This is the last letter and it is late in coming. “Lo siento” as my new host countrymen would say. There are three topics that I would like to address:
1. the wiki-leaks doc-dump of 91,000 secret documents on the Afghan war;
2. Mr Tony Hodgin’s – Choate History Teacher’s – discussion via e-mail on the culture of the U.S. Army in which American soldiers are willing to fight and die for people they do not always like and view the cohesion required for combat as a singular value; and,
3. my bailing on USAID in favor of the Peace Corps.
WIKI-SQUEAKS
BLUF: What is the big deal about leaks? They balance out the over-use of classification.
First, is a discussion point raised by Liz Seacord’s mother, a lovely and formidable woman with a sharp mind and clear conviction. Mrs Seacord was interested in my views on the wiki-leaks case. Truth-be-told: I am not really in a position to discuss this question meaningfully for two reasons. First, I have done very little reading on the subject and, second, I cannot seem to access the files themselves (if only to scratch the surface of some 200,000 pages of material).
In that very narrow view, I can say that the summary articles that I read at the time did not reveal anything that was not already accessible from very public sources. I heard General Petraeus state that the identities of some host country military intelligence assets had been compromised. Additionally, I read a New York Times article, while in the Adirondacks, that portrayed the leaker as a neurotic homosexual bent on gaining attention.
There is an obvious question: ¿Would the Army ever have put someone of this young man’s alleged disposition into a sensitive position? The following passage from the wiki-leaks page gainsays, at least in part, the sentiments portrayed by General Petraeus, a genuinely honest man and among the best America can produce. “We have delayed the release of some 15,000 reports from the total archive as part of a harm minimization process demanded by our source. After further review, these reports will be released, with occasional redactions, and eventually in full, as the security situation in Afghanistan permits.”
All that said, there has to be some license given to conscience with respect to disclosure of classified information. Popular accountability under a democracy relies upon it. That is to say: intention matters. In reviewing this soldier’s intentions, I believe that those who sit in judgement of this young man have to take the higher-order reasons into account, and not become diverted by the sensational as amplified in the media about the protagonist’s sexual preferences (implied as quirks) or personality profile. I believe we need also to keep things in perspective: secret information simply is not a big deal.
The dissemination of the U.S.A.’s nuclear secrets in the middle of the last century was likely the single largest act of treason ever in U.S. history. What ultimate harm came from that far more disloyal act? The world moved on and likely became a safer place. (The Secretary of State at the time had been loudly advocating the use of tactical nuclear weapons to bail out France in Indo-China.)
These 200,000 pages do not begin to approach this treason. These are after-action reports and do not tip-off the reader to actionable information to harm our younger brothers and sisters in uniform (and their brave Afghan counterparts).
While intentions count – and can over-ride normal tendencies toward retributive justice – they are not paramount. Safety of U.S. military personnel and local Afghan partners count for more. The question remains: ¿Is the young man a hero for blowing the whistle on a failing war or suited to rot in prison for betraying his country? Time and the Uniform Code of Military Justice – yes, this court system is fair – will make that determination.
The question pre-supposing any other remains open: ¿Did this U.S. soldier release names of specific people, thus endangering them? If so, he committed treason. If not, give him, at worst, a dishonorable discharge and move on. It is as likely that this leak will save lives by curtailing a failing counter-insurgency as it is to lose lives by revealing identities. Time and legal discovery will tell.
TONY HODGIN’s E-MAIL
BLUF: Cohesion of the active duty military unit leaves its imprimatur.
Tony was one of the more popular teachers at Choate and was well known for his service in the Peace Corps. Though I never had the honor of taking one of Tony’s courses, his status as a Peace Corps volunteer – not to mention the school’s most famous alumnus being the initiator of it (Cuerpo de Paz in Mexico) – may have planted the seeds leading up to this decision.
Tony was writing me about the newly released book, ‘War’ by Sebastian Junger. In his note to me Tony stated, “Why do guys want to come back to the war zone time and again and miss it so much when back home? Why do they risk and sometimes give their lives to save fellows they don't particularly like?”
Again, as was the case with Mrs Seacord, I am going to be a weenie and say that I do not know. When I have worked with National Guard units, the cohesion is strong but not rigid, allowing my fuller participation. When I have served with active duty units, I have always felt like an outsider looking in.
My efforts to insinuate myself into the group resembled a moth trying to eat his way through chain-mail. Theoretically, it’s possible but unlikely. That is to say: group cohesion runs very high. My experience reflects no criticism of our armed forces, especially those men and women serving in active duty.
The fact of the matter is that this cohesion has strengthened with the onset of the professional army over the past thirty-five years and will most likely continue. This cohesion saves U.S. lives in combat situation by enabling tightly coordinated field tactics. It allows the foot soldiers to spread out in dangerous fields to reach down to the local communities.
The criticism that a certain myopia and rigidness may set in due to the ambitions of senior field grade officers pushing for results is valid. Another difficulty with active duty units remains the lack of genuine internal communication between companies, with other units or government players to integrate the unexpected.
All that said, however, a combination of an extended line of communication (i.e., the reach of U.S. forces); the “battle rhythm” (i.e., how the U.S. Army does business); and, the day-to-day courage of our youngest and best enable U.S. Army and Marines in Afghanistan to be the only source of development actually reaching the people quickly and consistently.
Much of it is proving to be marginallyeffective whilw much is critically successful. Again, read this response to Tony with a grain of salt since I would never ‘blend’ in the Army and since I was in the North of Afghanistan and not a kinetic area.
THE SWITCH
BLUF: Better late than never, mios amigos.
This answer is short. I had stated in my college applications in excess of thirty years ago that my first ambition was to serve in the Peace Corps. Well it took long enough. The reason for walking out on a great job is because I think Afghanistan is crumbling; worse yet, it is wrecking USAID with excess funding amounts corrupting the development structure of “implementing partners” and undermining due-diligence. So, coward that I am, I did not want to live through the institutional crisis dead-ahead to USAID. Secondly, the Peace Corps will make a true professional of me in development…or so I hope.
Saturday, August 28, 2010
Monday, August 16, 2010
Letter-16: Excerpts from 'Best Practice' Discussion with USAID
PRT Best Practices Lessons Learned QUESTION GUIDE:
HOW OFTEN ARE YOU ABLE TO GET OUT TO THE FIELD?
ARE YOU A SELF-DRIVE AREA? HOW IS MOBILITY IN YOUR AREA?
NedMcD: Any day I got off dead center for Kunduz-proper. Less frequently for points beyond. CIMIC (Bundeswehr Civil Affairs) was supportive for idea generation, translators and transportation to Taloqan. GA National Guard / 10th MTN were very helpful, especially GA National Guard; most new major projects in Kunduz through support of Georgia National Guard Company and the Tenth Mountain Division.
HOW KINETIC IS YOUR AREA?
NedMcD: Not particularly. Two districts in Kunduz (Aliabad and Chahar Dara) are contested; parts are violent with outside insurgents coming in (about 200). The attacks on NGOs are disturbing and, with the killing of medical personnel in Nuristan, will likely lead to exits by remaining international donors. At great risk are EGGI (USAID) and UNDP (elections).
Would recommend not locating EGGI personnel in Kunduz. Risk assessment by 10th MTN Division too severe for the rest of Kunduz. Takhar has crime problems in the northwest part of the province, leaving two districts (Darqad and Yangi Qala) up for grabs and moderately ‘infecting’ two other districts.
CAN YOU CHARACTERIZE YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE PRT? (HOW IS THE CIV/MIL RELATIONSHIP?).
NedMcD: Excellent. I enjoyed working with these people, particularly D-CO of the 10th MTN. The two most popularly successful projects in Kunduz initiated by me came through the foot patrols of the GA National Guard (in Khanabad District) and the 10th MTN (in Kunduz proper). The German CIMIC group came through with twelve proposals in Kunduz city (four) and Takhar (eight).
WHAT INITIATIVES ARE YOU AND YOUR TEAM CURRENTLY UNDERTAKING? ARE THERE ANY MAJOR PROJECTS WORTH NOTING?
NedMcD: The most worthy projects undertaken by me are the women’s rights media campaign in Takhar, initiated by the UNAMA governance officer there and the previously mentioned projects in Khanabad and Kunduz city.
