Life of an average joe

These essays cover a tour in Afghanistan for the first seventeen letters home. For an overview of that tour, and thoughts on Iraq, essays #1, #2 and #17 should suffice. Staring with the eighteenth letter, I begin to recount -- hopefully in five hundred words -- some daily aspects of life in Mexico with the Peace Corps.



Thursday, June 12, 2014

Letter to Friends and Familiares #100: Arabian Agony

Iraq, stated concisely, may be in her death-throes. The Sunni-based Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (I.S.I.S., anything but a fertile goddess misplaced in the fertile crescent) is sweeping across the Sunni-dominated north and west of Iraq.  The U.S. experiment, initiated by President Bush, appears to be failing.  The politicoes are lobbing blame every which way.  Iraq continues to collapse.

The enormity of the challenge facing the U.S. et al. makes focussing on something or anything not only preferable but, in the eyes of a discredited President, politically imperative. Ten years ago, when I first worked in Baghdad, a wealthy Iraqi construction magnate, a Sunni, warned me of the infiltration into the Ministry of Interior by Shi’ite death squads.

Though AMB Bremer’s reign had only recently ended, his tenure was already proving to be a ‘DefCon-1’ disaster with the wrong analogy (i.e., post-war Germany) applied to the wrong culture (one with little tradition of western-style democracy) at the wrong time (after a devastating three decades). At that point, this friend told me only one insurgent leader was worth a damn: Muqtada al-Sadr.

Al-Sadr? The crazy cleric that many of the ‘cool set’ had long deemed as slightly retarded? The bad-boy of U.S. reconstruction efforts? What my colleague told me was that, as stupid and stubborn as Muqtada al-Sadr was, he was a “crazy kid nationalist”. Religious, yes; a anti-Sunni Shi´ite sectarian, not really.  Obviously, I rejected this insight out of hand. And so did the most Americans, to our subsequent peril.
Ten years later, I have argued until my face is blue against a number of dimensions of delusional thinking overtaking much of American policy. President Bush, at least and at last in 2007, broke the denial and surged troop strength to try to stem the slide toward total civil war. With General David Petraeus in field-command and partnering with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, one of the finest diplomats since General George Marshall, that gutsy surge carried the day.

Unfortunately, American victory in the field has proven not to be permanent. A very senior diplomat and Middle East trouble shooter, who had dealt with Prime Minister al-Maliki quite a bit, warned me in 2008, during his participation in the negotiation of the agreement between the Bush Administration and the duly elected Iraqi government of al-Maliki, that the then relatively new and always scruffy leader was looking to be a dictator.

To my eternal regret, I did not believe him; he was right. Trying to blame someone singularly is not a productive exercise. As far as President Obama’s strategy is concerned, it is time to end the riveting but irrelevant debate with its successive waves of recriminations and alibis. The President has confused detachment with appeasement; his policy has manifestly failed. 

Okay. 

As I have ranted many times, the President failed to act in 2010, when Prime Minister al-Maliki showed his true dictatorial ‘alpha-male fido’ by not handing the reins of government over to the duly elected Ayad Allawi, a secular Shi´ite and former Saddam official who had fallen out of favor with that tyrant for political and not sectarian reasons.
Allawi8.jpg
Democrats and liberal apologists need to accept this fact of President Obama’s strategy to date lest the current problems be neither addressed nor solved over time. As a quick aside: the U.S. invasion will eventually succeed in implanting a democratic governance – albeit quite different from the type we are used to – over the next ten to twenty years; think Viêt Nam in the late 1990s. The root causes of the startling advances, in recent days, of this newest crop of blood-drunk radicals in I.S.I.S. calls for nothing other than decisive moves including, but not limited to, the following:
  • no aid or action until P.M. al-Maliki resigns while new elections and a new constitutional convention are scheduled;
  • integration of the largest tribes into that new convention, the subsequent constitution and the eventual government;
  • immediate integration into the security forces of the former Sons of Iraq (the Sunnis disaffected with Al Qaeda in 2007 who sided with the Americans to win the war);
  • limited dispatch of Special Forces to usher in U.N. peace-keepers, preferably from non Arab Muslim countries like Indonesia, Senegal and Malaysia;
  • limited airstrikes, only if necessary, to slow the I.S.I.S. advance while the honest members of the security forces – guessing roughly a 25-35% core – institute crime-watches and other neighbourhood policing tactics;
  • provision of safe-havens for Muqtada al-Sadr and Ayatollah Sistani to avoid a deepening dependence upon Iran as well as high profile sectarian murders; as well as,
  • an international police-training effort to clean the Shi´ite death squads out of the security forces.
These suggestions can be implemented rapidly to stanch the bleeding and permit the great majority of moderate Kurds, Sunnis and Shi´ites to take their country back from the current crime wave. I.S.I.S. may have high-sounding rhetoric – and may even believe its own P.R. copy – but it remains, first and foremost, a criminal gang. This insurgency is simply another crime-wave traipsing around in the garb of a galloping caliphate.  The trouble-makers on both sides are sectarian; their even-tempered and far more numerous compatriots may be religious but they are tolerant. All are Arabs or Kurds or both in the end.

