Up north, in Kunduz, the Germans have the lead in development and in military activity. USAID definitely plays a secondary role and, consequently, keeps the budget as low as its profile. Basically, I have been whining about the lack of resources (i.e., “Show me the money! Can’t you see I’m hungry up here?”).
That attitude changed drastically when I attended a contracting course with many colleagues in the two primary theaters of the Afghan War: Kandahar and the south as well as Bagram and the east. These regions comprise the Pashtun belt whence the Taliban came and where trouble remains.
My colleagues worried out loud about having too many dollars to commit too quickly! Initially, I felt the ‘burden’ of too much money to shovel out the door as quickly as possible was a high-class problem.
WRONG. Over the ten day life of this course, however, I came to believe that excess monies undermine the enthusiasm of high-minded people for surprisingly evident reasons.
First, capital inflows into Afghanistan surpassed long ago the country's saturation limit. By drowning in liquidity, Afghanistan has the appearance of a society on a lightning-fast mend from centuries of poverty and pain.
But that burgeoning wealth is bogus and represents short-term funding for unsustainable projects and, worse, a catalyst of greater corruption. President Obama’s prudent time-table, unhappily, has had at least one unintended effect: corrupt local political brokers realize that the aid spigot is about to be shut-off and are busy grabbing what they can.
But once the imported liquidity dries out, the Afghan withdrawal from an addiction to other people's money will almost certainly trigger renewed, and savage, civil strife. The one-eyed bandit will look clairvoyant and Al Qaida sympathetic by comparison.
Second, this massive display of ‘generosity’ simply does not work. After eight years of allied presence in their cities and villages, most Afghans have formed firm opinions about the success, failure, desirability or repugnance of a forceful foreign presence.
Additionally, there simply are not enough skilled laborers in the country to complete and maintain the projects in process or in the planning stage.
Third, my colleagues feel very vulnerable. The requirement to dispense with so much money so quickly subverts the USAID due-diligence process. My acquaintances despise this 'spending at all costs', as the U.S. government equates dollars obligated and funded with success.
Well – “surprise” writ large across the sky – it is not working. And for reasons additional to the sobering fact that, at best, 20% of the “billions and billions” of aid dollars actually reach Afghan beneficiaries. Worse, many of the funds funnel over to the enemy.
Further, my peers foresee a day when the U.S. government’s accounting ‘Gotcha-Goons’ will picking through every nook and cranny of twisted documentation to find fraud, waste and abuse. Given the complexity and unwieldiness of the grants documentation, combined with the surfeit of aid that overwhelms it, my colleagues dread the day when investigators may impugn their professional integrity over policy errors and errant appropriations emanating from Washington.
The part that drives my colleagues to anxiety are emerging sadnesses: that 75-85% of the Afghans will remain illiterate throughout this spree; that girls all-too-often will continue not going to school; and, that women will face brutal hurdles in exercising their electoral franchise.
The solutions to this queasy quandary number as many as the people proposing them. Cobbling together bits of some ideas with pieces of others produces a simple policy.
First, cease all funding for long-term projects that lie ahead of the Afghan learning curve. Then place these ‘de-obligated’ funds into a trust to be spent down over the next generation as Afghans mature their capabilities to use them wisely.
Second, suspend any further work in the Pashtun provinces for at least six months to see who and where the bad guys are; they will be ‘razing hell’ soon enough.
Third, target the surge toward these ‘unpacified’ areas.
Fourth, turn over all USAID ‘stabilization’ programming to the military for use under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. USAID is not suited for palliatives. Moreover, those released funds allow the Army field soldiers to apply $750 million for consequence management during the surge. It just may save their lives.
Lastly, diminish USAID personnel to 25% and funding to 10% of their current levels in Afghanistan to focus activities on tranquil parts of the country. Good citizenship should be supported first and now.
And why are these solutions, and others like them, “meet and right so to do”? Otherwise, we leave a sullied legacy of civil strife, of ethnic cleansing and of “life being nasty brutish and short”.
Friday, July 23, 2010
Friday, July 16, 2010
Letter #12 to Friends and Family: Ned forgot his Wheaties
This letter should not require even five hundred words. The first draft was three times that amount. Three items drive this mea culpa. First, I under-estimated President Obama. Second, I imputed my cynicism to the President. Third, the sum of two counts half-accepted represents yet another bout of the unbearable greyness of being.
FIRST: UNDER-ESTIMATING the PRESIDENT
Recently, I had dinner in Kabul with some acquaintances from the Embassy who were wired into the real events of General McChrystal’s fateful half-hour meeting from which he emerged a relieved man. Apparently, General McChrytsal walked into the White House meeting proudly, almost defiantly. No surprise there. Present at the ritual slaughter with President Obama were Vice President Biden, National Security Council Chairman Jones, General Petraeus and Secretary Gates. After the usual pleasantries and, perhaps, a briefing, the meeting turned to the real subject. General McChrystal apparently stated that President Obama had his letter of resignation. The ritual slaughter for which I had previously argued should have followed. Except, it never occurred. President Obama proved his capacity as a statesman by replying that he was “considering [accepting] it.” General McChrystal asked the other four whether he still enjoyed their confidence and support. Two said ‘yea’; two remained silent, at which point McChrystal recommended that the President accept the resignation. President Obama accepted the resignation but did not bust General McChrystal’s rank down to Lieutenant General (i.e., from four to three stars on the epaulet). The senior Embassy types, like David Smith, chastised me kindly for mis-reading the situation. And so I had – thank God Himself for that!