HOW OFTEN ARE YOU ABLE TO INTERACT WITH LOCAL LEADERS AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL?
NedMcD: Frequently in Kunduz; just starting in Takhar, though provincial officials. The Director of Health and Governor’s executive officer in Taloqan were prepared to enable me to visit districts or facilities.
WHAT IS YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH INTER-AGENCY PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS OFFICE AND THE KABUL EMB?
NedMcD: Excellent. Always received prompt, professional responses. Sometimes we differed but the explanations were thorough and helped me up the learning curve quickly.
HOW DOES THE GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IN YOUR AREA? (DESCRIBE LOCAL GOVERNANCE)
NedMcD: In Takhar, where funding is not as available, governance is progressing along smartly as the Governor and Provincial Council realize that they will need to solve the problems on their own. In Kunduz, where the expectation for funding is greater, officials have less incentive to solve problems and constantly try to manipulate or shame donors into giving money. Consequently, capacity-building is lagging in Kunduz, where the outside funding is!
CAN YOU MEASURE CORRUPTION IN YOUR AREA? IS IT AN ISSUE?
NedMcD: While reports of corruption in Kunduz were widespread, I found the leaders approachable. My FSO colleague may have a better view through materials he received from the Germans; he very rarely left the military compound and so his field-feel was constricted.
WHAT ARE THE ROOT CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN YOUR REGION?
NedMcD: Absence of community policing and, perhaps, a lack of enforcement of new standards of governance (e.g., women’s rights). The COIN effort should be re-cast as combating a crime-wave. The ideology will take care of itself over the generation or two. Many of the so-called jihadists would probably be vandals in more peaceful times.
The current incentive structure of twelve dollars per day for insurgent mercenary allows anti-government elements to indulge in anti-social behavior under the guise of a bogus jihad. The failure by the USG, ISAF and GIRoA to be aggressive in protecting women and their newly ordained rights may be making the situation more difficult for women as gender-based abuse reaches into the all levels of society, including the legal and law-enforcement machinery.
HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN IN YOUR AREA OF OPERATIONS – AND HOW HAVE YOU SEEN THINGS CHANGE OVER TIME?
NedMcD: Seven months. Saw both positive and negative changes. While security has deteriorated, as punctuated by the attack on the facility of an implementing partner six weeks ago in Kunduz, local Pashtun push-back in a contested district to improve – and keep open – all but one girls’ school vindicates the German policy of engaging that population on the premise that “we don’t have to like or trust each other but simply work together.”
LESSONS LEARNED – WHAT DO YOU WISH YOU KNEW BEFORE YOU CAME TO AFG?
NedMcD: In the case of people working on non-U.S. PRTs or FOBs, clearer guidance on what to do when area U.S. forces need assistance that conflicts with the preferences of the ruling country at the PRT. Also, training on what the Special Forces do and how we can help.
BEST PRACTICES – ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT FOR OTHERS TO LEARN FROM?
IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD? ADVICE FOR OTHERS?
NedMcD: Remember that support can include what one does not want to hear; promptness and candor are more important. Do not try to pull an end-run on other departments or the chain-of-command in Kabul simply because the idea is apparently beyond the comprehension of others, particularly in Kabul. There are almost always good reasons for the restraints imposed. Money is less important than kindness, courtesy and respect. People need to know that we have faith in their determination – however imperfect – to build their country’s destiny.
Remember, too, that Moses marched the liberated Israelites through the desert for forty years for a very good reason: it takes two generations for the capacity-building seeds planted today to manifest. Lastly, look at Viet Nam thirty-five years after the U.S. defeat. The country today resembles what the U.S. tried to make of it forty years ago.
WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF YOUR JOB?
NedMcD: Troubleshoot programs administered out of Kabul; set up visits and facilitate contacts. Meet and be supportive to the efforts of local leadership. Seek and secure funding for, as well as implementation of, local development projects
WHAT WAS THE GUIDANCE YOU RECEIVED BEFORE YOU ASSUMED YOUR POST? WAS THIS SUFFICIENT? DID YOU RECEIVE TRAINING BEFORE YOU CAME TO POST? WAS IT USEFUL FOR THE WORK YOU ARE DOING?
NedMcD: The guidance was minimal and not sufficient. This fact was not the fault of USAID; we had to be in the field quickly. Sufficient training would have required at least six months, probably a year. The key, however, has proved to be the access to, and patience demonstrated by, the professionals in Kabul. So while lack of front-ended readiness was inevitable, USAID handled my learning curve very well.
WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY CHALLENGES FOR YOU IN ACHIEVING YOUR OBJECTIVES?
NedMcD: My own necessity to learn the tasks of the job. On the funding: I realized in the COTR / AOTR course that my colleagues to the south and east were facing a far more challenging problem of being pressured to fund projects without time or head-count needed for prudence. The concern is that people will be subject in the future to changing standards of accountability – from the looseness of pushing billions out the door to far more exacting standards – when the inspectors general arrive.
HOW DO YOU COORDINATE AND MAKE DECISIONS AS AN INTERAGENCY/CIV-MIL TEAM? DOES THIS WORK WELL? WHY OR WHY NOT? HAS THIS BEEN FORMALIZED (I.E. WRITTEN DOWN) OR IS IT INFORMAL?
NedMcD: There was a meeting with the Bundeswehr CIMIC to align priorities. Otherwise my close collaboration with GTZ (the German USAID) the U.N. (for the women’s media proposals) etc. came through my initiative. In this respect, the support and encouragement of the two senior FSOs in Mazar-i-Sharif were indispensible for that initiative. I also convvened the first meeting -- informally and off-the-record of U.N., uniformed military, local government and development personnel. Off-the-record because the U.N. officers were not supposed to coordinating with U.S. Army uniformed officers.
This meeting benefitted the province directly by creating the urgency to put contingency plans into place in the case of earth-quakes. While I convened the meeting, it was a U.S. National Guard Officer, with a career as an envirommental engineer States-side. His knowledge of the Alaska earthquake of 1965 and his ability to detect the same ground formation across Kunduz led him to approach me. Fortunately, I was able to convey the urgency to other stake-holders and, honestly, everybody wanted the meeting. My convening was limited to setting a compatible time and ordering food,
WHO ARE THE MAIN ACTORS OUTSIDE OF YOUR POST THAT YOU REGULARLY INTERACT WITH?
NedMcD: The U.S. Army (as discussed), UNAMA. The E.U., the German military & foreign ministries; local and provincial officials; and, NGOs (e.g., Mercy Corps).
WHAT IS YOUR PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE RELATED TO THIS WORK?
NedMcD. A senior budgeting & national security advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior; a senior economic advisor & knowledge manager at an Iraqi PRT; as well as, a strategic planner for military assistance for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.
HOW OFTEN ARE YOU ABLE TO GET OUT TO THE FIELD?
ARE YOU A SELF-DRIVE AREA? HOW IS MOBILITY IN YOUR AREA?
NedMcD: Any day I got off dead center for Kunduz-proper. Less frequently for points beyond. CIMIC (Bundeswehr Civil Affairs) was supportive for idea generation, translators and transportation to Taloqan. GA National Guard / 10th MTN were very helpful, especially GA National Guard; most new major projects in Kunduz through support of Georgia National Guard Company and the Tenth Mountain Division.
HOW KINETIC IS YOUR AREA?
NedMcD: Not particularly. Two districts in Kunduz (Aliabad and Chahar Dara) are contested; parts are violent with outside insurgents coming in (about 200). The attacks on NGOs are disturbing and, with the killing of medical personnel in Nuristan, will likely lead to exits by remaining international donors. At great risk are EGGI (USAID) and UNDP (elections).
Would recommend not locating EGGI personnel in Kunduz. Risk assessment by 10th MTN Division too severe for the rest of Kunduz. Takhar has crime problems in the northwest part of the province, leaving two districts (Darqad and Yangi Qala) up for grabs and moderately ‘infecting’ two other districts.
CAN YOU CHARACTERIZE YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE PRT? (HOW IS THE CIV/MIL RELATIONSHIP?).
NedMcD: Excellent. I enjoyed working with these people, particularly D-CO of the 10th MTN. The two most popularly successful projects in Kunduz initiated by me came through the foot patrols of the GA National Guard (in Khanabad District) and the 10th MTN (in Kunduz proper). The German CIMIC group came through with twelve proposals in Kunduz city (four) and Takhar (eight).