President Bush won the war in 2007 by not abandoning the Iraqis to a fate almost as grim as the one implied by this currently dire situation.  President Obama did not fail us by not negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement in 2011. The Iraqis wanted us out. Where President Obama failed us was by not threatening to pull the 50-75,000 American troops still in-country when al-Maliki subverted an American-modeled electoral process based upon a flawed constitution with its civil war time-bomb of ceding vast swathes of territory from Arabs to Kurds. 

That threat of immediate redeployment in 2010 would have pressured Prime Minister al-Maliki  at least to come to the table and, perhaps, to acquiesce in the democratic transfer of power. There are many moving parts in this labyrinth of the two rivers; Ariadne's thread may well have been snipped by now.  There are too many issues for me to be able to perceive and capture as well as far too many to describe here.  The priority now is not to panic and bail out al-Maliki. Instead, cooler minds, Muslim minds, must empower moderate and religiously tolerant Iraqis to squeeze this vanguard of the caliphate out of everyone’s misery. 

What we can not accept right now is the same old reasoning of President Obama that, since Americans are rightly fed-up with war, his administration need not do anything and wait for the problem simply to drift away.  That hasn’t worked in Iraq, Syria and Ukraine. The largely muted responses in these three cases have added up to a tendency toward appeasement, exciting bullies – Putinistas or blood-drunkards – to seize what they can, when they can, until 2017 (i.e., three years).

5 comments:

  1. PART ONE OF LETTER on SURGE and REFORM
    =======================================
    Friday, June 2, 2006
    The Honorable George W. Bush
    President
    The United States of America
    The White House
    1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20500

    Re Proposed Exit Solution for Coalition Forces in Iraq

    Dear President Bush,

    Thank you for the privilege of a ‘3161’ appointment to the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office of the Department of State. In Baghdad through October 2005, I served you for fourteen months. Today I write you in the hope of returning that favor by mapping out a strategy to ease the anguish you likely feel each day about the darkness rapidly descending upon Iraq.

    President Bush, three years after our liberation of Iraq, you confront a perplexing, tragic dilemma. On the one hand, a publicly announced but pre-mature withdrawal by U.S.-led Coalition forces will only encourage blood-drunk insurgents and sectarian vigilantes. Yet our ongoing presence alienates more Iraqis from a fragile democracy that cost 2,500 U.S. troops. We entered Iraq honorably; we have time, albeit limited, to leave in a like manner.

    Iraq’s destiny belongs to Iraq, not to the Coalition. A large majority of the Iraqi people now dismiss our military personnel as irrelevant to a burgeoning civil war. Widespread revulsion by Iraqis against the accidental shootings of their countrymen by U.S. troops clarifies that time is running out quickly. Our young people in uniform have been in harm’s way for too long. If you propose a plan that preserves democracy, lives and honor, Congress will support your initiative.

    If we mean to leave with honor, we must act quickly – by year’s end – to do so. Though six or seven months allow little time to act, with hard work, one day at a time, we can lay the foundation for a lasting legacy of life, liberty and prosperity in Iraq. And that future, richly earned by a beleaguered people, will vindicate your steadfast commitment to freedom and will honor America’s singular mission in the world.

    The United States military has acquitted itself well, extraordinarily well, in the face of relentless danger. When I worked in the U.S. Embassy, however, many political appointees and contractors wasted too much time protecting and prolonging lavish, if temporary, pay-checks. Prime Ministers Blair and Howard joined you in taking the moral initiative to remove Saddam Hussein and lift the sanctions in 2003. You deserve better results on the capacity-building side.

    The idea that our presence prevents civil war remains a seductive illusion in a country that has more AK-47s than adults. Such an endeavor will prove as fruitless as trying to persuade someone to quit smoking. No matter how vociferously we harangue somebody to kick the habit, that person will not do it until he or she is ready.

    The same element of human nature applies in Iraq today. If sectarian gangsters refuse to refrain from murder, the U.S. can no more prevent such bloodshed than can you or I prevail upon another person not to smoke. What we can do, however, is empower our Iraqi brethren to take control of their common, if currently clouded, destiny.

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  2. PART II of LETTER to PRESIDENT BUSH
    ================================
    President Bush; page-2

    The time has arrived for us to admit to the limits of our power and disengage constructively. lf we apply ourselves mightily to that effort, we can remedy problems of our own making and depart with honor. An outline of a two-part disengagement plan is attached. President Bush, I recommend that you dispatch me as a team leader to Iraq. Implementing the attached plan will bring our soldiers home while affording Iraqis a chance for building a peaceful democracy.

