military defeat of the U.S. interests in 1975, the seeds planted by decade-long American presence and culture have borne the bear fruit for which the greatest generation desperately hoped in the 1960s and 1970s. The process is likely to take more than two generations, if it ever occurs, in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the legacy left by the USG will shape the way rising Afghan generations view their prospects and society. That means remembering that the battlefield is not a particular village, tribe, city, valley, province or road-way. It remains the future. Inexpensive programs can innovate the future for Afghans. For example, addressing the increasing abuse of drugs in the Af-Pak region is important but trivialized.

Self-help groups are more effective than all the millions spent on cash-for-work. Teaching people to read the Qu'ran in vernacular creates an incentive to overcome the culture of poverty (where literacy is not valued) and diminishes the influence of mullahs since they now are the Qu'ran as the illiterate faithful know it.

One potentially pricey measure is to plan for internally displaced women with children. The Western Powers have an acutely evident moral obligation to protect women -- and the children -- who assert their God-endowed rights in the face of a severely misogynist and brutally sexist culture, particularly in Taliban-controlled areas in the South and East.

Letter #14: The more things change...

The U.S. Embassy, Kabul
ATTN: Senior Civilian Representative; Regional Command-North
Deputy Director; USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams

2nd August 2010

RE Resignation of Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA from USAID effective 2nd August 2010

Doug and Herbie,

After an unsuccessful effort to defer my entrance into the Peace Corps, I submit to you my resignation, effective immediately, from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It is with sadness that I proceed in this manner. Nevertheless, the Peace Corps has been a lifelong ambition and, with my ageing beginning to take hold, I view this time and opportunity as the last one available to me.

Attached is a schedule of the projects on which I have worked with a status report on each one. The status of these projects has not changed significantly. Also attached is the strategy for the Community-based Stabilization Grant Program for Takhar Province.

Please be advised that I timed my resignation to allow for three key gender-equality projects to proceed to approval. Mr XXXXX is GOR-qualified and can oversee the administration of these fundings. Since any monies advanced will be done so electronically, this oversight should not be a burden.

My experience at USAID, while curtailed, has been deeply rewarding. Through my tenure in Kunduz, I have learned a great deal and matured more than I would have expected. Through certain difficulties related to security and institutional constraints, I learned to persevere to bring projects to fruition and contribute to the whole-of-government approach.

Additionally, I will cherish my experience of working with German diplomats, aid-workers, civilians and soldiers as well as with UNAMA officials and representatives of a dozen international non-governmental organizations. Most rewarding, of course, has been the relationships developed with host-country officials and ordinary Afghans.

Beleaguered as they are, Afghans – whether Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek or Hezara – never once failed to assist me and show consideration to me. Lastly, the support I received from Kabul – both from the Department of State and from USAID – was consistently professional and timely.

My gratitude runs deeply and I hope to return to USAID in 2012, when I have experience that can truly facilitate the transmission of a value-add to local beneficiaries.

Very truly yours,

Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA / CAPM
formerly, General Development Officer

Letter to Friends and Family #13: the surge may work; the splurge surely won't

Up north, in Kunduz, the Germans have the lead in development and in military activity. USAID definitely plays a secondary role and, consequently, keeps the budget as low as its profile. Basically, I have been whining about the lack of resources (i.e., “Show me the money! Can’t you see I’m hungry up here?”).

That attitude changed drastically when I attended a contracting course with many colleagues in the two primary theaters of the Afghan War: Kandahar and the south as well as Bagram and the east. These regions comprise the Pashtun belt whence the Taliban came and where trouble remains.

My colleagues worried out loud about having too many dollars to commit too quickly! Initially, I felt the ‘burden’ of too much money to shovel out the door as quickly as possible was a high-class problem.

WRONG. Over the ten day life of this course, however, I came to believe that excess monies undermine the enthusiasm of high-minded people for surprisingly evident reasons.

First, capital inflows into Afghanistan surpassed long ago the country's saturation limit. By drowning in liquidity, Afghanistan has the appearance of a society on a lightning-fast mend from centuries of poverty and pain.

But that burgeoning wealth is bogus and represents short-term funding for unsustainable projects and, worse, a catalyst of greater corruption. President Obama’s prudent time-table, unhappily, has had at least one unintended effect: corrupt local political brokers realize that the aid spigot is about to be shut-off and are busy grabbing what they can.

But once the imported liquidity dries out, the Afghan withdrawal from an addiction to other people's money will almost certainly trigger renewed, and savage, civil strife. The one-eyed bandit will look clairvoyant and Al Qaida sympathetic by comparison.