WHAT INITIATIVES ARE YOU AND YOUR TEAM CURRENTLY UNDERTAKING? ARE THERE ANY MAJOR PROJECTS WORTH NOTING?
NedMcD: The most worthy projects undertaken by me are the women’s rights media campaign in Takhar, initiated by the UNAMA governance officer there and the previously mentioned projects in Khanabad and Kunduz city.
HOW OFTEN ARE YOU ABLE TO INTERACT WITH LOCAL LEADERS AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL?
NedMcD: Frequently in Kunduz; just starting in Takhar, though provincial officials. The Director of Health and Governor’s executive officer in Taloqan were prepared to enable me to visit districts or facilities.
WHAT IS YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH INTER-AGENCY PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS OFFICE AND THE KABUL EMB?
NedMcD: Excellent. Always received prompt, professional responses. Sometimes we differed but the explanations were thorough and helped me up the learning curve quickly.
HOW DOES THE GOVERNMENT FUNCTION IN YOUR AREA? (DESCRIBE LOCAL GOVERNANCE)
NedMcD: In Takhar, where funding is not as available, governance is progressing along smartly as the Governor and Provincial Council realize that they will need to solve the problems on their own. In Kunduz, where the expectation for funding is greater, officials have less incentive to solve problems and constantly try to manipulate or shame donors into giving money. Consequently, capacity-building is lagging in Kunduz, where the outside funding is!
CAN YOU MEASURE CORRUPTION IN YOUR AREA? IS IT AN ISSUE?
NedMcD: While reports of corruption in Kunduz were widespread, I found the leaders approachable. My FSO colleague may have a better view through materials he received from the Germans; he very rarely left the military compound and so his field-feel was constricted.
WHAT ARE THE ROOT CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN YOUR REGION?
NedMcD: Absence of community policing and, perhaps, a lack of enforcement of new standards of governance (e.g., women’s rights). The COIN effort should be re-cast as combating a crime-wave. The ideology will take care of itself over the generation or two. Many of the so-called jihadists would probably be vandals in more peaceful times.
The current incentive structure of twelve dollars per day for insurgent mercenary allows anti-government elements to indulge in anti-social behavior under the guise of a bogus jihad. The failure by the USG, ISAF and GIRoA to be aggressive in protecting women and their newly ordained rights may be making the situation more difficult for women as gender-based abuse reaches into the all levels of society, including the legal and law-enforcement machinery.
HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN IN YOUR AREA OF OPERATIONS – AND HOW HAVE YOU SEEN THINGS CHANGE OVER TIME?
NedMcD: Seven months. Saw both positive and negative changes. While security has deteriorated, as punctuated by the attack on the facility of an implementing partner six weeks ago in Kunduz, local Pashtun push-back in a contested district to improve – and keep open – all but one girls’ school vindicates the German policy of engaging that population on the premise that “we don’t have to like or trust each other but simply work together.”
LESSONS LEARNED – WHAT DO YOU WISH YOU KNEW BEFORE YOU CAME TO AFG?
NedMcD: In the case of people working on non-U.S. PRTs or FOBs, clearer guidance on what to do when area U.S. forces need assistance that conflicts with the preferences of the ruling country at the PRT. Also, training on what the Special Forces do and how we can help.
BEST PRACTICES – ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT FOR OTHERS TO LEARN FROM?
IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD? ADVICE FOR OTHERS?
NedMcD: Remember that support can include what one does not want to hear; promptness and candor are more important. Do not try to pull an end-run on other departments or the chain-of-command in Kabul simply because the idea is apparently beyond the comprehension of others, particularly in Kabul. There are almost always good reasons for the restraints imposed. Money is less important than kindness, courtesy and respect. People need to know that we have faith in their determination – however imperfect – to build their country’s destiny.
Remember, too, that Moses marched the liberated Israelites through the desert for forty years for a very good reason: it takes two generations for the capacity-building seeds planted today to manifest. Lastly, look at Viet Nam thirty-five years after the U.S. defeat. The country today resembles what the U.S. tried to make of it forty years ago.
WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF YOUR JOB?
NedMcD: Troubleshoot programs administered out of Kabul; set up visits and facilitate contacts. Meet and be supportive to the efforts of local leadership. Seek and secure funding for, as well as implementation of, local development projects
WHAT WAS THE GUIDANCE YOU RECEIVED BEFORE YOU ASSUMED YOUR POST? WAS THIS SUFFICIENT? DID YOU RECEIVE TRAINING BEFORE YOU CAME TO POST? WAS IT USEFUL FOR THE WORK YOU ARE DOING?
NedMcD: The guidance was minimal and not sufficient. This fact was not the fault of USAID; we had to be in the field quickly. Sufficient training would have required at least six months, probably a year. The key, however, has proved to be the access to, and patience demonstrated by, the professionals in Kabul. So while lack of front-ended readiness was inevitable, USAID handled my learning curve very well.
WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY CHALLENGES FOR YOU IN ACHIEVING YOUR OBJECTIVES?
NedMcD: My own necessity to learn the tasks of the job. On the funding: I realized in the COTR / AOTR course that my colleagues to the south and east were facing a far more challenging problem of being pressured to fund projects without time or head-count needed for prudence. The concern is that people will be subject in the future to changing standards of accountability – from the looseness of pushing billions out the door to far more exacting standards – when the inspectors general arrive.
HOW DO YOU COORDINATE AND MAKE DECISIONS AS AN INTERAGENCY/CIV-MIL TEAM? DOES THIS WORK WELL? WHY OR WHY NOT? HAS THIS BEEN FORMALIZED (I.E. WRITTEN DOWN) OR IS IT INFORMAL?
NedMcD: There was a meeting with the Bundeswehr CIMIC to align priorities. Otherwise my close collaboration with GTZ (the German USAID) the U.N. (for the women’s media proposals) etc. came through my initiative. In this respect, the support and encouragement of the two senior FSOs in Mazar-i-Sharif were indispensible for that initiative. I also convvened the first meeting -- informally and off-the-record of U.N., uniformed military, local government and development personnel. Off-the-record because the U.N. officers were not supposed to coordinating with U.S. Army uniformed officers.
This meeting benefitted the province directly by creating the urgency to put contingency plans into place in the case of earth-quakes. While I convened the meeting, it was a U.S. National Guard Officer, with a career as an envirommental engineer States-side. His knowledge of the Alaska earthquake of 1965 and his ability to detect the same ground formation across Kunduz led him to approach me. Fortunately, I was able to convey the urgency to other stake-holders and, honestly, everybody wanted the meeting. My convening was limited to setting a compatible time and ordering food,
WHO ARE THE MAIN ACTORS OUTSIDE OF YOUR POST THAT YOU REGULARLY INTERACT WITH?
NedMcD: The U.S. Army (as discussed), UNAMA. The E.U., the German military & foreign ministries; local and provincial officials; and, NGOs (e.g., Mercy Corps).
WHAT IS YOUR PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE RELATED TO THIS WORK?
NedMcD. A senior budgeting & national security advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior; a senior economic advisor & knowledge manager at an Iraqi PRT; as well as, a strategic planner for military assistance for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.
Sunday, August 15, 2010
Letter-15: Closing Thoughts on Afghanistan
From: Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA
Date: Mon, Aug 16, 2010 at 12:45 AM
Subject: Reflections on USAID tour from Ned McDonnell
To:
Cc:
Philip and Jackie,
Please pardon the tardiness of this letter, requested by you Philip, as per his e-mail appended below. Jackie, Please pardon my not including you on earlier e-mails; I did not have your address. The following premisses -- perhaps what you are really seeking -- drove the lessons learned of rationalizing civilian reporting structures; restraints on further civilian projects; removing institutional frictions; and, focussing on everyday (i.e., common and cheap) programs with large legacies. The longer discussion on these lessons learned follows my signature.
• The United States Government (USG): the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA); and the NATO / U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are not succeeding in the counter-insurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan as evidenced by the problems encountered in Marjah, the delay in entering Kandahar and the dismissal of two ranking generals within a year.
• After nearly nine years of ISAF, the U.S. military as well as the USG and allied governments, almost every Afghan affected by this joint intervention has made up his mind about whether to embrace, accept or attack the foreign presence.