SECOND: REALIZING the CYNIC’s PARADOX
Not one person I know - Democrat, Republican, Independent or Fair-weather partisan - has bought into my concern that President Obama appointed General Petraeus to assume command in Afghanistan to hang the Afghanistan War on the latter. Most people think that General Petraeus accepted the request with all of the earnestness at his command for three reasons. His theory of counter-insurgency faces a steep test in Afghanistan; the South is not progressing well. ‘Governance in a box’ appears to be ‘government as a hoax’. Additionally, General Petraeus has the credibility to squeeze one more year out of the American people if conditions do not favour the commencement of withdrawal in mid-2011. Lastly, I genuinely believe that General Petraeus remains, to his core, a devoted citizen-soldier of the United States of America. Three plausible reasons; three cheers for General Petraeus.
THIRD: TWO HALF-COUNTS of SECONDARY IMPORTANCE
The two half-counts, in view of their moral ambiguity, can only unleash a torrent of ‘Hamletizing’. Since you, the reader, are about as interested in contemplating my navel as I have time to do so, I prefer to leave those debates to you. First, intelligence types tell me that the locals, most Pashtuns included, welcome U.S. special forces as they kill very bad men; in fact, these villagers want to see more aggressive attacks by the U.S. Fair enough. Nevertheless, I cannot help but wonder if Afghans, conditioned to a culture of conflict, find such ethical finery to be just so much nit-picking. After all, had the social lottery placed me in Afghanistan as a subsistence farmer, I would most likely be dead by now and dead for several years. The other half-count, whether General McChrystal should have lost his command over the Rolling Stone article, really is anyone’s judgement call. While I remain unconvinced, people more intelligent than I seem to agree that Gerneral McChrystal went too far and was fortunate not to be summarily fired.
In conclusion, the irony remains that I was not a big fan of General McChrystal. In any case, President Obama deserves credit for pre-meditated statesmanship after the die was cast. The lesson for me? Oscar Wilde was right: a cynic knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. Best I quit counting my pennies and put them back into my loafers.
FIRST: UNDER-ESTIMATING the PRESIDENT
Recently, I had dinner in Kabul with some acquaintances from the Embassy who were wired into the real events of General McChrystal’s fateful half-hour meeting from which he emerged a relieved man. Apparently, General McChrytsal walked into the White House meeting proudly, almost defiantly. No surprise there. Present at the ritual slaughter with President Obama were Vice President Biden, National Security Council Chairman Jones, General Petraeus and Secretary Gates. After the usual pleasantries and, perhaps, a briefing, the meeting turned to the real subject. General McChrystal apparently stated that President Obama had his letter of resignation. The ritual slaughter for which I had previously argued should have followed. Except, it never occurred. President Obama proved his capacity as a statesman by replying that he was “considering [accepting] it.” General McChrystal asked the other four whether he still enjoyed their confidence and support. Two said ‘yea’; two remained silent, at which point McChrystal recommended that the President accept the resignation. President Obama accepted the resignation but did not bust General McChrystal’s rank down to Lieutenant General (i.e., from four to three stars on the epaulet). The senior Embassy types, like David Smith, chastised me kindly for mis-reading the situation. And so I had – thank God Himself for that!
SECOND: REALIZING the CYNIC’s PARADOX
Not one person I know - Democrat, Republican, Independent or Fair-weather partisan - has bought into my concern that President Obama appointed General Petraeus to assume command in Afghanistan to hang the Afghanistan War on the latter. Most people think that General Petraeus accepted the request with all of the earnestness at his command for three reasons. His theory of counter-insurgency faces a steep test in Afghanistan; the South is not progressing well. ‘Governance in a box’ appears to be ‘government as a hoax’. Additionally, General Petraeus has the credibility to squeeze one more year out of the American people if conditions do not favour the commencement of withdrawal in mid-2011. Lastly, I genuinely believe that General Petraeus remains, to his core, a devoted citizen-soldier of the United States of America. Three plausible reasons; three cheers for General Petraeus.
THIRD: TWO HALF-COUNTS of SECONDARY IMPORTANCE
The two half-counts, in view of their moral ambiguity, can only unleash a torrent of ‘Hamletizing’. Since you, the reader, are about as interested in contemplating my navel as I have time to do so, I prefer to leave those debates to you. First, intelligence types tell me that the locals, most Pashtuns included, welcome U.S. special forces as they kill very bad men; in fact, these villagers want to see more aggressive attacks by the U.S. Fair enough. Nevertheless, I cannot help but wonder if Afghans, conditioned to a culture of conflict, find such ethical finery to be just so much nit-picking. After all, had the social lottery placed me in Afghanistan as a subsistence farmer, I would most likely be dead by now and dead for several years. The other half-count, whether General McChrystal should have lost his command over the Rolling Stone article, really is anyone’s judgement call. While I remain unconvinced, people more intelligent than I seem to agree that Gerneral McChrystal went too far and was fortunate not to be summarily fired.
In conclusion, the irony remains that I was not a big fan of General McChrystal. In any case, President Obama deserves credit for pre-meditated statesmanship after the die was cast. The lesson for me? Oscar Wilde was right: a cynic knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. Best I quit counting my pennies and put them back into my loafers.
Saturday, July 3, 2010
Letter #11 to friends and family: The Politics of Murder
Life returns to normal – that is to say: back to sunny surrealism – after a bloody incident like the “complex” attack that occurred two nights ago in the heart of Kunduz City (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-attack-20100703,0,2973351.story). Life on the plateau, on which we rest complacently, appears to be relatively immune to reality. Five of the six murdered belonged, in some capacity, to one of USAID’s largest “implementing partners”, Development Alternatives International (DAI).
Many of the eighteen wounded, however, had nothing to do with the incident. Again, they were pure innocents falling victim to the local police peppering the stricken building with rocket-propelled grenades. Beat cops with R.P.G.s? Not good for community policing. The attack that hammered DAI was complex in that it represented a tightly planned sequence of attacks.