    Having worked with many people in Baghdad, I know highly qualified, highly motivated people who would serve again if they had your support in doing the next right thing for Americans and Iraqis alike. There are men and women as committed as or more dedicated than I; for example, as I write you this letter, a seventy year old gentleman is preparing to leave for Iraq to salvage U.S. leadership in restoring Baghdad’s capital markets.

    Do not expect my colleagues or me to spend much time in the International Zone, a place where many things get done but little gets accomplished. The team you send in will not generate PowerPoint presentations or Exel spreadsheets ad infinitum. We will produce results out in the field. We will risk our lives to get those elements in place for U.S. troops to depart with honor and for Iraq eventually to assume its place among stable democracies.

    In closing, President Bush, let me emphasize that the tasks ahead are not easy ones. The work will be hard, both for the Coalition and for the Iraqi people. You will have to make that clear by drawing on your greatest strength: your candor. By appealing directly to the American and Iraqi peoples and partnering with the U.S. Congress, you can harness what popular support remains for Operation Iraqi Freedom to triumph over terrorism for the benefit of free people, everywhere.

    Sir, I look forward to further contact with your colleagues. Together, we shall get our compatriots out. If need be, I can compose the first drafts of your statements to rally support for a concerted effort to set conditions right in Iraq. With your leadership, the vast number of Iraqis of every affiliation who cry out for peace and liberty can begin to banish the forces of terror and totalitarianism from their midst.

    Very truly yours,
    Edward J. McDonnell III, CFA


    Attachments / support documents enclosed:
    • outline for exit plan (three pages)
    • résumé (two pages); attachment of State Department security clearance (one page)
    • letter to editor of the New York Times and op-ed essay to which it responded (four pages)
    • PowerPoint presentation on private sector development in Iraq (forty-five pages)
    • plan for tree trade zone in Kurdistan (ten pages)
    • emergency economic development plan submitted to U.S.A.I.D. (four pages)
    • plan for police salary reform in Iraq (three pages)

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  3. PART III of PRESIDENT BUSH LETTER: 1st part of plan
    ========================================
    Brief Outline of Exit Plan; page-1

    Rationale for these plans to converge to allow Coalition forces to exit in six months:
    1. militias disarmed, or at least legally disbanded, and under surveillance;
    2. Iranian-backed militias disarmed, Iranian ascendancy over the bottom third of Iraq temporarily halted;
    3. neighborhood policing to combat the largest component of current civil disorder – a crime wave;
    4. further insinuation of Iranian surrogates and cross-border Sunni insurgents into the streets of Iraq slowed significantly or halted;
    5. oil reserves in Al Anbar proven and future investment negotiated to assure Sunni self-reliance in event of a national break-up or a federalist fragmentation;
    6. Iraqi Shi’ites consequently empowered to stand with Sunni loyalists to forestall Iranian influence permanently;
    7. high profitability for international banks from electronic banking in short run in exchange for treatment of electronic banking as a public utility in long run;
    8. legislation in place to open up capital flows and regional business arrangements through a Directorate of Private Sector Development.

    The three themes of this rationale – crime prevention, national sovereignty and economic development – are based on precedents in Afghanistan and New York City and on research I performed, almost always with the aid of others, in Baghdad.

    This plan rests on my perception of ‘ground-truth’ that diverges from current popular opinion. Iraq primarily suffers under the burdens of a crime-wave unaddressed, perhaps aggravated, by a compromised police force. The Ministry of Interior has been infiltrated by militias backed by Iran.

    If current polices continue, the Coalition is in danger of consigning the lower third of Iraq as a satellite state of Iran. While the governorates involved will remain nominally Iraqi, they will be – under the provisions of the current constitution – largely self-sufficient with the country’s richest oil fields under the covert control of Iran.

    This outcome would be harmful to U.S. and Iraqi interests. With oil development beginning in Al-Anbar, if large reserves are proven, Iraqi Shi’ites will be in a position to stand with their Sunni Arab brethren as they did in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.

    Trustworthy policemen, vetted and approved by local inhabitants, will empower Iraqi citizens to turn over the insurgents who are nothing more than people enjoying the blood-sport of – and financial gain from – killing, destruction, kidnapping and mayhem.

    This plan will save time, energy and money which can then be better allocated to Afghanistan to complete Operation Enduring Freedom in support of a tenuous democratic government under President Karzai.

    If the West can get Iraq and Afghanistan right, Iran will take care of itself. That is to say: the cosmopolitan urban population of Iran will be empowered to throw off the shackles of three decades of religious fascism. As a democracy, Iran will be less disposed toward meddling in the affairs of its traditional rival.