• The current end-sate for sustainable rule-of-law and development throughout Afghanistan is unattainable. It is wise to reserve limited means on areas where security permits capacity-building and capacity sticking to proceed. This may be only a quarter of the country; but that is a start.
• By reinforcing progressive, civilized behavior among beleaguered Afghans, conciliatory parties in contested areas will have ample incentive to re-take control of their villages. The costly part of this idea will be the expenses incurred to quarantine areas controlled by the AGE.
• A focus on the possible will free up USAID resources urgently needed elsewhere across the world while reducing incentives for corruption within and among the various levels of the GIRoA.
In closing this note, permit me to say that I am grateful to the United States Government for the opportunity to serve and for my German colleagues who helped make the short tour personally fulfilling. The timing of my departure reflects my inability to negotiate an extension from the Peace Corps; apparently, the work I will be doing is technical in nature. In the end, I either fulfilled my life-long --much procrastinated -- ambition or 'kiss it good-bye, forever'.
My appreciation of Messrs John CCCCCC and Matthew SSSSSS for their support of the women's rights program in Takhar remains sincere. My high regard remains firm for Mr Mark BBBBBBBBBBBBB -- one of the finest public officers with whom I have worked --for his facilitating the success of a lamentably truncated but deeply fulfilling tour with USAID.
Sincerely,
Ned McDonnell
Peace Corps-Mexico
Personal line: 860-690-1740
LESSONS LEARNED
LESSON #1: UNIFY the CIVILIAN CHAIN of COMMAND DIRECTLY UNDER the STATE DEPARTMENT (DoS).
That means integrate USAID into the DoS under the policy leadership of the Secretary of State and place all other civilian detachments (including the intelligence agencies), particularly those in conflict zones, under the direct authority of the United States Embassy. Like it or not, whole of government efforts entail institutional negotiations to reconcile differing visions of unstable, unclear situations. Consensus, at least in the field, is rare. Our military counterparts possess tremendous bargaining power for two reasons, the lesser important of which is funding.
The larger source of military leverage lies in its unification of the chains of command of at least four, likely more, cabinet-level institutions -- namely, the Army, Navy, Air Force and the former War Department (now the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or OSD) into the Department of Defense (DoD). The fragmentation of the civilian chain of command among the DoS, Treasury Department, USAID, the USDA, the Commerce Department et al. serves to dissipate the bargaining power of the civilian chain.
The break-down in accountability that follows -- best articulated as "I am with XYZ agency and don't report to State" -- coddles mediocrity of execution and circumvention of USG or GIRoA policies or preferences. The proposed unification of civilian reporting chains may appear threatening to some of my friends in USAID. I would submit, however, that the promotion of centralized accountability can permit de-centralized decision-making without the damage done by people placing personal preferences ahead of policy guidance.
Lastly, whether I deplore what I deem to be the pitfalls of American diplomacy as a USAID 'type' or not, I am still responsible to the DoS since my actions affect, and represent an extension of, diplomatic initiatives on the national level. As things stand now, the disparity of bargaining power between DoD on the one side and rivalling civilian agencies on the other forfeits too much initiative to the military. This vacuum of USG diplomacy has led to the military's appropriating civilian functions. This encroachment on civilian functions -- due to civilian weakness -- hurts the USG and muddles the military mission.
LESSON #2: DE-OBLIGATE or SUSPEND / CANCEL FUNDING of ALL USAID MISSIONS, NOW!
The current skew of development resources to Afghanistan neglects urgent development needs elsewhere and promotes corruption within the GIRoA at the national and sub-national levels. The excess funding in AGE-controlled areas in the South and the East appears to be ineffective. With ISAF in Afghanistan for nine years, painting a mosque will hardly change minds or win hearts.
Afghans have drawn their own conclusions by now and little, if anything, will change their acceptance of, or antipathy toward, the coalition presence. More money catalyzes an effort to "grab all funding" possible while it still lasts a little longer.
In view of the current size of the field-staff truly equipped to handle these funds, excess commitments are breaking down the disciplines of due-diligence and monitoring rightfully expected by U.S. tax-payers. We would all regret seeing good public servants damaged by future auditing reports that will effectively change the ground rules retro-actively.
All short-term stabilization programs of USAID really ought to be cancelled in favor of the military having adequate funding under the Commander's Emergency Response Program during upcoming clearing operations.
These funds can be devoted to consequence management to promote the safety and welfare of American troops in the field. In short, the U.S. Army and Marines need to concern themselves with military considerations in the short-term so muscular clearing of very difficult areas has a a chance to succeed.
Suspended funding will define clearly contested areas as candidates for clearing or, more likely, quarantining the AGE. After a nine-year presence of U.S. military personnel, investing in contested areas at this point simply reinforces bad behavior.
As the mid-2011 date for commencing the U.S. draw-down approaches, USAID and other agencies should begin to focus on sustainably secure areas, no matter how few in number. Instead of front-ending billions that the USG does not have, placing a reasonable amount of funding into a dedicated account for funding long-term development in Afghanistan is cost-efficient, conforms to U.S. standards of conduct avoids creating a 'beggar-ecomy'.
LESSON #3: DE-LINK USAID DEVELOPMENT and MILITARY 'BATTLE RHYTHMS'.
USAID needs to pursue its traditional mission in other regions currently neglected by the ongoing over-allocation of resources to Afghanistan. Furthermore, the COIN formula of shape-clear-hold-build is sequenced for a reason. The military's primary mission lies in the clear and hold phases. The USG's traditional development activities focus on long-term 'build' projects.
The two commands share an interest in the 'shape' (i.e., planning) phase to map out when civilian USG and military agencies assume logical primacies of command. As matters unfold presently, the forced synchronization of battle rhythms and COIN phases confuses people, diminishes whole-of-government effectiveness and contributes to disappointment with unmet (often unrealistic) expectations, cessation of open dialogue and lower morale.
LESSON #4: FOCUS on the TRUE BATTLE-FIELD: the FUTURE!
Viet Nam has matured into a thriving nation over the last thirty-five years. Notwithstanding military defeat of the U.S. interests in 1975, the seeds planted by decade-long American presence and culture have borne the bear fruit for which the greatest generation desperately hoped in the 1960s and 1970s. The process is likely to take more than two generations, if it ever occurs, in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the legacy left by the USG will shape the way rising Afghan generations view their prospects and society. That means remembering that the battlefield is not a particular village, tribe, city, valley, province or road-way. It remains the future. Inexpensive programs can innovate the future for Afghans. For example, addressing the increasing abuse of drugs in the Af-Pak region is important but trivialized.
Self-help groups are more effective than all the millions spent on cash-for-work. Teaching people to read the Qu'ran in vernacular creates an incentive to overcome the culture of poverty (where literacy is not valued) and diminishes the influence of mullahs since they now are the Qu'ran as the illiterate faithful know it.
One potentially pricey measure is to plan for internally displaced women with children. The Western Powers have an acutely evident moral obligation to protect women -- and the children -- who assert their God-endowed rights in the face of a severely misogynist and brutally sexist culture, particularly in Taliban-controlled areas in the South and East.
Date: Mon, Aug 16, 2010 at 12:45 AM
Subject: Reflections on USAID tour from Ned McDonnell
To:
Cc:
Philip and Jackie,
Please pardon the tardiness of this letter, requested by you Philip, as per his e-mail appended below. Jackie, Please pardon my not including you on earlier e-mails; I did not have your address. The following premisses -- perhaps what you are really seeking -- drove the lessons learned of rationalizing civilian reporting structures; restraints on further civilian projects; removing institutional frictions; and, focussing on everyday (i.e., common and cheap) programs with large legacies. The longer discussion on these lessons learned follows my signature.
• The United States Government (USG): the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA); and the NATO / U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are not succeeding in the counter-insurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan as evidenced by the problems encountered in Marjah, the delay in entering Kandahar and the dismissal of two ranking generals within a year.
• After nearly nine years of ISAF, the U.S. military as well as the USG and allied governments, almost every Afghan affected by this joint intervention has made up his mind about whether to embrace, accept or attack the foreign presence.
• The current end-sate for sustainable rule-of-law and development throughout Afghanistan is unattainable. It is wise to reserve limited means on areas where security permits capacity-building and capacity sticking to proceed. This may be only a quarter of the country; but that is a start.