Had DAI’s security people followed the spurned advice of the local police, the car-bomb would have killed one DAI guard – Afghan, I am sure – instantly at the front gate. The remaining five insurgents should have had to face a second, strongly fortified perimeter ten feet behind the gate and meet a rather quick demise. Such “simplistification”, however, misses the larger question: why was DAI itself attacked? The obvious answer, and the one that ends most analyses, is that DAI is a large USAID contractor. American NGOs are fair game; end of story.
Well, not quite. Several USAID implementing partners work in Kunduz, not to mention about half a dozen others from Europe working on Germany’s far larger program. So, why DAI in particular? Because DAI’s dormitory was in a residential area and neighbors were none-too-pleased with its presence. Now why would that be? After all, this house populated in large part by highly paid foreigners would normally be pumping money into the neighborhood economy.
True; nevertheless, local inhabitants suspect that large American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) pose as front organizations for intelligence organizations and, worse (from the Afghan view), the special forces. The ‘black ops’ mode of selective elimination of key enemy figures has significantly reduced collateral damage, a definite “PLUS” ethically. On the other hand, many Afghans rightly or wrongly view these midnight rangers as assassins or terrorists in uniform.
All very interesting but where does DAI figure in all of this? DAI is implementing a program to aid the counter-insurgency by investing in small local projects in contested areas. This 'window-dressing' program confers “quick-impacts” on hostile communities by employing local workers. All just fine; that is counter-insurgency. To do that, however, DAI likely works with intelligence resources to target particular villages for these non-lethal activities aimed at winning hearts and minds.
The villagers see through the manipulation as easily as we can see through overt and often insincere efforts of someone trying to ‘buy’ our liking. Taliban sympathizers may take -- and even like -- the money. Yet they continue to detest the ulterior motives imputed to the DAIs of the world. Buying allegiances will not work. Furthermore, companies like DAI should fail developmental smell-tests.
DAI is a for-profit organization dedicated (apparently) to development or capacity-building, the flip-side of ‘sovereign’ loans extended by international money-center banks. Admittedly, I once made the argument that international banks should take the lead in lending to poorer countries because the money-centers would differentiate third-world countries – those with the ability to grow and pay off loans to the banker’s profit – from fourth world countries (i.e., today's the bottom billion). All very logical on my part...when I was a twenty-two year old trying to get a job in banking in the late 1970s.
We know the reality of global finance by now, with periodic 'sovereign debt' write-offs in exchange for (supposedly) coerced votes in the U.N., and the like. (Not original to me, but to a self-indulgent former ‘development professional’ in a book titled “Confessions of an Economic Hit-Man”; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confessions_of_an_Economic_Hit_Man.) In the contemporary economics of U.S. development aid, much of the money designated as "pledged" to a poor country, barely trickles down to the intended beneficiaries. The bulk of this 'foreign aid' funds white-collar make-work consulting jobs that enrich Americans and U.S. companies like DAI.
Large non-profit implementing (what?) partners often are little better. The good news is that most NGOs, including American and those contracting out to USAID, do not fit the profile of “beltway bandits”. They do good work. Their best work comes through working with start-up NGOs in Afghanistan and elsewhere that engage local populations to take back their futures to the extent they can, little-by-little.
Thus, DAI was attacked more for being perceived as a corporate bag-man doing the bidding of the U.S. government. Sadly, two nights ago, theocratic thugs murdered six people most of whom had no axe to grind with insurgents, criminals, freedom-fighters, corporate welfare chiselers or anyone else. Every bit as sad will be the continuing “battle rhythm” of many large USAID implementing partners: high-profiles, fast bucks and fleeting, if any, results.
Many of the eighteen wounded, however, had nothing to do with the incident. Again, they were pure innocents falling victim to the local police peppering the stricken building with rocket-propelled grenades. Beat cops with R.P.G.s? Not good for community policing. The attack that hammered DAI was complex in that it represented a tightly planned sequence of attacks.
Had DAI’s security people followed the spurned advice of the local police, the car-bomb would have killed one DAI guard – Afghan, I am sure – instantly at the front gate. The remaining five insurgents should have had to face a second, strongly fortified perimeter ten feet behind the gate and meet a rather quick demise. Such “simplistification”, however, misses the larger question: why was DAI itself attacked? The obvious answer, and the one that ends most analyses, is that DAI is a large USAID contractor. American NGOs are fair game; end of story.
Well, not quite. Several USAID implementing partners work in Kunduz, not to mention about half a dozen others from Europe working on Germany’s far larger program. So, why DAI in particular? Because DAI’s dormitory was in a residential area and neighbors were none-too-pleased with its presence. Now why would that be? After all, this house populated in large part by highly paid foreigners would normally be pumping money into the neighborhood economy.
True; nevertheless, local inhabitants suspect that large American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) pose as front organizations for intelligence organizations and, worse (from the Afghan view), the special forces. The ‘black ops’ mode of selective elimination of key enemy figures has significantly reduced collateral damage, a definite “PLUS” ethically. On the other hand, many Afghans rightly or wrongly view these midnight rangers as assassins or terrorists in uniform.
All very interesting but where does DAI figure in all of this? DAI is implementing a program to aid the counter-insurgency by investing in small local projects in contested areas. This 'window-dressing' program confers “quick-impacts” on hostile communities by employing local workers. All just fine; that is counter-insurgency. To do that, however, DAI likely works with intelligence resources to target particular villages for these non-lethal activities aimed at winning hearts and minds.
The villagers see through the manipulation as easily as we can see through overt and often insincere efforts of someone trying to ‘buy’ our liking. Taliban sympathizers may take -- and even like -- the money. Yet they continue to detest the ulterior motives imputed to the DAIs of the world. Buying allegiances will not work. Furthermore, companies like DAI should fail developmental smell-tests.