Second, this massive display of ‘generosity’ simply does not work. After eight years of allied presence in their cities and villages, most Afghans have formed firm opinions about the success, failure, desirability or repugnance of a forceful foreign presence.

Additionally, there simply are not enough skilled laborers in the country to complete and maintain the projects in process or in the planning stage.

Third, my colleagues feel very vulnerable. The requirement to dispense with so much money so quickly subverts the USAID due-diligence process. My acquaintances despise this 'spending at all costs', as the U.S. government equates dollars obligated and funded with success.

Well – “surprise” writ large across the sky – it is not working. And for reasons additional to the sobering fact that, at best, 20% of the “billions and billions” of aid dollars actually reach Afghan beneficiaries. Worse, many of the funds funnel over to the enemy.

Further, my peers foresee a day when the U.S. government’s accounting ‘Gotcha-Goons’ will picking through every nook and cranny of twisted documentation to find fraud, waste and abuse. Given the complexity and unwieldiness of the grants documentation, combined with the surfeit of aid that overwhelms it, my colleagues dread the day when investigators may impugn their professional integrity over policy errors and errant appropriations emanating from Washington.

The part that drives my colleagues to anxiety are emerging sadnesses: that 75-85% of the Afghans will remain illiterate throughout this spree; that girls all-too-often will continue not going to school; and, that women will face brutal hurdles in exercising their electoral franchise.

The solutions to this queasy quandary number as many as the people proposing them. Cobbling together bits of some ideas with pieces of others produces a simple policy.

First, cease all funding for long-term projects that lie ahead of the Afghan learning curve. Then place these ‘de-obligated’ funds into a trust to be spent down over the next generation as Afghans mature their capabilities to use them wisely.

Second, suspend any further work in the Pashtun provinces for at least six months to see who and where the bad guys are; they will be ‘razing hell’ soon enough.

Third, target the surge toward these ‘unpacified’ areas.

Fourth, turn over all USAID ‘stabilization’ programming to the military for use under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. USAID is not suited for palliatives. Moreover, those released funds allow the Army field soldiers to apply $750 million for consequence management during the surge. It just may save their lives.

Lastly, diminish USAID personnel to 25% and funding to 10% of their current levels in Afghanistan to focus activities on tranquil parts of the country. Good citizenship should be supported first and now.

And why are these solutions, and others like them, “meet and right so to do”? Otherwise, we leave a sullied legacy of civil strife, of ethnic cleansing and of “life being nasty brutish and short”.

Letter #12 to Friends and Family: Ned forgot his Wheaties

This letter should not require even five hundred words. The first draft was three times that amount. Three items drive this mea culpa. First, I under-estimated President Obama. Second, I imputed my cynicism to the President. Third, the sum of two counts half-accepted represents yet another bout of the unbearable greyness of being.

FIRST: UNDER-ESTIMATING the PRESIDENT
Recently, I had dinner in Kabul with some acquaintances from the Embassy who were wired into the real events of General McChrystal’s fateful half-hour meeting from which he emerged a relieved man. Apparently, General McChrytsal walked into the White House meeting proudly, almost defiantly. No surprise there. Present at the ritual slaughter with President Obama were Vice President Biden, National Security Council Chairman Jones, General Petraeus and Secretary Gates. After the usual pleasantries and, perhaps, a briefing, the meeting turned to the real subject. General McChrystal apparently stated that President Obama had his letter of resignation. The ritual slaughter for which I had previously argued should have followed. Except, it never occurred. President Obama proved his capacity as a statesman by replying that he was “considering [accepting] it.” General McChrystal asked the other four whether he still enjoyed their confidence and support. Two said ‘yea’; two remained silent, at which point McChrystal recommended that the President accept the resignation. President Obama accepted the resignation but did not bust General McChrystal’s rank down to Lieutenant General (i.e., from four to three stars on the epaulet). The senior Embassy types, like David Smith, chastised me kindly for mis-reading the situation. And so I had – thank God Himself for that!

SECOND: REALIZING the CYNIC’s PARADOX
Not one person I know - Democrat, Republican, Independent or Fair-weather partisan - has bought into my concern that President Obama appointed General Petraeus to assume command in Afghanistan to hang the Afghanistan War on the latter. Most people think that General Petraeus accepted the request with all of the earnestness at his command for three reasons. His theory of counter-insurgency faces a steep test in Afghanistan; the South is not progressing well. ‘Governance in a box’ appears to be ‘government as a hoax’. Additionally, General Petraeus has the credibility to squeeze one more year out of the American people if conditions do not favour the commencement of withdrawal in mid-2011. Lastly, I genuinely believe that General Petraeus remains, to his core, a devoted citizen-soldier of the United States of America. Three plausible reasons; three cheers for General Petraeus.

