"Never negotiate out of fear but never fear to negotiate."
-- President Kennedy
OPENING THOUGHTS. For months, I have wanted to favour
this arrangement negotiated among the United States, the European Union, the
United Kingdom, France, China, Germany, Russia and Iran for three reasons.
First, I have felt that Iran has its reasons for seeking a nuclear deterrent
versus Pakistan; that notion proved to be incorrect. Second, I have felt that the best
approach to Iran is to empower its middle class and moderates by bringing them
into the community of nations.
Third, the behavior of Republicans toward President Obama has been disrespectful. The letter sent by most Senate Republicans to the Iranian leadership and the speech of Prime Minister Netanyahu to Congress, at the invitation of Republicans and without the courtesy of consulting the President, strike me as repugnant. The concern by conservatives toward this arrangement is understandable, as are the worries expressed by their more dovish brethren if no rapprochement with Iran can be achieved.
BLUF: I cannot support proceeding with this arrangement, at least at this time. Though I lean against the accord, I do so barely. There are some great arguments in favor of the accord by none other than President Obama via the social medium, QUORA:
Third, the behavior of Republicans toward President Obama has been disrespectful. The letter sent by most Senate Republicans to the Iranian leadership and the speech of Prime Minister Netanyahu to Congress, at the invitation of Republicans and without the courtesy of consulting the President, strike me as repugnant. The concern by conservatives toward this arrangement is understandable, as are the worries expressed by their more dovish brethren if no rapprochement with Iran can be achieved.
BLUF: I cannot support proceeding with this arrangement, at least at this time. Though I lean against the accord, I do so barely. There are some great arguments in favor of the accord by none other than President Obama via the social medium, QUORA:
- http://www.quora.com/What-is-it-about-the-Iran-nuclear-deal-that-keeps-them-from-getting-nuclear-weapons
- http://www.quora.com/Would-a-rejection-of-the-Iran-nuclear-deal-by-the-US-Congress-be-a-vote-for-war
- http://www.quora.com/Can-Irans-leaders-be-trusted
Summary. We need to
lessen tensions with Iran. Nevertheless, before moving ahead with this
arrangement, there has to be a resolution of the situation in Syria; or, at
least, a decisive move toward that resolution. Certain sanctions – for banking,
peaceful nuclear development and weapons – should not be lifted
unconditionally. Nor should frozen government-owned assets be released immediately.
Conclusion. This arrangement is not going to affect Iran’s calculations in deciding in
whether or not to develop nuclear weapons. This accord may prove to be a guided pathway
for Iran to follow toward developing nuclear weapons in a universally acceptable manner and timeline.
Further, a nuclear Iran will not materially change the level of danger the world currently faces. The danger lies in the nature of the society hosting such weapons and its geopolitical pressures. The larger issue here is how to engage the Iranian people so they can throw off, peacefully, the shackles of a religious dictatorship.
Further, a nuclear Iran will not materially change the level of danger the world currently faces. The danger lies in the nature of the society hosting such weapons and its geopolitical pressures. The larger issue here is how to engage the Iranian people so they can throw off, peacefully, the shackles of a religious dictatorship.
Open questions. Though much of the
agreement cites in detail many technical terms and concepts which I do not know, I have finally
wandered through the arrangement. ¡UGGH! There are questions in this debate, the answers to
which are not visible to the casual observer and will go a long way toward colouring
the complexion of the agreement.
- Are there side-agreements that may bind the United States to future commitments? If such commitments exist, they may be helpful or they may not.
- Does the agreement represent a quiet coup (or shift of power) from the theocracy in Iran to the moderates and the cosmopolitan middle class of that country? Were such a shift of power to occur, the arrangement could well be a milestone in constructive engagement with the Iranian people.
- Are the European leaders under pressure to lift the sanctions against Iran? If true, this arrangement might be an exercise of making a virtue of a necessity.
These
questions tend to argue in favor of subjecting this arrangement to the scrutiny
and accountability of a treaty.
Observations. There are certain observations that I tentatively make from my reading
of this arrangement. Truthfully, I should be candid about feeling tentative since the text
is complicated and detailed. My confidence in my understanding of the
arrangement is modest; I wanted to see for myself what the agreement said, even
if I am utterly confused by its twisted terminology.
- Sanctions do not lift immediately. They lift after six months or so, depending upon the lag between the 'Adoption Day’ of formal approval and the 'Implementation Day' when sanctions lift and Iran does her part to restrict enrichment activities.
- The snap-back provision is tenuous and will not work. This illusion may be in place to shroud the pressure overwhelming European and other policy makers that private companies are exerting to open up the Iranian market by jettisoning the sanctions.
- Certain time-lines are not readily apparent. There is no twenty-four day notice period for inspections (at least that I could find within the basic text). From my reading, adjudication of violations gives Iran more like six-to-eight weeks to shift prohibited materials around to avoid detection. Additionally, I could find no reference to a one-year break-out period.
- Oversight will be easier than it was in Iraq. Since few sites (only two that I recall) will be active for eight years, the International Atomic Agency will have considerable enforcement powers, if, and only if, Iran complies with the arrangement and restricts activities to these stipulated sites.
- This agreement depends on good faith. Several requirements for following “the letter and spirit” of the arrangement make the complicated language unsettling in its inherent difficulty to understand and enforce.
There
will be ample room for competing interpretations, giving Iran the latitude to
violate the agreement before the international community can plausibly react.
On the other hand, while good faith sounds ‘gooey’, that commitment is the bedrock underlying any
international agreement.