• By reinforcing progressive, civilized behavior among beleaguered Afghans, conciliatory parties in contested areas will have ample incentive to re-take control of their villages. The costly part of this idea will be the expenses incurred to quarantine areas controlled by the AGE.
• A focus on the possible will free up USAID resources urgently needed elsewhere across the world while reducing incentives for corruption within and among the various levels of the GIRoA.
In closing this note, permit me to say that I am grateful to the United States Government for the opportunity to serve and for my German colleagues who helped make the short tour personally fulfilling. The timing of my departure reflects my inability to negotiate an extension from the Peace Corps; apparently, the work I will be doing is technical in nature. In the end, I either fulfilled my life-long --much procrastinated -- ambition or 'kiss it good-bye, forever'.
My appreciation of Messrs John CCCCCC and Matthew SSSSSS for their support of the women's rights program in Takhar remains sincere. My high regard remains firm for Mr Mark BBBBBBBBBBBBB -- one of the finest public officers with whom I have worked --for his facilitating the success of a lamentably truncated but deeply fulfilling tour with USAID.
Sincerely,
Ned McDonnell
Peace Corps-Mexico
Personal line: 860-690-1740
LESSONS LEARNED
LESSON #1: UNIFY the CIVILIAN CHAIN of COMMAND DIRECTLY UNDER the STATE DEPARTMENT (DoS).
That means integrate USAID into the DoS under the policy leadership of the Secretary of State and place all other civilian detachments (including the intelligence agencies), particularly those in conflict zones, under the direct authority of the United States Embassy. Like it or not, whole of government efforts entail institutional negotiations to reconcile differing visions of unstable, unclear situations. Consensus, at least in the field, is rare. Our military counterparts possess tremendous bargaining power for two reasons, the lesser important of which is funding.
The larger source of military leverage lies in its unification of the chains of command of at least four, likely more, cabinet-level institutions -- namely, the Army, Navy, Air Force and the former War Department (now the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or OSD) into the Department of Defense (DoD). The fragmentation of the civilian chain of command among the DoS, Treasury Department, USAID, the USDA, the Commerce Department et al. serves to dissipate the bargaining power of the civilian chain.
The break-down in accountability that follows -- best articulated as "I am with XYZ agency and don't report to State" -- coddles mediocrity of execution and circumvention of USG or GIRoA policies or preferences. The proposed unification of civilian reporting chains may appear threatening to some of my friends in USAID. I would submit, however, that the promotion of centralized accountability can permit de-centralized decision-making without the damage done by people placing personal preferences ahead of policy guidance.
Lastly, whether I deplore what I deem to be the pitfalls of American diplomacy as a USAID 'type' or not, I am still responsible to the DoS since my actions affect, and represent an extension of, diplomatic initiatives on the national level. As things stand now, the disparity of bargaining power between DoD on the one side and rivalling civilian agencies on the other forfeits too much initiative to the military. This vacuum of USG diplomacy has led to the military's appropriating civilian functions. This encroachment on civilian functions -- due to civilian weakness -- hurts the USG and muddles the military mission.
LESSON #2: DE-OBLIGATE or SUSPEND / CANCEL FUNDING of ALL USAID MISSIONS, NOW!
The current skew of development resources to Afghanistan neglects urgent development needs elsewhere and promotes corruption within the GIRoA at the national and sub-national levels. The excess funding in AGE-controlled areas in the South and the East appears to be ineffective. With ISAF in Afghanistan for nine years, painting a mosque will hardly change minds or win hearts.
Afghans have drawn their own conclusions by now and little, if anything, will change their acceptance of, or antipathy toward, the coalition presence. More money catalyzes an effort to "grab all funding" possible while it still lasts a little longer.
In view of the current size of the field-staff truly equipped to handle these funds, excess commitments are breaking down the disciplines of due-diligence and monitoring rightfully expected by U.S. tax-payers. We would all regret seeing good public servants damaged by future auditing reports that will effectively change the ground rules retro-actively.
All short-term stabilization programs of USAID really ought to be cancelled in favor of the military having adequate funding under the Commander's Emergency Response Program during upcoming clearing operations.
These funds can be devoted to consequence management to promote the safety and welfare of American troops in the field. In short, the U.S. Army and Marines need to concern themselves with military considerations in the short-term so muscular clearing of very difficult areas has a a chance to succeed.
Suspended funding will define clearly contested areas as candidates for clearing or, more likely, quarantining the AGE. After a nine-year presence of U.S. military personnel, investing in contested areas at this point simply reinforces bad behavior.
As the mid-2011 date for commencing the U.S. draw-down approaches, USAID and other agencies should begin to focus on sustainably secure areas, no matter how few in number. Instead of front-ending billions that the USG does not have, placing a reasonable amount of funding into a dedicated account for funding long-term development in Afghanistan is cost-efficient, conforms to U.S. standards of conduct avoids creating a 'beggar-ecomy'.
LESSON #3: DE-LINK USAID DEVELOPMENT and MILITARY 'BATTLE RHYTHMS'.
USAID needs to pursue its traditional mission in other regions currently neglected by the ongoing over-allocation of resources to Afghanistan. Furthermore, the COIN formula of shape-clear-hold-build is sequenced for a reason. The military's primary mission lies in the clear and hold phases. The USG's traditional development activities focus on long-term 'build' projects.
The two commands share an interest in the 'shape' (i.e., planning) phase to map out when civilian USG and military agencies assume logical primacies of command. As matters unfold presently, the forced synchronization of battle rhythms and COIN phases confuses people, diminishes whole-of-government effectiveness and contributes to disappointment with unmet (often unrealistic) expectations, cessation of open dialogue and lower morale.
LESSON #4: FOCUS on the TRUE BATTLE-FIELD: the FUTURE!
Viet Nam has matured into a thriving nation over the last thirty-five years. Notwithstanding military defeat of the U.S. interests in 1975, the seeds planted by decade-long American presence and culture have borne the bear fruit for which the greatest generation desperately hoped in the 1960s and 1970s. The process is likely to take more than two generations, if it ever occurs, in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the legacy left by the USG will shape the way rising Afghan generations view their prospects and society. That means remembering that the battlefield is not a particular village, tribe, city, valley, province or road-way. It remains the future. Inexpensive programs can innovate the future for Afghans. For example, addressing the increasing abuse of drugs in the Af-Pak region is important but trivialized.
Self-help groups are more effective than all the millions spent on cash-for-work. Teaching people to read the Qu'ran in vernacular creates an incentive to overcome the culture of poverty (where literacy is not valued) and diminishes the influence of mullahs since they now are the Qu'ran as the illiterate faithful know it.
One potentially pricey measure is to plan for internally displaced women with children. The Western Powers have an acutely evident moral obligation to protect women -- and the children -- who assert their God-endowed rights in the face of a severely misogynist and brutally sexist culture, particularly in Taliban-controlled areas in the South and East.
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
Letter #14: The more things change...
The U.S. Embassy, Kabul
ATTN: Senior Civilian Representative; Regional Command-North
Deputy Director; USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams
2nd August 2010
RE Resignation of Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA from USAID effective 2nd August 2010
Doug and Herbie,
After an unsuccessful effort to defer my entrance into the Peace Corps, I submit to you my resignation, effective immediately, from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It is with sadness that I proceed in this manner. Nevertheless, the Peace Corps has been a lifelong ambition and, with my ageing beginning to take hold, I view this time and opportunity as the last one available to me.
Attached is a schedule of the projects on which I have worked with a status report on each one. The status of these projects has not changed significantly. Also attached is the strategy for the Community-based Stabilization Grant Program for Takhar Province.
Please be advised that I timed my resignation to allow for three key gender-equality projects to proceed to approval. Mr XXXXX is GOR-qualified and can oversee the administration of these fundings. Since any monies advanced will be done so electronically, this oversight should not be a burden.
My experience at USAID, while curtailed, has been deeply rewarding. Through my tenure in Kunduz, I have learned a great deal and matured more than I would have expected. Through certain difficulties related to security and institutional constraints, I learned to persevere to bring projects to fruition and contribute to the whole-of-government approach.
Additionally, I will cherish my experience of working with German diplomats, aid-workers, civilians and soldiers as well as with UNAMA officials and representatives of a dozen international non-governmental organizations. Most rewarding, of course, has been the relationships developed with host-country officials and ordinary Afghans.