THIRD: TWO HALF-COUNTS of SECONDARY IMPORTANCE
The two half-counts, in view of their moral ambiguity, can only unleash a torrent of ‘Hamletizing’. Since you, the reader, are about as interested in contemplating my navel as I have time to do so, I prefer to leave those debates to you. First, intelligence types tell me that the locals, most Pashtuns included, welcome U.S. special forces as they kill very bad men; in fact, these villagers want to see more aggressive attacks by the U.S. Fair enough. Nevertheless, I cannot help but wonder if Afghans, conditioned to a culture of conflict, find such ethical finery to be just so much nit-picking. After all, had the social lottery placed me in Afghanistan as a subsistence farmer, I would most likely be dead by now and dead for several years. The other half-count, whether General McChrystal should have lost his command over the Rolling Stone article, really is anyone’s judgement call. While I remain unconvinced, people more intelligent than I seem to agree that Gerneral McChrystal went too far and was fortunate not to be summarily fired.

In conclusion, the irony remains that I was not a big fan of General McChrystal. In any case, President Obama deserves credit for pre-meditated statesmanship after the die was cast. The lesson for me? Oscar Wilde was right: a cynic knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. Best I quit counting my pennies and put them back into my loafers.

Letter #11 to friends and family: The Politics of Murder

Life returns to normal – that is to say: back to sunny surrealism – after a bloody incident like the “complex” attack that occurred two nights ago in the heart of Kunduz City (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-attack-20100703,0,2973351.story). Life on the plateau, on which we rest complacently, appears to be relatively immune to reality. Five of the six murdered belonged, in some capacity, to one of USAID’s largest “implementing partners”, Development Alternatives International (DAI).

Many of the eighteen wounded, however, had nothing to do with the incident. Again, they were pure innocents falling victim to the local police peppering the stricken building with rocket-propelled grenades. Beat cops with R.P.G.s? Not good for community policing. The attack that hammered DAI was complex in that it represented a tightly planned sequence of attacks.

Had DAI’s security people followed the spurned advice of the local police, the car-bomb would have killed one DAI guard – Afghan, I am sure – instantly at the front gate. The remaining five insurgents should have had to face a second, strongly fortified perimeter ten feet behind the gate and meet a rather quick demise. Such “simplistification”, however, misses the larger question: why was DAI itself attacked? The obvious answer, and the one that ends most analyses, is that DAI is a large USAID contractor. American NGOs are fair game; end of story.

Well, not quite. Several USAID implementing partners work in Kunduz, not to mention about half a dozen others from Europe working on Germany’s far larger program. So, why DAI in particular? Because DAI’s dormitory was in a residential area and neighbors were none-too-pleased with its presence. Now why would that be? After all, this house populated in large part by highly paid foreigners would normally be pumping money into the neighborhood economy.

True; nevertheless, local inhabitants suspect that large American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) pose as front organizations for intelligence organizations and, worse (from the Afghan view), the special forces. The ‘black ops’ mode of selective elimination of key enemy figures has significantly reduced collateral damage, a definite “PLUS” ethically. On the other hand, many Afghans rightly or wrongly view these midnight rangers as assassins or terrorists in uniform.

All very interesting but where does DAI figure in all of this? DAI is implementing a program to aid the counter-insurgency by investing in small local projects in contested areas. This 'window-dressing' program confers “quick-impacts” on hostile communities by employing local workers. All just fine; that is counter-insurgency. To do that, however, DAI likely works with intelligence resources to target particular villages for these non-lethal activities aimed at winning hearts and minds.

The villagers see through the manipulation as easily as we can see through overt and often insincere efforts of someone trying to ‘buy’ our liking. Taliban sympathizers may take -- and even like -- the money. Yet they continue to detest the ulterior motives imputed to the DAIs of the world. Buying allegiances will not work. Furthermore, companies like DAI should fail developmental smell-tests.

DAI is a for-profit organization dedicated (apparently) to development or capacity-building, the flip-side of ‘sovereign’ loans extended by international money-center banks. Admittedly, I once made the argument that international banks should take the lead in lending to poorer countries because the money-centers would differentiate third-world countries – those with the ability to grow and pay off loans to the banker’s profit – from fourth world countries (i.e., today's the bottom billion). All very logical on my part...when I was a twenty-two year old trying to get a job in banking in the late 1970s.