DAI is a for-profit organization dedicated (apparently) to development or capacity-building, the flip-side of ‘sovereign’ loans extended by international money-center banks. Admittedly, I once made the argument that international banks should take the lead in lending to poorer countries because the money-centers would differentiate third-world countries – those with the ability to grow and pay off loans to the banker’s profit – from fourth world countries (i.e., today's the bottom billion). All very logical on my part...when I was a twenty-two year old trying to get a job in banking in the late 1970s.
We know the reality of global finance by now, with periodic 'sovereign debt' write-offs in exchange for (supposedly) coerced votes in the U.N., and the like. (Not original to me, but to a self-indulgent former ‘development professional’ in a book titled “Confessions of an Economic Hit-Man”; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confessions_of_an_Economic_Hit_Man.) In the contemporary economics of U.S. development aid, much of the money designated as "pledged" to a poor country, barely trickles down to the intended beneficiaries. The bulk of this 'foreign aid' funds white-collar make-work consulting jobs that enrich Americans and U.S. companies like DAI.
Large non-profit implementing (what?) partners often are little better. The good news is that most NGOs, including American and those contracting out to USAID, do not fit the profile of “beltway bandits”. They do good work. Their best work comes through working with start-up NGOs in Afghanistan and elsewhere that engage local populations to take back their futures to the extent they can, little-by-little.
Thus, DAI was attacked more for being perceived as a corporate bag-man doing the bidding of the U.S. government. Sadly, two nights ago, theocratic thugs murdered six people most of whom had no axe to grind with insurgents, criminals, freedom-fighters, corporate welfare chiselers or anyone else. Every bit as sad will be the continuing “battle rhythm” of many large USAID implementing partners: high-profiles, fast bucks and fleeting, if any, results.
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
Letter #10 to Friends and Family: Papa was a Rolling Stone
In pondering the fate of General Stanley McChrystal, I giggle with the memory of a top-40s song from the early 1970s “On the Cover of the Rolling Stone”. General McChrystal has done certain things that make me shudder like trying to shame allies into sending more troops, falsifying reports of Pat Tillman’s death in 2004 and, drawn from this article, looking the other way on torture.
Any one of these things may have been grounds for dismissal. But this Rolling Stone article? I do not think so. General McChrystal is not breaking orders but indulging an ego fed on sleep deprivation and asceticism. The General’s behavior seems to say, non-verbally, “See I am a hard-guy and, every day, I make the tough decisions – like not eating – that make America the kick-ass nietzschean über-nation that wins wars against all odds.”
This quaint arrogance has enabled General McChrystal to take the heat of pursuing a strategy fraught with risk. Most mere mortals (e.g., me) would never be able to manage this type of awful responsibility. Awful in its intensity. Awful in its relentlessness. Awful in its consequences. So the man deserves some credit for his transparency – even when he appears to be blatantly impolitic.
Instinctively, I felt dread when confronted by colleagues with this fracas in the fishbowl of modern media-made warfare. What drove General McChrystal and his rottweiler retinue to make such remarks? Staff Sgt. Kennith Hicks put my feelings vividly in the article itself: "I get COIN. I get all that. McChrystal comes here, explains it, it makes sense. But then he goes away on his bird [helicopter], and by the time his directives get passed down to us through Big Army, they're all f**ked up – either because somebody is trying to cover their ass, or because they just don't understand it themselves. But we're f**king losing this thing."
And things are not going well among the allies, either. If anything, General McChrystal’s candor, at times ill-advised, has made him a lightning rod for anger boiling over against the United States of America from Afghans and, at least German, allies alike. Sensitivities run very high these days when German officers, proud of their professionalism, uncharacteristically lash out at the arrogance of the U.S. Army in my presence. And many are quite accurate. Behind my impassive manner amid all of this heat-lightning lurks a thought taken from a lesson taught long ago.
First the thought: we may be preparing to exit Afghanistan. President Obama has decided upon yet another strategic review of this war; scheduled in December, a month after the Congressional elections. That sounds to me like the Administration expects a popular repudiation of the Afghan policy in November. This review will simply sanction the popular will. Don’t get me wrong: I support the time-line. Reason has to put limits on open-ended policies. Eighteen months – the timeline identified by President Obama in late 2009 – to get it right or get out still seems reasonable to me.
Which brings this letter to a lesson still alive in my mind from my Choate days. In May of 1975, I had a heated discussion with a Choate History teacher, Tom Generous. Saigon had fallen; punks in Phnom Penh had hijacked the S.S. Mayaguez. At dinner, I asked Mr Generous why so many people disliked the United States when we sought only to bring liberty to downtrodden people around the world.
Well, ‘T.G.’ – a Viet Nam Navy veteran – had a field day over dessert. Mr Generous shot right back, “What do you think of when you see a swastika?” I said, “Why the Nazis of course.” He asked me if that was a positive image. I said of course not.
Mr Generous then instructed me, in effect, “Ned, think about what the stars-and-stripes mean to people who have seen their families burned by napalm from U.S. jet-fighters. Or what about those people who find out their elected leader has been overthrown by the U.S. government? What do these people think of when they see the stars-&-stripes?”
These were, as they remain today, hard questions from a well-intentioned, highly intelligent and deeply patriotic man. Mr Generous got me thinking hard that evening thirty-five years ago, or as hard as my polluted fifth-form brain could at the time. Suddenly, with the quiet cues of defeat beginning to surface here in Afghanistan, they have me thinking again, some thirty-five years later.
Any one of these things may have been grounds for dismissal. But this Rolling Stone article? I do not think so. General McChrystal is not breaking orders but indulging an ego fed on sleep deprivation and asceticism. The General’s behavior seems to say, non-verbally, “See I am a hard-guy and, every day, I make the tough decisions – like not eating – that make America the kick-ass nietzschean über-nation that wins wars against all odds.”