Beleaguered as they are, Afghans – whether Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek or Hezara – never once failed to assist me and show consideration to me. Lastly, the support I received from Kabul – both from the Department of State and from USAID – was consistently professional and timely.
My gratitude runs deeply and I hope to return to USAID in 2012, when I have experience that can truly facilitate the transmission of a value-add to local beneficiaries.
Very truly yours,
Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA / CAPM
formerly, General Development Officer
ATTN: Senior Civilian Representative; Regional Command-North
Deputy Director; USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams
2nd August 2010
RE Resignation of Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA from USAID effective 2nd August 2010
Doug and Herbie,
After an unsuccessful effort to defer my entrance into the Peace Corps, I submit to you my resignation, effective immediately, from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It is with sadness that I proceed in this manner. Nevertheless, the Peace Corps has been a lifelong ambition and, with my ageing beginning to take hold, I view this time and opportunity as the last one available to me.
Attached is a schedule of the projects on which I have worked with a status report on each one. The status of these projects has not changed significantly. Also attached is the strategy for the Community-based Stabilization Grant Program for Takhar Province.
Please be advised that I timed my resignation to allow for three key gender-equality projects to proceed to approval. Mr XXXXX is GOR-qualified and can oversee the administration of these fundings. Since any monies advanced will be done so electronically, this oversight should not be a burden.
My experience at USAID, while curtailed, has been deeply rewarding. Through my tenure in Kunduz, I have learned a great deal and matured more than I would have expected. Through certain difficulties related to security and institutional constraints, I learned to persevere to bring projects to fruition and contribute to the whole-of-government approach.
Additionally, I will cherish my experience of working with German diplomats, aid-workers, civilians and soldiers as well as with UNAMA officials and representatives of a dozen international non-governmental organizations. Most rewarding, of course, has been the relationships developed with host-country officials and ordinary Afghans.
Beleaguered as they are, Afghans – whether Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek or Hezara – never once failed to assist me and show consideration to me. Lastly, the support I received from Kabul – both from the Department of State and from USAID – was consistently professional and timely.
My gratitude runs deeply and I hope to return to USAID in 2012, when I have experience that can truly facilitate the transmission of a value-add to local beneficiaries.
Very truly yours,
Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA / CAPM
formerly, General Development Officer
Friday, July 23, 2010
Letter to Friends and Family #13: the surge may work; the splurge surely won't
Up north, in Kunduz, the Germans have the lead in development and in military activity. USAID definitely plays a secondary role and, consequently, keeps the budget as low as its profile. Basically, I have been whining about the lack of resources (i.e., “Show me the money! Can’t you see I’m hungry up here?”).
That attitude changed drastically when I attended a contracting course with many colleagues in the two primary theaters of the Afghan War: Kandahar and the south as well as Bagram and the east. These regions comprise the Pashtun belt whence the Taliban came and where trouble remains.
My colleagues worried out loud about having too many dollars to commit too quickly! Initially, I felt the ‘burden’ of too much money to shovel out the door as quickly as possible was a high-class problem.
WRONG. Over the ten day life of this course, however, I came to believe that excess monies undermine the enthusiasm of high-minded people for surprisingly evident reasons.
First, capital inflows into Afghanistan surpassed long ago the country's saturation limit. By drowning in liquidity, Afghanistan has the appearance of a society on a lightning-fast mend from centuries of poverty and pain.
But that burgeoning wealth is bogus and represents short-term funding for unsustainable projects and, worse, a catalyst of greater corruption. President Obama’s prudent time-table, unhappily, has had at least one unintended effect: corrupt local political brokers realize that the aid spigot is about to be shut-off and are busy grabbing what they can.
But once the imported liquidity dries out, the Afghan withdrawal from an addiction to other people's money will almost certainly trigger renewed, and savage, civil strife. The one-eyed bandit will look clairvoyant and Al Qaida sympathetic by comparison.
Second, this massive display of ‘generosity’ simply does not work. After eight years of allied presence in their cities and villages, most Afghans have formed firm opinions about the success, failure, desirability or repugnance of a forceful foreign presence.
Additionally, there simply are not enough skilled laborers in the country to complete and maintain the projects in process or in the planning stage.
Third, my colleagues feel very vulnerable. The requirement to dispense with so much money so quickly subverts the USAID due-diligence process. My acquaintances despise this 'spending at all costs', as the U.S. government equates dollars obligated and funded with success.
Well – “surprise” writ large across the sky – it is not working. And for reasons additional to the sobering fact that, at best, 20% of the “billions and billions” of aid dollars actually reach Afghan beneficiaries. Worse, many of the funds funnel over to the enemy.
Further, my peers foresee a day when the U.S. government’s accounting ‘Gotcha-Goons’ will picking through every nook and cranny of twisted documentation to find fraud, waste and abuse. Given the complexity and unwieldiness of the grants documentation, combined with the surfeit of aid that overwhelms it, my colleagues dread the day when investigators may impugn their professional integrity over policy errors and errant appropriations emanating from Washington.
The part that drives my colleagues to anxiety are emerging sadnesses: that 75-85% of the Afghans will remain illiterate throughout this spree; that girls all-too-often will continue not going to school; and, that women will face brutal hurdles in exercising their electoral franchise.
The solutions to this queasy quandary number as many as the people proposing them. Cobbling together bits of some ideas with pieces of others produces a simple policy.
First, cease all funding for long-term projects that lie ahead of the Afghan learning curve. Then place these ‘de-obligated’ funds into a trust to be spent down over the next generation as Afghans mature their capabilities to use them wisely.
Second, suspend any further work in the Pashtun provinces for at least six months to see who and where the bad guys are; they will be ‘razing hell’ soon enough.
Third, target the surge toward these ‘unpacified’ areas.
Fourth, turn over all USAID ‘stabilization’ programming to the military for use under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. USAID is not suited for palliatives. Moreover, those released funds allow the Army field soldiers to apply $750 million for consequence management during the surge. It just may save their lives.
Lastly, diminish USAID personnel to 25% and funding to 10% of their current levels in Afghanistan to focus activities on tranquil parts of the country. Good citizenship should be supported first and now.
And why are these solutions, and others like them, “meet and right so to do”? Otherwise, we leave a sullied legacy of civil strife, of ethnic cleansing and of “life being nasty brutish and short”.
That attitude changed drastically when I attended a contracting course with many colleagues in the two primary theaters of the Afghan War: Kandahar and the south as well as Bagram and the east. These regions comprise the Pashtun belt whence the Taliban came and where trouble remains.
My colleagues worried out loud about having too many dollars to commit too quickly! Initially, I felt the ‘burden’ of too much money to shovel out the door as quickly as possible was a high-class problem.
WRONG. Over the ten day life of this course, however, I came to believe that excess monies undermine the enthusiasm of high-minded people for surprisingly evident reasons.
First, capital inflows into Afghanistan surpassed long ago the country's saturation limit. By drowning in liquidity, Afghanistan has the appearance of a society on a lightning-fast mend from centuries of poverty and pain.
But that burgeoning wealth is bogus and represents short-term funding for unsustainable projects and, worse, a catalyst of greater corruption. President Obama’s prudent time-table, unhappily, has had at least one unintended effect: corrupt local political brokers realize that the aid spigot is about to be shut-off and are busy grabbing what they can.
But once the imported liquidity dries out, the Afghan withdrawal from an addiction to other people's money will almost certainly trigger renewed, and savage, civil strife. The one-eyed bandit will look clairvoyant and Al Qaida sympathetic by comparison.
Second, this massive display of ‘generosity’ simply does not work. After eight years of allied presence in their cities and villages, most Afghans have formed firm opinions about the success, failure, desirability or repugnance of a forceful foreign presence.
Additionally, there simply are not enough skilled laborers in the country to complete and maintain the projects in process or in the planning stage.
Third, my colleagues feel very vulnerable. The requirement to dispense with so much money so quickly subverts the USAID due-diligence process. My acquaintances despise this 'spending at all costs', as the U.S. government equates dollars obligated and funded with success.
Well – “surprise” writ large across the sky – it is not working. And for reasons additional to the sobering fact that, at best, 20% of the “billions and billions” of aid dollars actually reach Afghan beneficiaries. Worse, many of the funds funnel over to the enemy.