We know the reality of global finance by now, with periodic 'sovereign debt' write-offs in exchange for (supposedly) coerced votes in the U.N., and the like. (Not original to me, but to a self-indulgent former ‘development professional’ in a book titled “Confessions of an Economic Hit-Man”; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confessions_of_an_Economic_Hit_Man.) In the contemporary economics of U.S. development aid, much of the money designated as "pledged" to a poor country, barely trickles down to the intended beneficiaries. The bulk of this 'foreign aid' funds white-collar make-work consulting jobs that enrich Americans and U.S. companies like DAI.

Large non-profit implementing (what?) partners often are little better. The good news is that most NGOs, including American and those contracting out to USAID, do not fit the profile of “beltway bandits”. They do good work. Their best work comes through working with start-up NGOs in Afghanistan and elsewhere that engage local populations to take back their futures to the extent they can, little-by-little.

Thus, DAI was attacked more for being perceived as a corporate bag-man doing the bidding of the U.S. government. Sadly, two nights ago, theocratic thugs murdered six people most of whom had no axe to grind with insurgents, criminals, freedom-fighters, corporate welfare chiselers or anyone else. Every bit as sad will be the continuing “battle rhythm” of many large USAID implementing partners: high-profiles, fast bucks and fleeting, if any, results.

Letter #10 to Friends and Family: Papa was a Rolling Stone

In pondering the fate of General Stanley McChrystal, I giggle with the memory of a top-40s song from the early 1970s “On the Cover of the Rolling Stone”. General McChrystal has done certain things that make me shudder like trying to shame allies into sending more troops, falsifying reports of Pat Tillman’s death in 2004 and, drawn from this article, looking the other way on torture.

Any one of these things may have been grounds for dismissal. But this Rolling Stone article? I do not think so. General McChrystal is not breaking orders but indulging an ego fed on sleep deprivation and asceticism. The General’s behavior seems to say, non-verbally, “See I am a hard-guy and, every day, I make the tough decisions – like not eating – that make America the kick-ass nietzschean über-nation that wins wars against all odds.”

This quaint arrogance has enabled General McChrystal to take the heat of pursuing a strategy fraught with risk. Most mere mortals (e.g., me) would never be able to manage this type of awful responsibility. Awful in its intensity. Awful in its relentlessness. Awful in its consequences. So the man deserves some credit for his transparency – even when he appears to be blatantly impolitic.

Instinctively, I felt dread when confronted by colleagues with this fracas in the fishbowl of modern media-made warfare. What drove General McChrystal and his rottweiler retinue to make such remarks? Staff Sgt. Kennith Hicks put my feelings vividly in the article itself: "I get COIN. I get all that. McChrystal comes here, explains it, it makes sense. But then he goes away on his bird [helicopter], and by the time his directives get passed down to us through Big Army, they're all f**ked up – either because somebody is trying to cover their ass, or because they just don't understand it themselves. But we're f**king losing this thing."

And things are not going well among the allies, either. If anything, General McChrystal’s candor, at times ill-advised, has made him a lightning rod for anger boiling over against the United States of America from Afghans and, at least German, allies alike. Sensitivities run very high these days when German officers, proud of their professionalism, uncharacteristically lash out at the arrogance of the U.S. Army in my presence. And many are quite accurate. Behind my impassive manner amid all of this heat-lightning lurks a thought taken from a lesson taught long ago.

First the thought: we may be preparing to exit Afghanistan. President Obama has decided upon yet another strategic review of this war; scheduled in December, a month after the Congressional elections. That sounds to me like the Administration expects a popular repudiation of the Afghan policy in November. This review will simply sanction the popular will. Don’t get me wrong: I support the time-line. Reason has to put limits on open-ended policies. Eighteen months – the timeline identified by President Obama in late 2009 – to get it right or get out still seems reasonable to me.

Which brings this letter to a lesson still alive in my mind from my Choate days. In May of 1975, I had a heated discussion with a Choate History teacher, Tom Generous. Saigon had fallen; punks in Phnom Penh had hijacked the S.S. Mayaguez. At dinner, I asked Mr Generous why so many people disliked the United States when we sought only to bring liberty to downtrodden people around the world.

Well, ‘T.G.’ – a Viet Nam Navy veteran – had a field day over dessert. Mr Generous shot right back, “What do you think of when you see a swastika?” I said, “Why the Nazis of course.” He asked me if that was a positive image. I said of course not.