This quaint arrogance has enabled General McChrystal to take the heat of pursuing a strategy fraught with risk. Most mere mortals (e.g., me) would never be able to manage this type of awful responsibility. Awful in its intensity. Awful in its relentlessness. Awful in its consequences. So the man deserves some credit for his transparency – even when he appears to be blatantly impolitic.
Instinctively, I felt dread when confronted by colleagues with this fracas in the fishbowl of modern media-made warfare. What drove General McChrystal and his rottweiler retinue to make such remarks? Staff Sgt. Kennith Hicks put my feelings vividly in the article itself: "I get COIN. I get all that. McChrystal comes here, explains it, it makes sense. But then he goes away on his bird [helicopter], and by the time his directives get passed down to us through Big Army, they're all f**ked up – either because somebody is trying to cover their ass, or because they just don't understand it themselves. But we're f**king losing this thing."
And things are not going well among the allies, either. If anything, General McChrystal’s candor, at times ill-advised, has made him a lightning rod for anger boiling over against the United States of America from Afghans and, at least German, allies alike. Sensitivities run very high these days when German officers, proud of their professionalism, uncharacteristically lash out at the arrogance of the U.S. Army in my presence. And many are quite accurate. Behind my impassive manner amid all of this heat-lightning lurks a thought taken from a lesson taught long ago.
First the thought: we may be preparing to exit Afghanistan. President Obama has decided upon yet another strategic review of this war; scheduled in December, a month after the Congressional elections. That sounds to me like the Administration expects a popular repudiation of the Afghan policy in November. This review will simply sanction the popular will. Don’t get me wrong: I support the time-line. Reason has to put limits on open-ended policies. Eighteen months – the timeline identified by President Obama in late 2009 – to get it right or get out still seems reasonable to me.
Which brings this letter to a lesson still alive in my mind from my Choate days. In May of 1975, I had a heated discussion with a Choate History teacher, Tom Generous. Saigon had fallen; punks in Phnom Penh had hijacked the S.S. Mayaguez. At dinner, I asked Mr Generous why so many people disliked the United States when we sought only to bring liberty to downtrodden people around the world.
Well, ‘T.G.’ – a Viet Nam Navy veteran – had a field day over dessert. Mr Generous shot right back, “What do you think of when you see a swastika?” I said, “Why the Nazis of course.” He asked me if that was a positive image. I said of course not.
Mr Generous then instructed me, in effect, “Ned, think about what the stars-and-stripes mean to people who have seen their families burned by napalm from U.S. jet-fighters. Or what about those people who find out their elected leader has been overthrown by the U.S. government? What do these people think of when they see the stars-&-stripes?”
These were, as they remain today, hard questions from a well-intentioned, highly intelligent and deeply patriotic man. Mr Generous got me thinking hard that evening thirty-five years ago, or as hard as my polluted fifth-form brain could at the time. Suddenly, with the quiet cues of defeat beginning to surface here in Afghanistan, they have me thinking again, some thirty-five years later.
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
Letter #9 to Friends and Family: Palestine after Four Days-Ghosts of Jimmy Past
Thirty years after Israël’s lightning victory in 1967, a good friend repeated heatedly that Israel had herded Palestineans into what he termed history’s largest concentration, not refugee, camps. Seeing Israël, as I still do, as the region’s lone democracy and most vital society, I disagreed with a vigor quite as intense as his.
At that time, I had few Muslim friends, fewer Arab acquaintances and zero respect for countries hostile to Israël. Nevertheless, I could not turn a blind eye towards Thucydides’ analysis of the blood-drunk foreign policy of Attica’s leading democracy during the Peloponnesian War. Democracy does not axiomatically equate to peace; losing a moral rudder often anticipates bloodshed and eventual defeat.
Two State Department tours in Iraq mollified my prejudice toward Arabs. Then Israël lost me with its over-reaction to Hezbollah in 2006 by killing dozens of civilians for every Israeli dead. The subsequent siege and impoverishment of Gaza two years later turned a rump of desert into, as my friend had warned a decade before, the world’s largest concentration camp. The now-threadbare rationale of Hamas being the cause of this indiscriminate killing of innocents belied Israël’s cry of self-defense.
At that time, I had few Muslim friends, fewer Arab acquaintances and zero respect for countries hostile to Israël. Nevertheless, I could not turn a blind eye towards Thucydides’ analysis of the blood-drunk foreign policy of Attica’s leading democracy during the Peloponnesian War. Democracy does not axiomatically equate to peace; losing a moral rudder often anticipates bloodshed and eventual defeat.
Two State Department tours in Iraq mollified my prejudice toward Arabs. Then Israël lost me with its over-reaction to Hezbollah in 2006 by killing dozens of civilians for every Israeli dead. The subsequent siege and impoverishment of Gaza two years later turned a rump of desert into, as my friend had warned a decade before, the world’s largest concentration camp. The now-threadbare rationale of Hamas being the cause of this indiscriminate killing of innocents belied Israël’s cry of self-defense.
The snip-it of exposure I have had of Palestine falls somewhere in between my reflexive support of Israël since 1982 and the disillusionment of the past four years. From my limited vantage point, at least, I see a depressing cohesion of fear on one side of the “wall”; despair on the other; and, sullenness on both. To be sure, I confronted my share of check-points and security personnel which seemed like petty annoyances facing a tourist.
Day after day, however, security detours stretch fifteen minute Palestinean commutes into an hour or more; searches and metal detectors treat innocents like terrorists; and, prohibited entries into sacred sites signal a two-tiered society. This gutting of liberty contrasts sharply with private ‘Israeli’ roads all over the West Bank and force protection of illegal Israeli colonizers populating illegal Israeli settlements atop precious Palestinean aquifers.
Thus ‘petty annoyances’ accumulate into a culture of shame and despair plaguing Palestineans simply seeking their four freedoms in their ancestral lands. The settlements and refugee camps each reek of this joint Jewish and Palestinean stasis of diminishing dreams, unsustainable privilege, and twisted tribalism.