Concerns with the Arrangement. There are two
fundamental concerns for me. First, I am not convinced that this arrangement really
changes anything going forward. The accord comes across more as a complicated
communiqué than some hard-and-fast agreement. The value of the accord may well lie in empowering the pro-democracy elements in Iran for a moderate policy to
prevail over the pugnacious preferences of authoritarian theocrats.
Many Iranians are sophisticated. Outside of Israël, Iran was once the most progressive culture in a historically backward region. Second,
the elements of timing, and not the arrangement itself, also trouble me. My
specific concerns – at least those that I remember – include:
- superseding a settled bi-partisan sanctions policy, perhaps even Congressional resolutions or laws, via waivers;
- the possibility of secret and binding commitments extended by the United States – unilaterally or as part of the working group – to Iran or other stake-holders;
- the lifting of all sanctions -- including nuclear development, weapons, banking and frozen assets – in the short-to-medium term, thereby removing a potent deterrent against Iran violating the arrangement;
- the eventual willingness (sic) of the United States (and our working partners) to resist violations by Iran through snap-back sanctions;
- the current context of Iran’s and Russia’s activities in Syria and, to a far lesser extent, Iran’s continued funding of Hizbulah precluding the efficacy of a ‘good-faith agreement’; as well as,
- the likelihood that the days of comprehensive allied sanctions being numbered, with that pressure driving an accord deleterious to American interests.
The context issue is crucial but also
very subjective. In view of the several events since 2008, American policy has
come to be viewed by many friends and foes as prone to appeasement. Sadly, a 'good-faith' agreement, written within the current context of perceived appeasement, may end up looking weak to our cynical counterparts in Teheran.
The critical question here – and one I can not
answer – is who is cynical and who is not, and the relative distribution of
power between those two factions in Iran (and in Russia). Again, this arrangement may have a million
things wrong with it but still be worthwhile if it empowers those in Iran ready
to renounce terrorism, work with Israël and rejoin the community of nations at the expense of theocratic tyranny.
The vacillating ambivalence expressed above shakes out, on balance, in an adverse manner for me. The possibility of the scenario immediately below, embedded in a
climate of such uncertainty, remains high enough to make this arrangement – in its
current form and with its current timing – too risky to pursue, at least for
now.
- Iran plays nice until the 'lmplementation Day', when the sanctions are lifted.
- Iran starts using the global banking system to finance Hizbulah attacks and other covert aggression across the region, prolonging and worsening the appalling carnage in Syria.
- Once Iran is integrated back into international economy, after six months to a year, she directly violates the treaty and produces a nuclear weapon.
- The West screams and yells but does nothing, with too much business pressure –together with an unwillingness forcibly to blunt Iranian and / or Russian expansionism –for the mythical snap-back sanctions to occur.
- Iran does not renounce terror but now has the financial system to expedite it.
Reflections. Now I am neither sure nor convinced that Iran would do these things. Yet the context is key, here, in view of the nation's capacity
to act. American policy has been arguably perceived as supporting a trend of
appeasement since 2008:
- little push-back on the Russian invasion of Georgia;
- delay of the deployment of missile protections in Poland and the Czech Republic;
- an unintentionally complicit silence in the face of a spontaneous then thwarted democratic uprising in Iran after phoney election results, reminiscent of Soviet charades in the previous century;
- unwillingness to push back on a manipulated election result in Iraq that kept a would-be sectarian dictator in power;
- following colonial powers willy-nilly into Libya, more to satisfy Italy without regard to a difficult régime's repudiation -- in word and deed -- of development weapons of mass destruction and state-sponsored terrorism;
- cancellation of those missile deployments to NATO’s Eastern allies;
- hysterical, then chimerical red-lines in Syria; as well as,
- no reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and reneging on a twenty year old commitment by the United States to guarantee the borders of Ukraine (in exchange for Ukraine giving up to Russia a credible nuclear deterrent).
If my view of perceived appeasement is a plausible one, the likelihood of Iranian non-compliance can be
expected to increase materially. This framework would also have a higher probability of success, were it proposed at a more
propitious time.
Additionally, I would add that this agreement does little to
address Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, to the extent she really does do that. (Is Hizbulah really any worse than the Contras or the U.S.-sponsored death squads in Central America?) The sanctions
being lifted unconditionally ought not include those applying to financial institutions
and the capital markets or the release of frozen Iranian assets; they ease the financing of terrorism.
Most of the sanctions are hurting the wrong people in Iran and, in
fairness to everyday Iranian innocents, many of the sanctions should be lifted in any
case. But those measures mentioned as troublesome (banks, guns and enrichment), together
with the release of frozen assets, should be deferred and their lifting earned
by deeds recorded not merely by intentions reported.
My recommendation to fellow Republicans. In the end, I think this agreement will be unenforceable and we have
yet to receive that best kind of assurance from Teheran -- actual deeds to reduce terrorism
and a genuine interest in the peaceful use of the uranium -- vital to forging a
strong and self-reinforcing trust between the two sides. So, this is what I
think my fellow Republicans should argue for:
- deferring, not scrapping, the agreement until a peace plan for Syria is reached;
- not lifting the sanctions on financial institutions and weapons makers, at least until Iran renounces terrorism;
- not releasing frozen assets until Iran has demonstrated good faith;
- lifting most other sanctions to encourage the Iranian people to push their government toward a more peaceful and democratic stance; as well as,
- requiring that the agreement be viewed, and voted on, as a treaty.
As always, I humbly thank you for your patience with
my presumption.

