Further, my peers foresee a day when the U.S. government’s accounting ‘Gotcha-Goons’ will picking through every nook and cranny of twisted documentation to find fraud, waste and abuse. Given the complexity and unwieldiness of the grants documentation, combined with the surfeit of aid that overwhelms it, my colleagues dread the day when investigators may impugn their professional integrity over policy errors and errant appropriations emanating from Washington.
The part that drives my colleagues to anxiety are emerging sadnesses: that 75-85% of the Afghans will remain illiterate throughout this spree; that girls all-too-often will continue not going to school; and, that women will face brutal hurdles in exercising their electoral franchise.
The solutions to this queasy quandary number as many as the people proposing them. Cobbling together bits of some ideas with pieces of others produces a simple policy.
First, cease all funding for long-term projects that lie ahead of the Afghan learning curve. Then place these ‘de-obligated’ funds into a trust to be spent down over the next generation as Afghans mature their capabilities to use them wisely.
Second, suspend any further work in the Pashtun provinces for at least six months to see who and where the bad guys are; they will be ‘razing hell’ soon enough.
Third, target the surge toward these ‘unpacified’ areas.
Fourth, turn over all USAID ‘stabilization’ programming to the military for use under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. USAID is not suited for palliatives. Moreover, those released funds allow the Army field soldiers to apply $750 million for consequence management during the surge. It just may save their lives.
Lastly, diminish USAID personnel to 25% and funding to 10% of their current levels in Afghanistan to focus activities on tranquil parts of the country. Good citizenship should be supported first and now.
And why are these solutions, and others like them, “meet and right so to do”? Otherwise, we leave a sullied legacy of civil strife, of ethnic cleansing and of “life being nasty brutish and short”.
Friday, July 16, 2010
Letter #12 to Friends and Family: Ned forgot his Wheaties
This letter should not require even five hundred words. The first draft was three times that amount. Three items drive this mea culpa. First, I under-estimated President Obama. Second, I imputed my cynicism to the President. Third, the sum of two counts half-accepted represents yet another bout of the unbearable greyness of being.
FIRST: UNDER-ESTIMATING the PRESIDENT
Recently, I had dinner in Kabul with some acquaintances from the Embassy who were wired into the real events of General McChrystal’s fateful half-hour meeting from which he emerged a relieved man. Apparently, General McChrytsal walked into the White House meeting proudly, almost defiantly. No surprise there. Present at the ritual slaughter with President Obama were Vice President Biden, National Security Council Chairman Jones, General Petraeus and Secretary Gates. After the usual pleasantries and, perhaps, a briefing, the meeting turned to the real subject. General McChrystal apparently stated that President Obama had his letter of resignation. The ritual slaughter for which I had previously argued should have followed. Except, it never occurred. President Obama proved his capacity as a statesman by replying that he was “considering [accepting] it.” General McChrystal asked the other four whether he still enjoyed their confidence and support. Two said ‘yea’; two remained silent, at which point McChrystal recommended that the President accept the resignation. President Obama accepted the resignation but did not bust General McChrystal’s rank down to Lieutenant General (i.e., from four to three stars on the epaulet). The senior Embassy types, like David Smith, chastised me kindly for mis-reading the situation. And so I had – thank God Himself for that!
SECOND: REALIZING the CYNIC’s PARADOX
Not one person I know - Democrat, Republican, Independent or Fair-weather partisan - has bought into my concern that President Obama appointed General Petraeus to assume command in Afghanistan to hang the Afghanistan War on the latter. Most people think that General Petraeus accepted the request with all of the earnestness at his command for three reasons. His theory of counter-insurgency faces a steep test in Afghanistan; the South is not progressing well. ‘Governance in a box’ appears to be ‘government as a hoax’. Additionally, General Petraeus has the credibility to squeeze one more year out of the American people if conditions do not favour the commencement of withdrawal in mid-2011. Lastly, I genuinely believe that General Petraeus remains, to his core, a devoted citizen-soldier of the United States of America. Three plausible reasons; three cheers for General Petraeus.
THIRD: TWO HALF-COUNTS of SECONDARY IMPORTANCE
The two half-counts, in view of their moral ambiguity, can only unleash a torrent of ‘Hamletizing’. Since you, the reader, are about as interested in contemplating my navel as I have time to do so, I prefer to leave those debates to you. First, intelligence types tell me that the locals, most Pashtuns included, welcome U.S. special forces as they kill very bad men; in fact, these villagers want to see more aggressive attacks by the U.S. Fair enough. Nevertheless, I cannot help but wonder if Afghans, conditioned to a culture of conflict, find such ethical finery to be just so much nit-picking. After all, had the social lottery placed me in Afghanistan as a subsistence farmer, I would most likely be dead by now and dead for several years. The other half-count, whether General McChrystal should have lost his command over the Rolling Stone article, really is anyone’s judgement call. While I remain unconvinced, people more intelligent than I seem to agree that Gerneral McChrystal went too far and was fortunate not to be summarily fired.
In conclusion, the irony remains that I was not a big fan of General McChrystal. In any case, President Obama deserves credit for pre-meditated statesmanship after the die was cast. The lesson for me? Oscar Wilde was right: a cynic knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. Best I quit counting my pennies and put them back into my loafers.
FIRST: UNDER-ESTIMATING the PRESIDENT
Recently, I had dinner in Kabul with some acquaintances from the Embassy who were wired into the real events of General McChrystal’s fateful half-hour meeting from which he emerged a relieved man. Apparently, General McChrytsal walked into the White House meeting proudly, almost defiantly. No surprise there. Present at the ritual slaughter with President Obama were Vice President Biden, National Security Council Chairman Jones, General Petraeus and Secretary Gates. After the usual pleasantries and, perhaps, a briefing, the meeting turned to the real subject. General McChrystal apparently stated that President Obama had his letter of resignation. The ritual slaughter for which I had previously argued should have followed. Except, it never occurred. President Obama proved his capacity as a statesman by replying that he was “considering [accepting] it.” General McChrystal asked the other four whether he still enjoyed their confidence and support. Two said ‘yea’; two remained silent, at which point McChrystal recommended that the President accept the resignation. President Obama accepted the resignation but did not bust General McChrystal’s rank down to Lieutenant General (i.e., from four to three stars on the epaulet). The senior Embassy types, like David Smith, chastised me kindly for mis-reading the situation. And so I had – thank God Himself for that!
SECOND: REALIZING the CYNIC’s PARADOX
Not one person I know - Democrat, Republican, Independent or Fair-weather partisan - has bought into my concern that President Obama appointed General Petraeus to assume command in Afghanistan to hang the Afghanistan War on the latter. Most people think that General Petraeus accepted the request with all of the earnestness at his command for three reasons. His theory of counter-insurgency faces a steep test in Afghanistan; the South is not progressing well. ‘Governance in a box’ appears to be ‘government as a hoax’. Additionally, General Petraeus has the credibility to squeeze one more year out of the American people if conditions do not favour the commencement of withdrawal in mid-2011. Lastly, I genuinely believe that General Petraeus remains, to his core, a devoted citizen-soldier of the United States of America. Three plausible reasons; three cheers for General Petraeus.
THIRD: TWO HALF-COUNTS of SECONDARY IMPORTANCE
The two half-counts, in view of their moral ambiguity, can only unleash a torrent of ‘Hamletizing’. Since you, the reader, are about as interested in contemplating my navel as I have time to do so, I prefer to leave those debates to you. First, intelligence types tell me that the locals, most Pashtuns included, welcome U.S. special forces as they kill very bad men; in fact, these villagers want to see more aggressive attacks by the U.S. Fair enough. Nevertheless, I cannot help but wonder if Afghans, conditioned to a culture of conflict, find such ethical finery to be just so much nit-picking. After all, had the social lottery placed me in Afghanistan as a subsistence farmer, I would most likely be dead by now and dead for several years. The other half-count, whether General McChrystal should have lost his command over the Rolling Stone article, really is anyone’s judgement call. While I remain unconvinced, people more intelligent than I seem to agree that Gerneral McChrystal went too far and was fortunate not to be summarily fired.
In conclusion, the irony remains that I was not a big fan of General McChrystal. In any case, President Obama deserves credit for pre-meditated statesmanship after the die was cast. The lesson for me? Oscar Wilde was right: a cynic knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. Best I quit counting my pennies and put them back into my loafers.