The over-riding impression of my visit to Palestine, however, remains one of frustration and sadness over opportunities foregone. The Palestineans are industrious, inquisitive, educated and intelligent; traits rightly associated with Israelis. On the other hand, imagine one state unified toward a common purpose . . . .
That economy of thirteen million people would put their Mediterranean, Levantine and Arab neighbors to shame on statistics like productivity, inventions, value-added, etc. . . . and with no oil to boot. These two peoples would not trust each other at first but, with explicit safeguards and incentives, they could work together.
Perhaps oppression and outrage have festered for so long that undoing their effects will prove insurmountable; I do not, can not, and will not believe it. So what to do in the light of Gaza just a couple of days ago? Try to build that peace against all odds, but in a single state harnessing the mutual distrust into institutional constraints and accountability.
How can the United States of America support this uncertain mission?
America brings a national experience and publicly witnessed precedent of progressing beyond a painful, racist past. The manifest liking for, and desire to emulate, Americans (if not the U.S. government) displayed by the Palestineans deepens the moral urgency confronting a U.S. Administration long on the rhetoric of reconciliation with Muslims but short on the substance of peace-making.
President Obama would do well to study thoroughly the bumbling Administration of President Jimmy Carter. The Palestinean desire to emulate America – and, in her best aspects, Israël – should come as no shock since the Palestineans relish enterprise, much like their U.S. and Israeli counterparts.
Friday, May 28, 2010
Letter #8 to friends and family: THE UNBEARABLE GREYNESS OF BEING
NOTE: re-telling of an investigation I conducted and unclassified situation report I composed that was elevated to the Ambassadorial level in Kabul, some 400 kliks and quite literally a world away.
To my mind, at least, we are confronting the undoing of Western absolutes by the unbearable “greyness” of being. Usually, the unbearable greyness of being refers to the downward spiral of a life prospect darkening, with the soul eventually going from grey to black to suicide.
In the larger world of politics writ large in Afghanistan, however, the unbearable greyness of being occurs when the lines between the bad and good or between Taliban and counter-insurgent blur, and blur perceptibly. Let’s take one simple example: girls’ schooling in Northern Afghanistan. The Taliban apparently took over a part of Kunduz, long known as a hot-bed for anti-U.S. and NATO sentiment, not to mention the local subversion, as an after-thought of the no-show Afghan government.
The initial reports from private-spooks on the counter-insurgency beat was that the Chahar Dara (southwest part of Kunduz) was ‘owned’ by the Taliban; that the insurgents had closed the girl’s schools, forbade any female education, blah, blah, blah. Not coincidentally, the purveyors of grim tidings were the 'instructors' of a billion dollar police-training contract, the contractor of which is facing uncertainty over the necessity of the extension. Hmmm.
Guess what? The Taliban did not close the girls’ schools. Instead, they ended the practice of Principals pilfering funds from teachers’ pay-checks. Likewise, these talibs set about making sure teachers did their jobs with men teaching in all boys’ schools and women teaching in girls’ environments. Not an alien space-ship proposition for this part of the world.
And guess what? The villages in the ‘contested area’ love the new arrangement! The challenge now remains training women to teach in high-schools to avoid a tenth-grade choke-point. The talibs should toil for this remedy since they were the ones who fired and harassed female educators during their reign of terror in the late 1990s.
Then comes mystery number-2: four alleged incidents of mass-poisonings at girls’ high schools in Kunduz. No one found incontrovertible proof that certain poisonous attacks actually took place. No one bothered to ask the basic questions of why 80-100 high school girls may have suddenly – as if spontaneously – fallen ill, but not seriously so. As thorough lab tests as possible did nothing to resolve the mystery.
Rumours also contributed to a feeling of spreading hysteria -- that the Taliban is out to wreck girls’ schooling. What? After all of the effort to shore-up primary school education in Taliban strongholds? The Taliban has come out, through credible sources, condemning the attacks. Yet nobody seems to ask three basic questions:
- Is there a cheap perfume or cologne popular with teen-age girls that may be poorly made, leaving a residue of insecticide (or something) that induces these symptoms?
- Does one contractor own the right to clean the floors, etc. of these schools but in doing so with a lacquer that may be mixed too strongly?
- Could insecticides seasonally sprayed have been applied on school days when such things, if over-used, might temporarily inhibit one’s breathing?
Latest studies, considered defining and exhaustive, released by NATO, indicate that the third possibility was the problem. The guilty substance was bleach and / or chloroform mixed in with water and sprayed heavily to kill off malarial mosquitoes. The Taliban had nothing to do with the scare, unlike the reports of NBC and others.
So, we face two challenges with this unbearable greyness of being, the ‘transubstantiated‘ Taliban is now fighting a “counter-counter” insurgency by improving substantially upon a critical service the established government is supposed to provide, but has not in Chahar Dara. Far from being the perpetrators of alleged poison-terror attacks, the local Taliban actually supported the protection of people by announcing that it would bring any wrong-doers to justice.
Well, having investigated the incidents and delved into the Taliban’s twisted, twittering mind, I say that NATO and its allies ought to congratulate the Taliban for work well done. Secondly, NATO should urge the Taliban to aid the justice system in providing quicker, firmer disposition of cases. The government's side? To moderate Taliban justice.
And, lastly, use that common interest – the protection of girls – as a pivot point for bringing the locals back into the fold. This reconciliation should start soon before these local Taliban, who have a stake in the tranquillity of their communities, be over-run by infiltrators from Kandahar, Pakistan, Chechnya and beyond. These latter, far uglier insurgents have less concern for the boys and girls, mother and fathers living in these contested villages.