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  4. PART IV of BUSH LETTER; 2nd part of plan
    ==================================
    Brief Outline of Exit Plan; page-2
    POLICY: INTERNAL SECURITY

    Objective:
    Restore the professionalism of the Iraqi Security Forces to restore credibility of, and local co-operation for, the rule-of-law.

    Time Horizon Anticipated
    Three months after arrival of the proposed task-force in Iraq

    Resources Required
    1. 100,000 additional troops for six months;
    2. provisions and transportation arrangements for a peace-keeping force from neighboring Arab nations;
    3. the Iraqi Army and National Guard;
    4. sustainment for Iraqi troops to re-deploy into the cities;
    5. police instructors familiar with gang control and neighborhood policing in the United States;
    6. temporary detention facilities for up to 50,000 police commandoes who resist surrender of weapons;
    7. 6,500 Iraqi citizens willing to serve on neighborhood police boards for 600-700 stations scattered across the country; and,
    8. up to $150 million for severance payments to Iraqi police relieved of duty.

    Resources Available
    • biographic / metric data compiled on up to 180,000 employees of the Ministry of Interior;
    • newly organized and vetted Iraqi Army;
    • element of surprise; and,
    • approximately 180,000 Coalition military personnel.

    Recommended Actions
    1st: Working with selected Sunni-Arab units in the Iraqi Army, Coalition units surround the ministry of Interior commando units and Public Order Battalions and relieve them of their weapons.
    2nd: Working with selected Shi’ite units in the National Guard, surround Sunni militias in the Iraqi Army and relieve them of their weapons and place any who resist into temporary detention facilities.
    3rd: Relieve every Ministry of Interior employee of duty with one month’s pay and inform these people they may re-apply for positions in one week.
    4th: Liquidate the Commando units and Public Order Battalions within the Ministry of Interior.
    5th: Rehire those policemen who apply and earn the approval of neighborhood vetting committees.
    6th: Re-hired officers take an oath foreswearing future affiliation with a militia.
    7th: Train rehired officers in the basics of neighborhood policing to engage with the local residents.
    8th: Maintain surveillance on former officers who do not re-apply or do not meet with local approval.
    9th: Iraqi Army to re-deploy as police for one month.
    10th: Arab peace-keeping force to secure borders in Army’s absence.
    11th: Arab peace-keeping forces replace Coalition troops as the latter leave Iraq
    12th: Outfit a peace-keeping force with 20,000 troops.

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  5. PART V of LETTER in 2006; 3rd part of plan
    ==================================
    Brief Outline of Exit Plan; page-3

    POLICY: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT and SUSTAINMENT

    Objective:
    Align government resources on an emergency basis to open lines of communications and funding for all levels of Iraqi society and to realize future self-sufficiency on local levels.

    Time Horizon Anticipated
    Three Months after the attainment of internal security objective. NOTE: the objective is to establish the programs and clarify the mechanics; Iraqis will attain their longer term policy goals over the next five to ten years.

    Resources Required
    1. petrochemical engineers;
    2. public-private sector leaders;
    3. emergency fast-track legislative authority;
    4. up to $100 million for economic initiatives including:
    • proving oil reserves;
    • establishing trade zones;
    • opening urban business development centers;
    • unifying rural market clusters;
    • funding micro-loan programs; and,
    5. security personnel to deploy to Al Anbar.

    Resources Available
    • unused funds for failed programs inside the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office for micro-loans and middle-market loans;
    • O.P.E.C. Council and Gulf Co-operation Council;
    • investment pool of Iraqi diaspora in Jordan; and,
    • international banks willing to enter the country.

    Recommended Actions
    1st: Declare an Economic State of Emergency, granting fast-track legislative prerogative to a Directorate of Private Sector Development for specified time.
    2nd: Populate the Commission overseeing Directorate with carefully selected business, civic, religious and government leaders.
    3rd: Limit legislative mandate to specified economic matters.
    6th: Make fast-track legislation permanent if not repealed by two-thirds of Parliament within ninety days.
    4th: Expand current U.S.A.I.D. and establish new micro-loan programs funded by donor aid (e.g., from the Madrid conference) as seed capital.
    5th: Grant cartel-pricing power for electronic funds transfer and banking with Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, National Bank of Kuwait and two other global banks.
    6th: Set up electronic banking first among the four banks to facilitate international investment and implement top-down money-laundering controls.
    6th: Roll out electronic funds transfer to regional State-owned banks in one year and to local banks within five years.
    7th: Prove the existence of the 100 billion barrels of oil thought to lie under the desert of Al Anbar.
    8th: Recruit Iraqi diaspora in Sunni countries to lead the formation of an investment syndicate for developing the oil fields in Al Anbar (if they exist).

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