Saturday, July 3, 2010
Letter #11 to friends and family: The Politics of Murder
Life returns to normal – that is to say: back to sunny surrealism – after a bloody incident like the “complex” attack that occurred two nights ago in the heart of Kunduz City (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-attack-20100703,0,2973351.story). Life on the plateau, on which we rest complacently, appears to be relatively immune to reality. Five of the six murdered belonged, in some capacity, to one of USAID’s largest “implementing partners”, Development Alternatives International (DAI).
Many of the eighteen wounded, however, had nothing to do with the incident. Again, they were pure innocents falling victim to the local police peppering the stricken building with rocket-propelled grenades. Beat cops with R.P.G.s? Not good for community policing. The attack that hammered DAI was complex in that it represented a tightly planned sequence of attacks.
Had DAI’s security people followed the spurned advice of the local police, the car-bomb would have killed one DAI guard – Afghan, I am sure – instantly at the front gate. The remaining five insurgents should have had to face a second, strongly fortified perimeter ten feet behind the gate and meet a rather quick demise. Such “simplistification”, however, misses the larger question: why was DAI itself attacked? The obvious answer, and the one that ends most analyses, is that DAI is a large USAID contractor. American NGOs are fair game; end of story.
Well, not quite. Several USAID implementing partners work in Kunduz, not to mention about half a dozen others from Europe working on Germany’s far larger program. So, why DAI in particular? Because DAI’s dormitory was in a residential area and neighbors were none-too-pleased with its presence. Now why would that be? After all, this house populated in large part by highly paid foreigners would normally be pumping money into the neighborhood economy.
True; nevertheless, local inhabitants suspect that large American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) pose as front organizations for intelligence organizations and, worse (from the Afghan view), the special forces. The ‘black ops’ mode of selective elimination of key enemy figures has significantly reduced collateral damage, a definite “PLUS” ethically. On the other hand, many Afghans rightly or wrongly view these midnight rangers as assassins or terrorists in uniform.
All very interesting but where does DAI figure in all of this? DAI is implementing a program to aid the counter-insurgency by investing in small local projects in contested areas. This 'window-dressing' program confers “quick-impacts” on hostile communities by employing local workers. All just fine; that is counter-insurgency. To do that, however, DAI likely works with intelligence resources to target particular villages for these non-lethal activities aimed at winning hearts and minds.
The villagers see through the manipulation as easily as we can see through overt and often insincere efforts of someone trying to ‘buy’ our liking. Taliban sympathizers may take -- and even like -- the money. Yet they continue to detest the ulterior motives imputed to the DAIs of the world. Buying allegiances will not work. Furthermore, companies like DAI should fail developmental smell-tests.
DAI is a for-profit organization dedicated (apparently) to development or capacity-building, the flip-side of ‘sovereign’ loans extended by international money-center banks. Admittedly, I once made the argument that international banks should take the lead in lending to poorer countries because the money-centers would differentiate third-world countries – those with the ability to grow and pay off loans to the banker’s profit – from fourth world countries (i.e., today's the bottom billion). All very logical on my part...when I was a twenty-two year old trying to get a job in banking in the late 1970s.
We know the reality of global finance by now, with periodic 'sovereign debt' write-offs in exchange for (supposedly) coerced votes in the U.N., and the like. (Not original to me, but to a self-indulgent former ‘development professional’ in a book titled “Confessions of an Economic Hit-Man”; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confessions_of_an_Economic_Hit_Man.) In the contemporary economics of U.S. development aid, much of the money designated as "pledged" to a poor country, barely trickles down to the intended beneficiaries. The bulk of this 'foreign aid' funds white-collar make-work consulting jobs that enrich Americans and U.S. companies like DAI.
Large non-profit implementing (what?) partners often are little better. The good news is that most NGOs, including American and those contracting out to USAID, do not fit the profile of “beltway bandits”. They do good work. Their best work comes through working with start-up NGOs in Afghanistan and elsewhere that engage local populations to take back their futures to the extent they can, little-by-little.
Thus, DAI was attacked more for being perceived as a corporate bag-man doing the bidding of the U.S. government. Sadly, two nights ago, theocratic thugs murdered six people most of whom had no axe to grind with insurgents, criminals, freedom-fighters, corporate welfare chiselers or anyone else. Every bit as sad will be the continuing “battle rhythm” of many large USAID implementing partners: high-profiles, fast bucks and fleeting, if any, results.
Many of the eighteen wounded, however, had nothing to do with the incident. Again, they were pure innocents falling victim to the local police peppering the stricken building with rocket-propelled grenades. Beat cops with R.P.G.s? Not good for community policing. The attack that hammered DAI was complex in that it represented a tightly planned sequence of attacks.
Had DAI’s security people followed the spurned advice of the local police, the car-bomb would have killed one DAI guard – Afghan, I am sure – instantly at the front gate. The remaining five insurgents should have had to face a second, strongly fortified perimeter ten feet behind the gate and meet a rather quick demise. Such “simplistification”, however, misses the larger question: why was DAI itself attacked? The obvious answer, and the one that ends most analyses, is that DAI is a large USAID contractor. American NGOs are fair game; end of story.
Well, not quite. Several USAID implementing partners work in Kunduz, not to mention about half a dozen others from Europe working on Germany’s far larger program. So, why DAI in particular? Because DAI’s dormitory was in a residential area and neighbors were none-too-pleased with its presence. Now why would that be? After all, this house populated in large part by highly paid foreigners would normally be pumping money into the neighborhood economy.
True; nevertheless, local inhabitants suspect that large American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) pose as front organizations for intelligence organizations and, worse (from the Afghan view), the special forces. The ‘black ops’ mode of selective elimination of key enemy figures has significantly reduced collateral damage, a definite “PLUS” ethically. On the other hand, many Afghans rightly or wrongly view these midnight rangers as assassins or terrorists in uniform.
All very interesting but where does DAI figure in all of this? DAI is implementing a program to aid the counter-insurgency by investing in small local projects in contested areas. This 'window-dressing' program confers “quick-impacts” on hostile communities by employing local workers. All just fine; that is counter-insurgency. To do that, however, DAI likely works with intelligence resources to target particular villages for these non-lethal activities aimed at winning hearts and minds.
The villagers see through the manipulation as easily as we can see through overt and often insincere efforts of someone trying to ‘buy’ our liking. Taliban sympathizers may take -- and even like -- the money. Yet they continue to detest the ulterior motives imputed to the DAIs of the world. Buying allegiances will not work. Furthermore, companies like DAI should fail developmental smell-tests.
DAI is a for-profit organization dedicated (apparently) to development or capacity-building, the flip-side of ‘sovereign’ loans extended by international money-center banks. Admittedly, I once made the argument that international banks should take the lead in lending to poorer countries because the money-centers would differentiate third-world countries – those with the ability to grow and pay off loans to the banker’s profit – from fourth world countries (i.e., today's the bottom billion). All very logical on my part...when I was a twenty-two year old trying to get a job in banking in the late 1970s.
We know the reality of global finance by now, with periodic 'sovereign debt' write-offs in exchange for (supposedly) coerced votes in the U.N., and the like. (Not original to me, but to a self-indulgent former ‘development professional’ in a book titled “Confessions of an Economic Hit-Man”; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confessions_of_an_Economic_Hit_Man.) In the contemporary economics of U.S. development aid, much of the money designated as "pledged" to a poor country, barely trickles down to the intended beneficiaries. The bulk of this 'foreign aid' funds white-collar make-work consulting jobs that enrich Americans and U.S. companies like DAI.
Large non-profit implementing (what?) partners often are little better. The good news is that most NGOs, including American and those contracting out to USAID, do not fit the profile of “beltway bandits”. They do good work. Their best work comes through working with start-up NGOs in Afghanistan and elsewhere that engage local populations to take back their futures to the extent they can, little-by-little.
Thus, DAI was attacked more for being perceived as a corporate bag-man doing the bidding of the U.S. government. Sadly, two nights ago, theocratic thugs murdered six people most of whom had no axe to grind with insurgents, criminals, freedom-fighters, corporate welfare chiselers or anyone else. Every bit as sad will be the continuing “battle rhythm” of many large USAID implementing partners: high-profiles, fast bucks and fleeting, if any, results.
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