Friday, May 21, 2010
Letter #7 to friends and family: Long hiatus; copied from an email
FROM the GENERALS to ME...downnnnn
My biggest fear has never been as much my own death as that of a twenty year old soldier standing through the roof of an armoured vehicle protecting me. If I were killed, while premature, my death would end a rather complete life. That soldier, however, is at the beginning of his...sobering. From the Chief of Staff of the United States Army through a Major Genral (DIA) a sobering and extraordinary tribut. Please take the time to read this passage; it is worth. When I go to Jordan and Israel over the next few days, I will finally send some letters, filled with criticisms, I am sure. But lest I forget what my younger brothers and sisters in uniform do....
===============================
-----Original Message-----
From: Flynn, Michael T USA MG USA CJ2 ISAF USFOR-A
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2010 12:51 AM
To: 'FLYNNM321@AOL.COM'; Flynn, Charles A USA COL USA ISAF COMISAF;
Gillian, David C BG CJ2 ISAF HQ; Velez, Rey A Mr USA CIV CJ2 CIV/MIL
Director; 'thomas.e.whittles@navy.mil'; Becker, Paul B RDML USN IJC;
Franz, George J USA COL USA IJC; Thompson, Andrea L USA COL USA USFOR-A
J2; Torrisi, Annette L COL USA IJC; Boothby, Duncan USA MR CIV ISAF
COMISAF; 'FLOWERSFISH@MORRISBB.NET'; 'sally.donnelly@js.pentagon.mil';
Beckman, Steven A COL USA USA RC(S) HQ; 'harry.hurst@js.pentagon.mil'
Subject: Fw: CSA Sends: CPT Kyle Comfort
Importance: High
Why we serve...
From: General Officer Management Office (GOMO)
To: undisclosed-recipients
Sent: Wed May 19 23:36:24 2010
Subject: CSA
Sends: CPT Kyle Comfort
Troops,Wanted to share this with you as an indicator of the spirit that lives
in this force.GEN Casey
-------I wanted to take the opportunity to give you a report from the funeral
for one of our warriors where I was your GO representative. CPT Kyle A.
Comfort was buried on MON, 17 May, in Jacksonville, Alabama. Kyle was
assigned to D CO 3rd/75th Ranger Regiment and was killed approximately
two weeks ago in combat in Afghanistan. He was survived by his wife of 5
years, and their 6 month old daughter.
The turnout/support for his wake and funeral was simply amazing...1000+
folks at the church and lining the approximately 3 mile route through
town to his final resting place (accompanied by 300+ motorcycle riders
from the various support riding groups).
What I wanted to provide for your personal SA is the following BLOG that
was read at his eulogy and was written by him as a young 2LT serving
with 2nd BDE of the 101st in Iraq about two years ago. I found it to be
one of the most profound descriptions of our soldierly bonds that I've
ever heard.
Thanks to you and USASOC for the opportunity to partake in this event as
I come away from an experience like this, as always, with an even more
intense commitment to our nation and our Army.
BG Raymond "Tony" Thomas
-------BLOG of CPT KYLE A. COMFORT:Thursday, January 31, 2008
Distance means nothing
Current mood: grateful
To All,Im not really a blog kind of person but I figured I would give it a
shot. There are a few things that run across my mind regularly while
serving in Iraq, and oddly enough I just happened to have a way to put
it down in "writing".
You can read it in books, you can see it on tv, you can see it in the
newspapers, but unless you have actually been here to watch these few,
these happy few, who day after day put themselves at risk to complete
the mission then you could never truly understand their sacrifices. Some
dont know what the mission is in the grand scheme, some dont even care,
but regardless they will complete it with honor.
Everyday I wake up to
see these men of Bravo company take another step closer towards freedom.
Not just freedom for themselves, for you or for me, but for the peopleof Iraq.
They have left it all behind, some for a 2nd and 3rd time, and they
conduct each day with nothing more than a guarantee that tomorrow is one
day closer to home. They complain not about being here, not about why
we're here, not even about how many times they have been here. Their
complaints are usually that the water they shaved with this morning,
assuming they were given the opportunity.
I can stare any one of these men in the face and read the story of what
it is to serve honorably.
Missing my incredibly supportive wife I can handle but waking up each
day to see these heroes driving on as if this day was the greatest day I
find hard to hold in. They ask nothing of their leaders except the
truth. Listening to encouraging words will no longer be necessary for me
when it gets hard in life for I have the expereinces of Bravo company to
help me drive on. I did not KNOW honor until I served with these
Soldiers. I am truly a blessed man who has been given all that I have
ever asked.
My reward is to have this opportunity to serve along sidethem.
Some of these men are no more then 17-18 years of age but make no
mistake for they are as much a man as any one person you know. Words can
never convey what these men do each day.
I did not know what to expect when I came to Iraq. I did not understand
my place on the battlefield in the current fight and I certainly did not
understand entirely what it would mean to serve along side Americas
finest. I believe I now know my role and it is a role I take very
seriously. I will do whatever it takes to get all these men home safely
and back to their families.
Everytime I leave the wire I know they are
watching out for me. Sometimes I can tell they are watching out for me
more so than they are themselves. At first I thought it was because I
was a Lieutenant, and maybe so at first, but not anymore. Now they do it
because Im one of them...........Bravo Company.
To all who know me, you know that I love my wife, my family, and my
soldiers more than anything. If you have never had the opportunity to
serve alongside them I implore you to speak with them. He is not a robot
anymore than anyone else, but if you attack him, his instincts will seem
almost reflexive in nature.
America, sleep sound tonight. The Soldiers of Bravo Company will tuck
you in with the power of freedom and all that it offers. They will ask
nothing of you and it is likely they never will.
When you see these few, these happy few, tell them you love them for
their sacrifice and that you slept well tonight.