Mr Generous then instructed me, in effect, “Ned, think about what the stars-and-stripes mean to people who have seen their families burned by napalm from U.S. jet-fighters. Or what about those people who find out their elected leader has been overthrown by the U.S. government? What do these people think of when they see the stars-&-stripes?”

These were, as they remain today, hard questions from a well-intentioned, highly intelligent and deeply patriotic man. Mr Generous got me thinking hard that evening thirty-five years ago, or as hard as my polluted fifth-form brain could at the time. Suddenly, with the quiet cues of defeat beginning to surface here in Afghanistan, they have me thinking again, some thirty-five years later.

Letter #9 to Friends and Family: Palestine after Four Days-Ghosts of Jimmy Past

By happenstance, May 31st proved to be an interesting day for me to wander around Jerusalem with sad and mystifying events unfolding in international waters off of the coast of Gaza. A long-held personal mission to investigate for myself the tortured land of Palestine underlay my all-too-brief sojourn. Forty years ago, I recall my philo-Semitic mother saying that a million people could not be thrown out of their homes without difficulties emerging. 

Thirty years after Israël’s lightning victory in 1967, a good friend repeated heatedly that Israel had herded Palestineans into what he termed history’s largest concentration, not refugee, camps. Seeing Israël, as I still do, as the region’s lone democracy and most vital society, I disagreed with a vigor quite as intense as his.

At that time, I had few Muslim friends, fewer Arab acquaintances and zero respect for countries hostile to Israël. Nevertheless, I could not turn a blind eye towards Thucydides’ analysis of the blood-drunk foreign policy of Attica’s leading democracy during the Peloponnesian War. Democracy does not axiomatically equate to peace; losing a moral rudder often anticipates bloodshed and eventual defeat.

Two State Department tours in Iraq mollified my prejudice toward Arabs. Then Israël lost me with its over-reaction to Hezbollah in 2006 by killing dozens of civilians for every Israeli dead. The subsequent siege and impoverishment of Gaza two years later turned a rump of desert into, as my friend had warned a decade before, the world’s largest concentration camp. The now-threadbare rationale of Hamas being the cause of this indiscriminate killing of innocents belied Israël’s cry of self-defense.

The snip-it of exposure I have had of Palestine falls somewhere in between my reflexive support of Israël since 1982 and the disillusionment of the past four years. From my limited vantage point, at least, I see a depressing cohesion of fear on one side of the “wall”; despair on the other; and, sullenness on both. To be sure, I confronted my share of check-points and security personnel which seemed like petty annoyances facing a tourist.

Day after day, however, security detours stretch fifteen minute Palestinean commutes into an hour or more; searches and metal detectors treat innocents like terrorists; and, prohibited entries into sacred sites signal a two-tiered society. This gutting of liberty contrasts sharply with private ‘Israeli’ roads all over the West Bank and force protection of illegal Israeli colonizers populating illegal Israeli settlements atop precious Palestinean aquifers.

Thus ‘petty annoyances’ accumulate into a culture of shame and despair plaguing Palestineans simply seeking their four freedoms in their ancestral lands. The settlements and refugee camps each reek of this joint Jewish and Palestinean stasis of diminishing dreams, unsustainable privilege, and twisted tribalism.

The over-riding impression of my visit to Palestine, however, remains one of frustration and sadness over opportunities foregone. The Palestineans are industrious, inquisitive, educated and intelligent; traits rightly associated with Israelis. On the other hand, imagine one state unified toward a common purpose . . . .

That economy of thirteen million people would put their Mediterranean, Levantine and Arab neighbors to shame on statistics like productivity, inventions, value-added, etc. . . . and with no oil to boot. These two peoples would not trust each other at first but, with explicit safeguards and incentives, they could work together.

Perhaps oppression and outrage have festered for so long that undoing their effects will prove insurmountable; I do not, can not, and will not believe it. So what to do in the light of Gaza just a couple of days ago? Try to build that peace against all odds, but in a single state harnessing the mutual distrust into institutional constraints and accountability.

How can the United States of America support this uncertain mission?

America brings a national experience and publicly witnessed precedent of progressing beyond a painful, racist past. The manifest liking for, and desire to emulate, Americans (if not the U.S. government) displayed by the Palestineans deepens the moral urgency confronting a U.S. Administration long on the rhetoric of reconciliation with Muslims but short on the substance of peace-making.

President Obama would do well to study thoroughly the bumbling Administration of President Jimmy Carter. The Palestinean desire to emulate America – and, in her best aspects, Israël – should come as no shock since the Palestineans relish enterprise, much like their U.S. and Israeli counterparts.