Kyle A. Comfort, 2LT FA Bravo Co
FSO 2-502D IN REGTClassification: UNCLASSIFIEDCaveats: NONE
My biggest fear has never been as much my own death as that of a twenty year old soldier standing through the roof of an armoured vehicle protecting me. If I were killed, while premature, my death would end a rather complete life. That soldier, however, is at the beginning of his...sobering. From the Chief of Staff of the United States Army through a Major Genral (DIA) a sobering and extraordinary tribut. Please take the time to read this passage; it is worth. When I go to Jordan and Israel over the next few days, I will finally send some letters, filled with criticisms, I am sure. But lest I forget what my younger brothers and sisters in uniform do....
===============================
-----Original Message-----
From: Flynn, Michael T USA MG USA CJ2 ISAF USFOR-A
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2010 12:51 AM
To: 'FLYNNM321@AOL.COM'; Flynn, Charles A USA COL USA ISAF COMISAF;
Gillian, David C BG CJ2 ISAF HQ; Velez, Rey A Mr USA CIV CJ2 CIV/MIL
Director; 'thomas.e.whittles@navy.mil'; Becker, Paul B RDML USN IJC;
Franz, George J USA COL USA IJC; Thompson, Andrea L USA COL USA USFOR-A
J2; Torrisi, Annette L COL USA IJC; Boothby, Duncan USA MR CIV ISAF
COMISAF; 'FLOWERSFISH@MORRISBB.NET'; 'sally.donnelly@js.pentagon.mil';
Beckman, Steven A COL USA USA RC(S) HQ; 'harry.hurst@js.pentagon.mil'
Subject: Fw: CSA Sends: CPT Kyle Comfort
Importance: High
Why we serve...
From: General Officer Management Office (GOMO)
To: undisclosed-recipients
Sent: Wed May 19 23:36:24 2010
Subject: CSA
Sends: CPT Kyle Comfort
Troops,Wanted to share this with you as an indicator of the spirit that lives
in this force.GEN Casey
-------I wanted to take the opportunity to give you a report from the funeral
for one of our warriors where I was your GO representative. CPT Kyle A.
Comfort was buried on MON, 17 May, in Jacksonville, Alabama. Kyle was
assigned to D CO 3rd/75th Ranger Regiment and was killed approximately
two weeks ago in combat in Afghanistan. He was survived by his wife of 5
years, and their 6 month old daughter.
The turnout/support for his wake and funeral was simply amazing...1000+
folks at the church and lining the approximately 3 mile route through
town to his final resting place (accompanied by 300+ motorcycle riders
from the various support riding groups).
What I wanted to provide for your personal SA is the following BLOG that
was read at his eulogy and was written by him as a young 2LT serving
with 2nd BDE of the 101st in Iraq about two years ago. I found it to be
one of the most profound descriptions of our soldierly bonds that I've
ever heard.
Thanks to you and USASOC for the opportunity to partake in this event as
I come away from an experience like this, as always, with an even more
intense commitment to our nation and our Army.
BG Raymond "Tony" Thomas
-------BLOG of CPT KYLE A. COMFORT:Thursday, January 31, 2008
Distance means nothing
Current mood: grateful
To All,Im not really a blog kind of person but I figured I would give it a
shot. There are a few things that run across my mind regularly while
serving in Iraq, and oddly enough I just happened to have a way to put
it down in "writing".
You can read it in books, you can see it on tv, you can see it in the
newspapers, but unless you have actually been here to watch these few,
these happy few, who day after day put themselves at risk to complete
the mission then you could never truly understand their sacrifices. Some
dont know what the mission is in the grand scheme, some dont even care,
but regardless they will complete it with honor.
Everyday I wake up to
see these men of Bravo company take another step closer towards freedom.
Not just freedom for themselves, for you or for me, but for the peopleof Iraq.
They have left it all behind, some for a 2nd and 3rd time, and they
conduct each day with nothing more than a guarantee that tomorrow is one
day closer to home. They complain not about being here, not about why
we're here, not even about how many times they have been here. Their
complaints are usually that the water they shaved with this morning,
assuming they were given the opportunity.
I can stare any one of these men in the face and read the story of what
it is to serve honorably.
Missing my incredibly supportive wife I can handle but waking up each
day to see these heroes driving on as if this day was the greatest day I
find hard to hold in. They ask nothing of their leaders except the
truth. Listening to encouraging words will no longer be necessary for me
when it gets hard in life for I have the expereinces of Bravo company to
help me drive on. I did not KNOW honor until I served with these
Soldiers. I am truly a blessed man who has been given all that I have
ever asked.
My reward is to have this opportunity to serve along sidethem.
Some of these men are no more then 17-18 years of age but make no
mistake for they are as much a man as any one person you know. Words can
never convey what these men do each day.
I did not know what to expect when I came to Iraq. I did not understand
my place on the battlefield in the current fight and I certainly did not
understand entirely what it would mean to serve along side Americas
finest. I believe I now know my role and it is a role I take very
seriously. I will do whatever it takes to get all these men home safely
and back to their families.
Everytime I leave the wire I know they are
watching out for me. Sometimes I can tell they are watching out for me
more so than they are themselves. At first I thought it was because I
was a Lieutenant, and maybe so at first, but not anymore. Now they do it
because Im one of them...........Bravo Company.
To all who know me, you know that I love my wife, my family, and my
soldiers more than anything. If you have never had the opportunity to
serve alongside them I implore you to speak with them. He is not a robot
anymore than anyone else, but if you attack him, his instincts will seem
almost reflexive in nature.
America, sleep sound tonight. The Soldiers of Bravo Company will tuck
you in with the power of freedom and all that it offers. They will ask
nothing of you and it is likely they never will.
When you see these few, these happy few, tell them you love them for
their sacrifice and that you slept well tonight.
Kyle A. Comfort, 2LT FA Bravo Co
FSO 2-502D IN REGTClassification: UNCLASSIFIEDCaveats: NONE
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